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ABSTRACT
Gutierrez, Christopher N. Ph.D., Purdue University, December 2017. Deceptive
Memory Systems. Major Professors: Eugene H. Spa↵ord and Saurabh Bagchi.
Unauthorized data destruction results in a loss of digital information and services,
a devastating issue for society and commerce that rely on the availability and integrity
of such systems. Remote adversaries who seek to destroy or alter digital information
persistently study the protection mechanisms and craft attacks that circumvent defense mechanisms such as data back-up or recovery.
This dissertation evaluates the use of deception to enhance the preservation of
data under the threat of unauthorized data destruction attacks. The motivation for
the proposed solution is two-fold. (i) An honest and consistent view of the preservation mechanisms are observable and often controlled from within the system under
protection, allowing the adversary to identify an appropriate attack for the given system. (ii) The adversary relies on some underlying I/O system to facilitate destruction
and assumes that the components operate according to a conﬁrmation bias based on
prior interactions with similar systems. A deceptive memory system (DecMS) masks
the presence of data preservation and mimics a system according to the adversary’s
conﬁrmation bias.
Two proofs of concepts and several destructive threat instances evaluate the feasibility of a DecMS. The ﬁrst proof of concept, DecMS-Kernel, uses rootkits’ stealth
mechanisms to mask the presence of DecMS and impede potential destructive writes
to enable preservation of data before destruction. The experimental results show that
DecMS is e↵ective against two common secure delete tools and an application that
mimics crypto ransomware methods.

xii
Based on the results of DecMS-Kernel, several improvements are incorporated into
a DecMS that uses virtual machine introspection. DecMS-VMI places the preservation mechanism out of reach from the system under protection. The virtual machine
under protection does not undergo any changes or need additional software to support
the deception, thus improving stealthiness. The results for DecMS-VMI demonstrate
the ability to preserve data under a wide range of destructive methods: 13 di↵erent
secure delete methods, four wiper malware, and one timestamp fabrication tool. Under both prototype systems, all of the detected data under destruction is successfully
preserved. The overall results indicate that it is feasible to create deceptive systems
to enhance data preservation methods on interactive computing systems.
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1 INTRODUCTION
In the information age, digital data is a critical asset. When adversaries destroy digital
information, it is challenging to recover it without a copy stored elsewhere. Physical
security can prevent adversaries from physically destroying storage devices. However,
it is possible to create malicious software to destroy data on a persistent storage
medium1 . Early examples date back to 1988 with programs such as the Jerusalem
Virus, which destroyed ﬁles on Fridays that fall on the 13th of each month [1]. Such
malware is referred to as wiper malware because it destroys ﬁles and makes them
unrecoverable. In the present day, loss of data, through an adversarial attack on
data availability, utility, and integrity [2], is more than a nuisance and can cause
substantial damage.
In 2017, high proﬁle Wiper Malware, such as Shamoon and Stonedrill, have been
responsible for the destruction of ﬁles on many tens of thousands of computer systems
[3] [4]. In August 2012, the Shamoon Wiper Malware destroyed critical system ﬁles
and digital documents on about 30,000 corporate computers at Saudi Aramco [3].
The US Secretary of Defense at the time, Leon E. Panetta, stated that the a↵ected
machines “were rendered useless” and that “the Shamoon virus was probably the
most destructive attack that the private sector has seen to date” [5]. Wiper malware
target critical systems, such as those connected to the energy sector to cause power
outages [6].
Once an attacker gains access to a system, ﬁles are at risk for unauthorized data
destruction. Frequently modiﬁed user ﬁles, such as documents, images, or spreadsheets, are targets for data destruction attacks. Adversaries may also target ﬁles that
require e↵ort to replace, such as operating system ﬁles that are necessary for system
1

A persistent storage medium is a device to store information that persists between machine
reboot cycles.
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stability and operation [6]. Destroying OS kernel ﬁles causes a system to become
unbootable, requiring the system administrators to rebuild the system.
Common among all software data destruction attacks is the reliance on underlying
system components to facilitate I/O requests. Both adversaries and users rely on several layers of abstraction that translates a semantic I/O request (such as writing to a
named ﬁle on a ﬁle system) into machine code that controls the hardware components
of a computing system. Both users and adversaries assume that the underlying layers
work correctly to handle I/O requests. The system defenders can use the adversary’s
conﬁrmation bias [7] to deceive.
In particular, this work proposes and evaluates Deceptive Memory Systems (DecMS) to enhance the protection of digital assets located on ﬁle systems under the
threat of unauthorized data destruction. DecMS relies on existing security monitoring
techniques which observe suspicious activity. Rather than denying suspicious writes
that appear to be destructive, a DecMS system attempts to deceive an attacker into
believing her destructive actions are successful while providing the system defenders
with valuable information about the attacker.
Prior work in deception for defending computing systems relies upon isolated systems to lure attackers away from real systems. However, there are several advantages
to deceive an adversary [7] who is conducting unauthorized data destruction on real
systems. If the defenders can preserve the data under destruction without the adversary’s knowledge, the defenders gain information about the adversary’s targets and
motivation. The defender observes the adversary from the context of a real system
rather than a honeypot system that may contain synthetic data, users, and context.
System defenders can craft deception into production systems to fool an adversary
into incorrectly believing that destructive actions are damaging real protection systems.
Some data destruction attacks bring systems o✏ine as quickly as possible. Another
viable deceptive strategy is to impede the speed of destructive actions. Forcing the
adversary to slow down provides a strategic advantage, allowing the system defenders
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more time to react appropriately to an adversary. The system defenders may choose
to impede the attacker while preserving the data under destruction in an isolated
location.
Existing methods to recover from or mitigate unauthorized data destruction fall
short in several ways. Data replication, such as a complete replica of a storage device,
is taken periodically. An adversary can destroy data between backups, causing a loss
of information. Some ﬁle systems track all changes and allow users or system administrators to recover from an accidental loss of data. However, several of these systems
are not resilient to adversaries who disable the backup schemes before destroying
data. Other techniques attempt to recover data after destruction occurs, which are
time-consuming, expensive, or unreliable in retrieving the data [8]. Integrity monitoring may be difficult to maintain on user ﬁles that frequently change and are targets
for destructive adversaries. Access control also fails to protect against unauthorized
data destruction. The adversary may gain a high level of privilege before executing
the destruction or may target user-level ﬁles, which may be difficult to replace.
The deceptive strategies explored in this dissertation are not alternatives to the
existing data preservation and security monitoring techniques, but instead, enhance
existing techniques through the use of deception. The system defenders may choose
to deny an adversary’s data destruction action or may use other data preservation
strategies, such as periodic backups of user ﬁles. However, this dissertation focuses
on the design and use of deception to enhance protection against data destruction
attacks.

1.1 Thesis Statement
It is feasible to use deception to enhance the preservation of digital assets against
unauthorized data destruction.
The dissertation demonstrates the feasibility by designing and implementing a
proof of concept system that monitors for destructive writes, preserve the data un-
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der destruction, and presenting a false reality to the adversary that indicates her
destructive actions are successful.

1.2 DecMS Goals
Throughout this thesis document, the experiments are designed to demonstrate
the following enhancements:
DecMS Preservation Goal It is possible to preserve digital assets when destruction occurs;
DecMS Impedance Goal It is possible to impede data destruction to provide time
for defenses mechanisms to adjust;
DecMS Reduction Goal It is possible to reduce the e↵ectiveness of data destruction attacks;
DecMS Identiﬁcation Goal It is possible to gain information about adversary
motivations by identifying targets for data destruction.
A successful proof of concept for any of the ﬁrst three enhancement goals will
demonstrate the feasibility of DecMS. The ﬁnal goal, DecMS Identiﬁcation Goal, is
a secondary enhancement that will provide a beneﬁt for system defenders. Evidence
of feasibility for the enhancement goals is given for each proof of concept system
considered.

1.2.1 Preserve
Rather than denying a potential destructive write, the action can appear successful
from the adversary’s perspective. The deception must persist throughout the attack
to observe all of the targets of an adversary. However, the data under destruction
must also be preserved to recover from an attack quickly. The preservation of data is
deceptive and is an action taken at the end of the attacker’s OODA loop but before
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the attacker can observe if the destructive action is successful. The DecMS proof
of concept preserves data under destruction and hides the existence of the preserve
data.

1.2.2 Impede
Several attacks attempt to destroy data quickly to prevent system defenders reacting to data destruction. There are advantages to slowing the attacker down to
allow the system defender time to reconﬁgure the system and mitigate the severity
of an oncoming attack.
Impedance allows more time for the system defenders to orient, decide, and act to
subsequent unauthorized data destruction attempts. During the unauthorized data
destruction, the DecMS proof of concept system impedes the unauthorized writing
of ﬁles to preserve the data under destruction without the adversary’s knowledge.
Impedance in the DecMS proof of concept system demonstrates the feasibility of
slowing down a threat to allow the defender to observe and act on unauthorized data
destruction.

1.2.3 Reduce
If an adversary is aware that the data destruction methods are not successful,
then she may adjust her strategy. The defender’s deception feeds false information to
mislead the adversary into believing her data destruction is successful. The deception
causes the adversary to incorrectly orient, decide, and act on subsequent unauthorized
data destruction attempts, reducing the e↵ectiveness of her techniques. In the DecMS
proof of concept system, the feasibility of protecting against several data destruction
attacks is demonstrated.
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1.2.4 Identify
Rather than denying suspicious behavior, the defenders may choose to learn about
an adversary by observing what the attacker is attempting to destroy. The conﬁguration of the system deceives the attacker into believing her data destruction methods
are useful while the defenders observe her actions. Identifying the targets of data
destruction allows system defenders to learn about their adversaries and react more
quickly to threats that follow a similar attack strategy. The information gained may
help protect other systems more quickly than capturing samples and conducting a
static or dynamic analysis. The motivation for the Identify Goal is that the portion
of attackers who can quickly break into systems is much higher than the portion of
defenders who can quickly discover breaches on their systems [9].
If the system suspects unauthorized data destruction for speciﬁc ﬁles, then the
system can react accordingly. Deception for defense provides an advantage in the
Observe, Orient, Decide, and Act loop (OODA) [7]. The deceptions may cause the
adversary to act incorrectly or induce confusion to slow down the decision process.
The Identify goal is relevant to the observation step in the OODA loop because
the defenders gain threat intelligence regarding targeted ﬁles. The DecMS proof of
concept system demonstrates feasibility by collecting the data assets that adversaries
target for data destruction and runtime information such as the process that requests
the destructive write.

1.3 Contributions
1. Chapter 3.2 describes the deceptive planning necessary to support a DecMS
System. In particular, the deceptive beneﬁts, risks, and potential impact of
using a DecMS System are detailed. Several types of computing systems are
potentially suitable for DecMS enhancement, and the impact on performance
is detailed.
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2. Chapter 4.1 details the various methods to integrate DecMS within a computing
system. Various layers of abstraction, deceptive strategies, and a discussion on
the advantages/disadvantages are provided.
3. Chapter 6.1 evaluates a DecMS system through the use of kernel modules to
enhance system calls relating to I/O. The results indicate that it is possible to
protect against data destruction and hide from the adversaries through the use
of several stealth techniques.
4. Chapter 6.2 evaluates a DecMS System by enhancing virtual machine monitoring by observing for data destruction indicators. The proposed system can
successfully protect against various data destruction techniques. The systems
also demonstrate an e↵ective attacker impedance to provide additional time for
adjusting defense strategies.
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2 BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
In 1965, Daley and Neumann [10] described a general purpose ﬁle system, which
organizes ﬁles through a hierarchy of directories. References to ﬁles within the ﬁle
system are done so through symbolic references rather than their physical location on
the storage device. Directories are containers of ﬁles (or other directories), and a ﬁle
is an ordered sequence of data elements (e.g., bits, words, and characters). An entry
name references a ﬁle or directory. An entry name that points to a ﬁle is called a
branch, which also contains additional information about a ﬁle. Branch information
(henceforward referred to as metadata), consists of information about a ﬁle, such as
the physical address (location) of the ﬁle on the storage medium, and the creation or
modiﬁcation time of the ﬁle, and other information about the state of the ﬁle.
Daley and Neumann’s work inspired several ﬁle systems such as New Technology
File System (NTFS), the File Allocation Table File System (FAT), Hierarchical File
System (HFS), and Extended File System (ext), to name a few. All of the above ﬁle
systems organize ﬁles through a hierarchy of directories, consist of ﬁles, and contain
metadata.
This thesis considers the protection against unauthorized data destruction on
digital assets stored ﬁle systems. Further, the scope of data destruction is limited
to software mechanisms that render data unrecoverable and does not consider the
physical destruction of data (e.g., pulverizing a hard drive). A device controller may
provide a method to destroy (also referred to as data sanitization) the contents of
the entire drive [11,12]. However, initiating the data sanitization may be inaccessible
adversaries because it may require physical access or access to the Basic Input-Output
System (BIOS) or Uniﬁed Extensible Firmware Interface (UEFI) [11]. This thesis
does not consider attackers who have physical access or access to data sanitization
methods on persistent storage devices.
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Software data destruction is the overwriting of a digital asset such that the digital
asset is no longer recoverable. A digital asset is any information related to accessing
the ﬁle (including symbolic references, ﬁle system data structures, or directories), ﬁle
metadata, or the ﬁle itself. Unauthorized data destruction can be partial or complete
such that it produces a loss of information either temporarily or permanently. There
are a variety of techniques for unauthorized data destruction. For instance, a threat
may overwrite data arbitrarily to make data assets unavailable or replace data with
misleading information to trick users. In Section 2.2, a description of the threat space
is given.
Before describing the threat space, a discussion of the data assets that need protection is necessary. As computing resources are bounded, some information may have
priority for preservation over other data assets. The severity of unauthorized data
destruction is dependent on the importance and e↵ort necessary to replace or repair
the ﬁle. Several ﬁles, such as software binaries, are easily replaced because of online
software distribution. Binaries for widely deployed software are available through
various software repositories, such as the Advance Package Tool (APT) for Debian
Linux1 . User-produced ﬁles are difficult to replace if no backup copy is available.

2.1 Digital Assets to Protect
Digital assets are any ﬁles within a persistent storage medium, organized by a
ﬁle system, and accessed through an operating system via a set of system calls. A
ﬁle system is an organized structure of ﬁles on the storage medium and consists of
metadata, directories, and the ﬁles. Programming interfaces use a ﬁle system to
translate the logical organization of the ﬁles (directory path and ﬁle name) to a
physical location on the storage medium.
Unauthorized data destruction may target any of the above components. A ﬁle
may become unavailable if the ﬁle system data structures are corrupted or destroyed.
1

https://wiki.debian.org/Apt
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Metadata, which contains information about a ﬁle, may also be a target of data
destruction. File destruction may occur without modifying the metadata or ﬁle system, allowing the ﬁle to be accessible from the operating system but may produce
unexpected results.
The e↵ort to recover from data destruction is dependent on the preparation before
destruction occurs. As storage space is ﬁnite, ﬁles are prioritized based on importance
and ease of replacement if destruction occurs. Attackers also consider the ease of
replacement when identifying digital assets for destruction.
For illustrative purposes and henceforward, threats target two categories of assets:
Replaceable Asset (RA), and Non-Replaceable Asset (NRA). The deﬁnition of NRAs
are assets that only exist within a given system and not replicated elsewhere. Examples of NRAs may include user created media ﬁles such as digital images and videos,
or system log ﬁles. The deﬁnition of RAs are ﬁles that are replicated elsewhere and
readily accessible to users or system administrators. Examples of RAs include ﬁles
such as widely deployed system libraries or applications.
Note that RAs and NRAs are perceptions that are subject to change based on
(mis)information available. An attacker may destroy a backup copy of a ﬁle, causing
the system administrator to misperceive an RA. A ﬁle that a system administrator
believes to be RA is in fact NRA. Likewise, a system administrator may mislead an
attacker into believing that she is destroying NRAs but is wasting e↵ort by destroying
RAs. The latter example is explored in subsequent sections and is fundamental in
deceiving a destructive adversary.
The perception of RAs and NRAs guides the strategies an attacker chooses in
data destruction. The destruction of RAs requires less e↵ort to recover compared
to the destruction of NRAs. However, the attacker may decide to target RAs for
other motivations, such as hiding the presence of ﬁles, compromising authenticity.
Another possible motivation is to render the target system unusable by overwriting
RAs that are necessary for system stability, jeopardizing the utility of the operating
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system. Authenticity and utility are some security elements that unauthorized data
destruction threaten. Other threats and deﬁnitions of security elements are below.

2.2 Threat Space
The Parkerian Hexad is a framework which describes security with six elements:
Availability, Utility, Integrity, Authenticity, Conﬁdentiality, and Possession, each of
which are deﬁned by Parker [2]. While data destruction, in conjunction with other
malicious actions, can compromise any combination of the six elements of the Parkerian Hexad [2], this dissertation deﬁnes data destruction as the loss of at least one of
the security elements, with emphasis on the necessary conditions.
The last two elements listed above, conﬁdentiality and possession, are not necessary for unauthorized data destruction. A loss of Conﬁdentiality requires more than
data destruction. A breach of conﬁdentiality requires an attacker to read conﬁdential
information. However, an attacker could destroy data without reading the data. A
loss of Possession overlaps with a loss of the other four remaining security elements.
As previously deﬁned, data destruction overwrites data assets to produce a loss of
information. Therefore, the information at the location where the attacker overwrites
always results in a loss of Possession of that given information. The loss of possession,
henceforward, is implicit if not otherwise mentioned.
For each of the remaining four security elements, a brief description or summary
is given from “Toward a New Framework for Information Security?” [2]. Examples
for each security element are provided and are formulated with minimal overlap to
illustrate the threat boundaries of the data destruction. In practice, data destruction
combines the loss of a combination of security elements, which is discussed in Section
2.3.
Data destruction causes a loss in availability when, at the minimum, the overwrite
causes a misplacement of information. In Loss Scenario 1 [2], Parker illustrates a loss
of availability, without su↵ering a loss to other security elements, by an adversary
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who renames a ﬁle without notifying valid users. When the attacker causes a loss in
availability for RAs such as drivers or kernel objects, a system may become unusable
until replacing or repairing the given ﬁles. A loss of availability on a NRAs is overcome
by methods to uncover or search for the misplaced ﬁle. Other examples include typical
uses of a delete command that cause a ﬁle to be misplaced.
The loss of authenticity through unauthorized data destruction causes, at the
minimum, misleading information. Data assets should remain consistent between
valid use. Unauthorized changes to a ﬁle that replaces information are misleading
because it violates the user’s perception of the ﬁle. Misleading information may
not cause a substantial loss in the other three security elements considered for data
destruction, as illustrated in Parker’s Loss Scenario 4 [2]. To clarify, overwriting
portions of ﬁles with misleading information always causes a partial loss of availability
and integrity. The overwritten parts of the ﬁle are no longer available. The data asset
also su↵ers a loss of integrity because the missing portions leave the ﬁle in a state
that is incomplete.
Replacing ﬁle metadata may produce misleading information, but the ﬁle itself
could still be available, have integrity, and have utility. For NRAs, it may be difficult
to recover the original data without replicating the original data. In practice, correlation analysis can help overcome misleading information. For instance, ﬁle timestamp
metadata can be cross-checked with application logs to help clarify misleading timestamp information [13].
The loss of integrity occurs when, at the minimum, a destructive action produces
incomplete information. Parker [2] illustrates in Scenario 3 that the other three security elements (authenticity, availability, and utility) may not su↵er a loss when
integrity is lost. For NRAs, it may be difficult to recover portions of the ﬁles without replications. Cryptographic checksums can help determine if a ﬁle is complete.
However, the creation of the checksum must occur before an attacker alters the ﬁle.
Further, the checksums must be in isolation from the attacker. Mechanisms such as
like Tripwire [14] can help detect a loss of integrity and other security elements.

13
The loss of utility occurs when, at the minimum, information is transformed then
replaced. Information transformation may have minimal impact on other security
elements. Parker illustrated in Loss Scenario 2 [2], that it is possible to lose utility,
through unauthorized encryption of ﬁles, without su↵ering a loss of other security
elements. Some loss of utility is recoverable for NRA if the attacker uses a poorly
implemented or weak encryption algorithm. For instance, an attacker may fail to
adequately destroy the decryption key, allowing the system administrator to recover
the key and decrypt the transformed data.
The recovery from unauthorized data destruction for NRAs is dependent on the
speciﬁc techniques that the attackers use.

2.3 Data Destruction Methods
There are several data destruction methods to consider. The work presented
considers software data destruction where the physical device is usable, but the data
is no longer available to the user. The data destruction methods may overwrite the
data within the ﬁle itself, the metadata associated with the ﬁle, or any symbolic
information that references the physical location of the ﬁle on the storage medium.

2.3.1 Delete
The deﬁnition of delete is “To remove or obliterate a record or item of data, such
as by overwriting data on disk or tape with new data or null characters” [15]. A
distinction between removing a record and removing an item is necessary. A record
is a reference that points to the location of a ﬁle within the ﬁle system. File deletion
overwrites the symbolic references (i.e., records) to speciﬁc ﬁle points to the physical
location on the storage medium.
The distinction is necessary. Deleting a ﬁle does not typically overwrite the contents of a ﬁle. A deletion typically overwrites the record that points to the location
of the ﬁle on the physical media. “Modern ﬁle systems associate the deletion of a ﬁle
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with the release of the storage related to that ﬁle” [16]. As the record that references
the ﬁle is overwritten, the ﬁle is no longer accessible from the ﬁle system. The actual contents of the ﬁle exist within the storage medium but are inaccessible without
special software that scans portions of the disks that are considered free.
Deleting a ﬁle may still cause issues for a user. The inability to ﬁnd a ﬁle may cause
system instability. For instance, removing shared libraries or the binaries necessary
for booting the operating system may cause the system to be inaccessible until the
deleted ﬁles are replace or “undeleted.” The deﬁnition of undelete is to restore a ﬁle
previously deleted [17]. If the deleted ﬁle is a NRA, then it may be necessary to use
“undelete” tools to recover the deleted ﬁle, which is discussed in Section 2.5.3.
The e↵ect of deletion is that a user who wishes to access the deleted ﬁle will require
additional e↵ort. Data deletion is an attack on the availability security element.
The deletion causes a loss of availability of a ﬁle or may cause a system to become
unavailable if critical system ﬁles are deleted.

2.3.2 Secure Delete
In addition to or an alternative to unlinking a ﬁle from the ﬁle system, secure
delete overwrites the entire ﬁle so that the undelete tools cannot recover any portion
of the ﬁle. Secure deletion is necessary to preserve privacy. Certain ﬁles may contain
sensitive information, so they are securely deleted to ensure that the information
within a ﬁle is no longer available. However, when combining secure delete with
unauthorized data destruction, the results may be devastating.
To completely remove a ﬁle from a system, one must consider several other components of a system, such as the physical storage medium, data replication, caches,
hardware/software redundancy, ﬁle system, or metadata [18]. The National Institute
of Science (NIST) provides guidelines for secure deletion of data concerning the type
of physical media in question [11].
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The NIST recommendation includes overwriting portions of memory with random
bits, several times, depending on the storage medium. Alternatively, secure data deletion could also write over portions of memory with a ﬁxed pattern such as all zeros, all
ones, or some predeﬁned pattern. This approach achieves secure data deletion without physical access to the storage space and without destroying the physical medium.
However, the NIST recommendations consider the type of physical medium to ensure
the destruction of residual data that may be present. For example, for magnetic storage devices, NIST recommends that several rounds of random bits be overwritten to
render recovery with magnetic analysis impossible [11]. Some algorithms for secure
deletion are detailed by the United States Defense Security Service [19, Section 4.4]
and Schneier [20].
Methods to securely delete data assets are typically available for users. However,
the secure delete method may not overwrite all the possible locations of a data asset
[18]. File system and data caches may complicate secure deletion if the goal is to
remove data assets from a system completely. The attacker must over-write the
logical storage location of the data object as well as temporary locations where the
data object may reside. Section 2.5.3 brieﬂy describes how ﬁle caches and other
systems may help in the restoration of destroyed data assets.
Another method to securely delete data is to use a “free-space ﬁlling” service [12,
18] that periodically identiﬁes unallocated portions of a storage device and overwrite
the free space rendering the data within the free space unrecoverable. An attacker
who wishes to destroy data only needs to delete (e.g., unlink from the ﬁle system)
and wait, or initiate, the free-space ﬁlling tool.
The overall process is similar to both delete and secure delete action with a different order of execution. Usually, the secure delete over-write occurs ﬁrst before
deleting the ﬁle. The Free-space ﬁlling tools delete the ﬁle ﬁrst and then overwrites
the space that it occupies. The di↵erence between space ﬁlling tools and secure
delete is delete-then-wipe (disk-ﬁlling tools) as opposed to a wipe-then-delete (secure
delete). The minor distinction, henceforward, is ignored and will both be referred
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to as “secure delete” as it has negligible impact in designing defense and deception
systems to protect against unauthorized data destruction.
Secure delete causes a loss of availability, utility, and integrity. A securely deleted
ﬁle is no longer available because the ﬁle is unlinked from the ﬁle system. Further,
in addition to causing the ﬁle to go missing, the securely deleted ﬁle has no utility.
Irrelevant information replaces the ﬁle. As the securely deleted ﬁle is not whole, the
ﬁle su↵ers a loss of integrity. Secure delete, on its own, is not designed to mislead
the user. However, replacing the ﬁle with information, rather than securely deleting,
causes a loss of authenticity.

2.3.3 Data Replacement
An adversary may securely delete data objects that a forensic examiner can use as
evidence of illegal activities. However, that is apparent when secure delete methods
destroy ﬁles on a storage medium [21]. Rather than replacing the ﬁle with randomly
distributed bits or other bit patterns, the attacker may replace the data.
Data replacement is advantageous for the attacker. Data replacement is more
stealthy than typical secure delete methods, especially if the replaced data appears
to be innocuous or indistinguishable from valid user data. Further, it may allow the
attacker to place misleading information to confuse or deceive a user. For instance,
ﬁle system metadata such as timestamps are critical for a forensic examiner to create
a timeline of illegal activities. An adversary may change the timestamp metadata
to obfuscate the order of events that took place or to cover evidence of ﬁle access or
modiﬁcation.
An attacker may use tools such as timestomp 2 , an anti-forensic tool that replaces
ﬁle system timestamp metadata with fabricated date and time entries. Timestamp
fabrication can increase the difficulty for the forensic investigator. Data fabrication
2

https://www.offensive-security.com/metasploit-unleashed/timestomp/
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is an attempt to impede the examination process, thus wasting time, money, or
personnel resources [22].
Data replacement causes a loss of authenticity at the minimum. Replacing timestamp metadata may mislead forensic analysts into believing a false chronologic order
of ﬁle modiﬁcation. Data replacement, when used with secure delete, may deceive
the system defenders. If the replaced data is similar to free space on the disk, the
defender may not be aware of the missing data assets. The data that is overwritten
su↵ers a loss of availability, as mentioned in Section 2.2.

2.3.4 Transformation
Data transformation obscures data objects. The transformation may be benign,
such as data compression to save storage space, or to hide from observation, such as
encryption. When combining with data replacement and unauthorized data destruction, the results can lead to a loss of utility.
An example of unauthorized data destruction through transformation is crypto
ransomware. Crypto ransomware [23, 24] replaces the data object with an encrypted
version of the data. The encryption key is not available to the owner of the ﬁle, but
rather, the key is in possession by an adversary. If the attacker is successful, the user
is forced to pay extortion to recover the ﬁles. Other transformation techniques, such
as steganography, can also transform data to produce a loss of utility. The attacker
possesses the extraction key and may extort the owner to recover the original ﬁle.
Files may also be transformed and replaced to appear to be corrupt, but in reality,
are corrupted by an attacker. Data transformation can be combined with the other
destruction techniques to produce a combination of a loss of security elements.

2.4 Data Destruction in Anti-Forensics
The adversary’s ultimate goal of anti-forensics is to minimize the forensic quality
and quantity of incriminating information [25]. An attacker may use anti-forensics to
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induce doubt and confusion through the use of fabricated evidence [26,27], resulting in
a loss of authenticity, integrity, or utility. Reducing the quantity of forensic evidence
is a loss of availability or integrity.
Anti-forensics may also be designed to increase the difficulty of forensic analysis,
relative to the resources available. Rather than replacing or altering evidence, an
attacker may place additional false evidence. The di↵erence is that the addition of
evidence does not necessarily destroy data assets of interest 3 . The forensic investigator must then distinguish between fabricated and truthful evidence. This thesis
e↵ort does not consider cases of false evidence that do not destroy data.
Anti-forensics overlaps with unauthorized data destruction. The di↵erence is that
anti-forensics is the destruction or the alteration of evidence that indicates malfeasance. Unauthorized data destruction may have alternative goals or motivations,
such as removing the availability or utility of data assets. Both unauthorized data
destruction and anti-forensics may produce a loss of integrity, availability, utility, or
authenticity, but the di↵erence in motivation guides the selection of data assets to
protect and the policies to enforce.

2.5 Defending Against Unauthorized Data Destruction
There are several methods to defend against unauthorized data destruction. For
each method, a description of the protection method is given. A short discussion is
also present which details the limitations to protect against certain types of unauthorized data destruction attacks.

2.5.1 Access Control
To limit the unauthorized destruction of a ﬁle, access control “protects shared resources against unauthorized accesses [...] according to an access control policy” [28].
3

The false evidence placed on persistent storage may overwrite previously deleted data assets of
interest
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Access control may enforce one of the Parkerian security elements, such as conﬁdentiality (read permission) or integrity (write permission). For unauthorized data
destruction, integrity models such as the Biba Integrity model [29] or the Clark and
Wilson model [30] are relevant. Integrity Models protect unauthorized modiﬁcations
of data assets by explicitly assigning integrity levels for both subjects (e.g., users) and
objects (e.g., data assets). Integrity levels for subjects are e↵ectively the trustworthiness that a subject will properly modify an object [31]. However, it is difficult to be
certain that an application on a computing system is trustworthy [32]. Both subjects
and object integrity levels must be properly deﬁned to protect against unauthorized
data modiﬁcation e↵ectively.
Ultimately, if the attacker can gain the highest level of privilege, access control
methods may fail. Other methods, such as data preservation or recovery strategies
can help mitigate against cases where attackers gain high levels of access. Nonetheless,
an attacker may cause signiﬁcant damage even without a high level of access. For
instance, an attacker who has access to a shared directory may destroy ﬁles, causing
a loss of availability for other users. A malicious user within the group may securely
delete a ﬁle, causing a loss of availability to other users in the group. Tricking a user
to run a malicious application is another attack vector that can cause a loss of data.
A malicious application may run at the same level of access to the user who ran the
application, allowing the malicious application to destroy user-owned ﬁles.
Some systems may prevent overwriting altogether, even if the user gains high
levels of privilege. For instance, immutable and append-only ﬁles [33, Chapter 20]
or write-once, read-many (WORM) storage media [12] only allow ﬁle-appending and
no other type of write access. An attacker cannot overwrite any information on
immutable write-only systems. The immutability may be enforced by disabling the
access permission modiﬁcation or through the use of storage media that does not
allow overwriting of ﬁles, such as optical disks [12].
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2.5.2 Data Preservation Strategies
Mitigation and recovery strategies for unauthorized data destruction consists of
data replication and data logging. If successful, either strategy can reduce the severity
of unauthorized data destruction by recovering data that su↵ers a loss of Parkerian
Hexad security elements.
The data replication strategy consists of replicating data in a location that is
isolated from the attacker. If a ﬁle su↵ers a loss of integrity, availability, utility, or
authenticity, the replicated data can replace or repair the ﬁle in question. Observing
for invalid changes to a ﬁle may also help detect unauthorized data destruction.
The data logging strategy achieves the same goals with an alternative approach.
All changes to ﬁles are saved and indexed. If at some point a loss of a security element
is observed, the changes to the ﬁles are reverted to a valid state.

Data Replication
Data replication strategies deﬁne data objects to be preserved and therefore replace ﬁles if they succumb to a destructive attacker. As long as the adversary does not
have access to the backup storage medium or the systems that manage the backups,
the ﬁles in the backup are considered RA.
There are several systems to create replicates of data objects for recoverability
purposes in case of destructive adversaries or accidental destruction. However, unless otherwise noted, these systems are designed for accidental destruction, or hardware/software failures and often fail to protect against motivated adversaries who
seek to destroy data.
Chervenak et al. [34] survey backup techniques for ﬁle systems and serves as the
foundation for the subsequent section. Deﬁnitions for each system from [34] are
given, and advantages/disadvantages of each backup technique under the threat of
unauthorized data destruction is detailed.
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A full or incremental backup replicates the entire storage medium to a backup
location, usually stored separately from the original [34]. In the case that a system
su↵ers a loss, the backup is referenced to recover ﬁles. Incremental backups create
copies of data that have changed from a prior backup, which saves storage space
relative to a full backup.
Full and incremental backups are viable when a system su↵ers a loss in integrity,
availability, or utility for user ﬁles or some system ﬁles that are infrequently updated.
Another advantage is that full or incremental backups can complement other data
backup systems. A copy of a storage medium placed o↵site can supplement local
backups if the attacker can compromise local backups. The o↵site copy may require
the attacker to compromise additional systems or have physical access to the backup
copy to destroy data.
The creation of full or incremental backups is periodic, which the adversary may
consider when destroying data. The adversary may compromise a security element
between the creation of backups. A most recent backup copy of frequently modiﬁed
ﬁles may not exist if the ﬁle is created and destroyed between a full or incremental
backup. Another disadvantage is the lack of details when a system su↵ers a loss
of a security element. A comparison of the storage medium and the full backup is
necessary to identify losses of security elements. Further, the comparison may not
yield details on losses to authenticity or integrity for newly created ﬁles. A system may
have new ﬁles relative to the backup copy, and the administrator cannot determine
if the new ﬁle contains misleading information or if the ﬁle is incomplete. Full or
incremental backups may require the users and applications to halt during backup,
to prevent ﬁle modiﬁcation during the backup process [34]. Online backup, described
below, handles the creation of a backup while users or applications are live on the
system.
Online backups must preserve ﬁles that are active without disrupting the end user
and without ﬁle inconsistencies [34]. The backup copies must be a valid copy of the
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ﬁles or else the backup may introduce losses to security elements if an administrator
uses the backup.
Online backups may provide valuable information regarding the losses of security
elements during an attack. It may be possible to observe what security elements su↵er
a compromise for speciﬁc ﬁles. Further, supplemental information may accompany
the online backup, such as active users and processes during the creation of the online
backup.
If not properly handled, ﬁle inconsistencies may be introduced by online backup
systems [34]. It may be difficult to distinguish inconsistencies introduced by the online
backup and the attacker. Another disadvantage is that an attacker may be able to
introduce temporal inconsistencies because backups do not occur instantaneously and
the users on the system may modify ﬁles as the backup is in progress.
File base backups [34] are copies of ﬁles and directories. File-based backups may
not include the data that may exist between ﬁles and directories, such as slack space
used for malicious hiding of data [35].
File base backups allow for ﬂexible policies for speciﬁc types of ﬁles and directories.
Frequently modiﬁed ﬁles may require more frequent backups compared to more static
ﬁles (e.g., system ﬁles, binaries, libraries).
File base backups do not capture information of previously deallocated ﬁles, which
may provide valuable information in reconstructing assets that su↵er a loss of a security element. Files that are partially destroyed, deleted, and no longer available on
the ﬁle system are not backed up. A loss of availability or integrity, through partial
destruction or deletion, may not be recoverable with ﬁle base backups.
Physical or device based backups [34] create a bit-by-bit replica of the disk, without
relying on the ﬁle system to replicate the data.
Physical level backups capture changes to slack space [35], which may help recover
from a loss of integrity (e.g., partial destruction of ﬁles) or a loss of availability (e.g.,
delete).
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Partially destroyed ﬁles are not necessarily recoverable. Undelete and ﬁle carving
tools may help recover ﬁles. However, if an attacker has overwritten the ﬁles, the ﬁle
may be lost. Further, a defender cannot recover ﬁles that an attacker has completely
overwritten.

Tracking Changes
A simple solution to counter unauthorized data destruction is to save all writes
to persistent storage. An attacker cannot destroy data if it is impossible to overwrite
previous data. However, there are several challenges in saving all writes to persistent
storage that have limited storage capacity. In practice, such a system must address
management of accessing the most up-to-date version of a speciﬁc ﬁle, the ability to
recover prior versions of a ﬁle, and the policies to react to when the persistent storage
is full.
Snapshots and copy-on-write (CoW) systems [34] allow for a ﬁle system to track
changes after a snapshot of the ﬁle system is taken. A snapshot is a read-only state
of an entire ﬁle system. Subsequent writes copy the portions of the data before
applying the writes (copy-on-write). The written copies are also indexed to keep
track of changes. If unauthorized data destruction occurs, the administrator can
recover the original contents of the ﬁle by referring back to an older copy of the ﬁle.
Uniﬁcation File Systems, such as UnionFS [36], support the ability to sandbox
potentially untrusted entities. A sandbox is a “forked”’ snapshot in which suspicious
actors are placed until their actions are veriﬁed as benign. Changes to persistent storage within the sandbox are isolated from trusted users and processes. If the entity
within the sandbox is valid and trustworthy, changes within the sandbox can then
merge with the persistent storage. If the entity within the sandbox is malicious, the
changes within the sandbox do not a↵ect the persistent storage, and a system administrator can observe the ﬁles that the untrusted entity modiﬁed to gain knowledge of
attack patterns and motivation.
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The unifying feature of the above systems is the creation of a read-only view of
the storage medium at some point in time. Changes to ﬁles after the snapshot are
saved and tracked.
After snapshot creation, the attacker must compromise the controls for CoW (e.g.,
remove the snapshot, disable CoW) to destroy data. The defenders can design systems
with a security perimeter to isolate the CoW snapshots and controls.
One disadvantage of snapshot and CoW systems are situations when a valid user
wishes to destroy a ﬁle. Destroying a ﬁle may require additional steps to remove the
ﬁle from snapshots, compared to the other backup schemes described above. Another
disadvantage is that snapshots may need to be updated to free up space of unneeded
copies of data. As all writes to existing ﬁles create copies, an attacker may attempt
to ﬁll the disk by repeatedly overwriting ﬁles. Rather than overwriting the same
portions of the disk, as in the systems previously described, a CoW ﬁle system create
copies, which is a path for an attacker to ﬁll the disk quickly with useless data.
Append-only, log, or continuous ﬁle systems write all modiﬁcations to storage
without overwriting existing data, which allows for users to roll back changes for
ﬁles [16]. As storage media are bounded, append-only, log, or continuous ﬁle systems
typically use a garbage collector or other mechanisms to free unwanted ﬁle versions.
The unifying feature of these systems is tracking the changes throughout the lifetime
of the ﬁle systems, and then the removal of obsolete information is decided later.
There are several version control systems speciﬁcally designed to recover from
faults or user-speciﬁed version recovery. Version ﬁles systems, such as Elephant [16],
retains important versions of speciﬁc ﬁles for recovery. The elephant system is designed to keep landmarks, versions of ﬁles speciﬁed by the user or through automation
based on a heuristic. The elephant ﬁle system may also keep all version of a ﬁle. Other
ﬁle systems such as for Plan 9 [37] take periodic snapshots of the ﬁle system for later
recovery (if necessary). NILFS [38] continuously creates snapshots of the ﬁle system
as users write to the disk, which allows for recovery of ﬁles immediately after they
occur.
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For digital forensics and security auditing, it may be necessary to have an exhaustive record of all ﬁles modiﬁed within an operating system to capture accurate
timelines. Systems like Elephant and NILFS provide resiliency to unauthorized data
destruction. However, sophisticated attackers may simply modify their strategies to
subvert systems such as Elephant or NILFS. Elephant and NILFS were not designed
to deceive attackers and the recovery, and checkpointing functionality is not isolated
from the end user. Further, the designs of append-only ﬁle system do not adequately
isolate the control mechanisms from the operating system, which may be untrusted.
As with Snapshot and CoW systems, if the controls and garbage collector for
the append-only ﬁle system (and the like) are isolated from the attacker, it is not
possible to destroy data directly. The attacker must rely on the garbage collector
to remove data. The policy of the garbage collector or related mechanism must be
carefully designed not to remove old data that may be useful to recover from a loss
of a security element.
The attacker’s actions may inﬂuence the garbage collector to remove old data,
even if the attacker is isolated from the garbage collector. For instance, an attacker
may attempt to ﬁll the disk, similar to the strategy on CoW systems, to prompt the
garbage collector to remove old records to free space. A patient attacker may be
able to destroy data by waiting for the garbage collector to remove old versions of
overwritten data. In practice, the garbage collector and control mechanisms for the
above systems are accessible within the system that the user and, potentially, the
attacker uses.

2.5.3 Data Recovery and Repair
Data destruction may occur on systems that do not use any data redundancy
systems. If no backups are available to recover the original data, data recovery
attempts to reconstruct the destroyed data assets. Several of the techniques presented
below overlap with the ﬁeld of digital forensics [39]. Speciﬁcally, data remanence,
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the “retain[tion] previously stored information beyond its intended lifetime,” [40] is
helpful in recovering data that has su↵ered from unauthorized data destruction.
It may be necessary to identify the missing data assets or identify data assets that
are illegally modiﬁed. A subsequent section, Section 2.5.4, discusses identiﬁcation
methods for unauthorized data destruction.
There are several methods to recover or repair previously deleted ﬁles or data.
Sluethkit, for instance, recovers “orphan” ﬁles that are inaccessible through the ﬁle
system but recoverable by analyzing ﬁle metadata to backtrack the location of the
ﬁle [41].
File carving may be necessary to reconstruct ﬁles that are fragmented and spread
across multiple locations on the storage medium [42]. However, if portions of the
deleted are missing because of a di↵erent ﬁle allocating the space of the deleted ﬁle,
it may be impossible to recover the ﬁle.

Data Caches
While not speciﬁcally designed to mitigate data destruction, data caches may
contain portions of data assets that have su↵ered a loss of a security element.
Journaling ﬁle systems duplicate data to repair ﬁle system inconsistencies caused
by an unexpected power loss [18]. Furthermore, ﬁle systems may store metadata
associated with a data object in a separate location from the data itself [18].
Hardware components may also contain portions of a destroyed data object. For
instance, a ﬂash-based storage device may contain spare memory cells to degrade the
device uniformly, [18]. Hybrid storage devices [43], which combine both solid-state
drives and hard disk drives, cache frequently access ﬁles within the solid-state portion
of the disk. An attacker may fail to destroy data assets located on both the solid-state
and hard disk.
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System caches may also pose a problem as portions of a ﬁle may still exist elsewhere. Temporary directories, swap space, or in-memory ﬁle caches may contain ﬁle
fragments.
A system administrator may use all of the above to recover portions of a destroyed
ﬁle. However, as with undelete and ﬁle carving methods, full recovery of a destroyed
data object is not guaranteed, especially for in-memory ﬁle caches that contain highly
fragmented ﬁles [44].

Digital Forensics
It is infeasible to anticipate and store all forensically relevant states that are
generated by a computing system without negatively impacting performance [45].
CoW and Append-only storage systems help track changes to storage over time, but
there is always an upper bound on the amount of storage available on real systems.
Forensic examiners use information such as system log ﬁles, checkpoints, backups,
and metadata in an investigation. However, forensic quality of such information
is not guaranteed. Furthermore, speciﬁc data objects, such as metadata, were not
designed for digital forensics [45]. It is possible for an adversary to edit audit trails,
logs, or relevant metadata as the adversary may have access to such items or gain
access to such items through the use of rootkits [45–47]. Thus, the preservation of
quality data objects is further complicated under an adversary who seeks to destroy
or alter incriminating evidence through anti-forensic techniques. Prior work mitigates
these issues by isolating the logs outside the operating system [48] or secure audit
logging [49] to inhibit the attacker’s ability to corrupt or view log ﬁles.
An adversary may replace the incriminating data objects with random binary
bits, as suggested by NIST, to ensure that recovery is infeasible. However, Savoldi
et al. [21] indicate that using such techniques are not stealthy as the distribution of
securely deleted data objects is distinguishable on the disk. Further, the tools for
secure deletion may generate additional evidence of malfeasance [27]. Nonetheless,
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the trade-o↵ between stealthiness and secure deletion is a decision that an adversary
must make.

2.5.4 Unauthorized Destruction Detection Strategies
Detection strategies attempt to detect destruction and react according to some
policies to mitigate or stop destructive actions or malware.

Signatures-Based Detection
Signature-based detection monitors behaviors and features for known destructive
malware [50]. The features can be (i) dynamic, derived from runtime interaction
with the suspected application; (ii) static, derived from code sequences that represent
malicious behavior; (iii) a hybrid of both [50].
The advantage of static signature-based detection is that it may protect a system
against known malware. However, there are several limitations in signature-based
detection. Some malware employs packers, metamorphic, or polymorphic techniques
[51] to obfuscate a binary, to hide features that signature-based detection schemes
rely upon. Further, generating signatures relies on careful analysis of malware and
the creation of signatures potentially by human experts [50]. Producing malware
signatures is outpaced by the rate at which malware is written. Another issue is that
signatures fail to detect previously unseen malware (zero-day malware) [50].
There are several examples of signature-based rules to detect destructive software.
For instance, device drivers that access the raw storage medium, which bypassing
the ﬁle system, is a sign of potentially destructive malware. Another example is
the detection of static features in known anti-forensic binaries such as timestamp
obfuscation or secure delete tools.
Dynamic signature-based features may observe destructive behaviors at runtime,
which may be more ﬂexible in identifying destructive malware static-based detection.
Several standard secure delete algorithms contain distinguishing features that may
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indicate data destruction attempts. Secure delete features may include sequences of
ﬁxed patterns, such as zero bits, one bits, or other standard secure delete patterns.
Integrity monitoring software such as Tripwire [14] observe for any modiﬁcation of a
ﬁle as an indication of an adverse modiﬁcation of data assets. Overwriting portions
of a ﬁle that are not frequently updated, such as a ﬁle signature, may also indicate a
destructive action [23].
The advantage of dynamic signature-based detection for data destruction is that it
forces the attacker to modify behavior rather than modifying its source code/binary.
There are several methods [51] to obfuscate the static features in a binary ﬁle. Another
advantage is that the detection of destruction is not unique to a single instance of
malware, as in static binary features, but may also detect known destructive malware
that behaves similarly.
The disadvantage of dynamic features is false positive detection. Some benign
software may behave similarly to destructive malware. For fraudulent timestamp
modiﬁcation, ﬁles from an archive (e.g., zip, tar, or rar ﬁles) may preserve the original
timestamp metadata. When extracting onto a new system, the discrepancy of the
newly created ﬁles and the timestamps written to the ﬁle system may cause a false
positive, as shown by Pennington et al. [52]. Similarly, updating system binaries may
trigger integrity monitoring software.

Anomaly-Based Detection
Anomaly-based detection observes and learns normal system behavior, without the
presence of an attacker, and detects derivations from the normal system behavior [50].
The advantage of anomaly-based detection schemes is the possibility of detecting
zero-day attacks, and the disadvantage is high false alarm rates and the challenge of
identifying features for detecting normal/anomalous behaviors [50].
Several anomaly-based detection schemes can help detect data destruction attacks.
For instance, a system may observe the entropy of I/O write bu↵ers. Anomalously
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high entropy on a write bu↵er may indicate unauthorized encryption of a ﬁle, indicating the potential presence of Ransomware [23, 24, 53]. Anomalous I/O patterns may
also indicate data destruction attacks. Prior work observes that crypto ransomware
has distinct I/O patterns that may indicate an unauthorized encryption [23,24]. Contienlla et al. in SheildFS [53] use anomalously high rates of read, write, or ﬁle rename
requests as an indication of unauthorized data encryption.
High false positive rates are a disadvantage of anomaly-based detection schemes.
For instance, false positive detection is observed in ShieldFS [53] when applications
such as Explorer and Visual Studio access a large number of ﬁles in short period.
The confusion may cause an incorrect insertion of deception or cause the system to
slow down at the incorrect time, both of which are undesirable for benign users on
the system.

2.5.5 Combining Detection and Preservation
Early works [52,54] have inspired the design of systems that prevent the accidental
or unauthorized data destruction or modiﬁcation of ﬁles on persistent storage. The
Self-Securing Storage System (S4) [54] keeps all versions of changes to ﬁles for a
ﬁxed window of time. The work builds on log-structured ﬁle systems but at a ﬁner
granularity of ﬁle changes. Further, S4 uses security perimeters, which separates
access to the recovery and conﬁguration mechanisms from the OS in case the OS
becomes untrusted. Without the security perimeter, an attacker can remove versions
of a ﬁle, e↵ectively destroying the data. For an attacker to destroy data on S4, she
must compromise the OS and the management interface. If the attacker only destroys
data on the OS, the administrator of S4 can recover the data.
An extension to S4 is a Storage-Based Intrusion Detection Systems (SBIDS) [52],
which observes disk access patterns for unauthorized actions. SBIDS observe for unusual access patterns that indicate that a machine may be under attack. The suspicious actions include erroneous data/time modiﬁcations, unexpected update patterns
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for critical ﬁles (e.g., system binaries or log ﬁles), or the hiding of ﬁles and directories. By combining S4 with SBIDS, an administrator can react to attacks, which are
observed and analyzed outside of the untrusted OS, and recover ﬁles that su↵er a loss
of a security element.
SBIDS and S4 provide an excellent solution for attacks against system binaries,
conﬁguration ﬁles, logs, libraries, kernel objects, or unauthorized data and timestamp
modiﬁcations. Speciﬁcally, SBIDS demonstrates the ability detect unauthorized modiﬁcations to date and time stamps (a loss of authenticity), deletion of log records in
log ﬁles (a loss of integrity), and the creation of hidden ﬁles (loss of availability).
However, SBIDS does not address the problem of detecting unauthorized actions on
critical user ﬁles that are frequently updated. User critical ﬁles can vary and do not
have a rigid structure and access pattern compared to critical system ﬁles.
Other related work that combines detection and protection is ShieldFS [53]. By
using a CoW system, ShieldFS protects a Windows OS against Crytpo Ransomware.
If a process behaves like Ransomware, the ﬁles under unauthorized encryption are
recoverable by revoking the changes. The system monitors write patterns through a
custom driver. Features are extracted from disk activity, through the custom driver,
along with in-memory cryptographic features, referred to as CryptoFinder. The features feed into a multi-tier classiﬁer, which examines various changes to the storage
medium over time. ShieldFS mostly relies on the CryptoFinder, which contributed
to 69.3% of all the malicious samples in their experimental evaluation.
The results indicate that the SheildFS approach works for cryptographic ransomware, which causes a loss of utility by data transformation. Unfortunately, there
are a variety of methods to destroy data. For instance, wiper malware may not use
ciphers to destroy ﬁles. As discussed in Section 2.3, data destruction methodologies
may vary, and crypto ransomware focuses on a narrow set of methods (a loss of utility through unauthorized data transformation). The experiments in this dissertation
examine a broader set of data destruction methods. The wide variety of methods
contribute to the challenge of unauthorized data destruction.
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The ShieldFS [53] work inspired some of the design and architecture decisions of
DecMS. In short, the experimental evaluation improves upon the design of ShieldFS
[53]. The di↵erence in the experimental design is that the monitoring, analysis, and
data preservation mechanism are isolated from the attacker, and the OS where the
attacker resides is assumed to be untrusted. SheildFS provides some defense against
an attacker who attempts to disable SheildFS. Although the ShieldFS drivers are
designed to be immutable, the authors describe a path to disable ShieldFS under an
attacker who has administrative privileges or by compromising the OS kernel.
The Taser Intrusion Recovery System [55] uses taint analysis with ﬁlesystem snapshots and audit logs to help identify and revert ﬁle changes after an attack discovery.
Taser relies on the use of an IDS or a system administrator to identify “detection
points,” which may be a ﬁle or process that is suspicious. The recovery algorithm references both the detection point and audit log and backtracks to ﬁnd all relevant ﬁles
and reverts the changes. Benign changes replay from the snapshot point to recover
the changes that are not a↵ected by the tainted ﬁles. It may be difficult to manage
and revert the e↵ects of destructive actions when benign applications are a↵ected by
the unauthorized data destruction. Taser attempts to resolve the conﬂicts that may
occur when a tainted ﬁle or process interacts with a benign ﬁle or process.

2.6 Deception for Defense
Cybersecurity deception is described in detail by Almeshekah and Spa↵ord [7]. A
summary of relevant topics and deﬁnitions for this dissertation is given below.
Deception, as deﬁned by Almeshekah and Spa↵ord [56] is “Planned actions taken
to mislead and confuse attackers and to thereby cause them to take (or not take)
speciﬁc actions that aid computer-security defenses.” However, defensive deception
when implemented as an isolated system has limitations, and there are beneﬁts in
using deception in conjunction with other security tools [7].
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In this dissertation, we explore deception as an enhancement of data preservation
(and other security mechanisms) under unauthorized data modiﬁcation. The deceptive strategies are designed to work on systems with real users and not as an isolated
system for interacting with adversaries (such as honeypots).
Based on Almeshekah and Spa↵ord’s taxonomy for deception [7], this dissertation
describes deceptive components with Bell and Whaley’s terminology of dissimulation
(hiding the real) and simulation (showing the false). Dissimulation components consist of (i) masking, (ii) repackaging, and (iii) dazzling. The simulation components
consist of (i) mimicking, (ii) inventing, and (iii) decoying.
Bell and Whaley order the above deceptive components from strongest to weakest
form of deception, where (i) indicates the strongest and (iii) is the weakest form of
simulation/dissimulation. Almehsekah and Spa↵ord [7] build on the Bell and Whaley’s work, applied to information security:
We can deny the target access to the truth and show him the deceit.
When we cannot stop the truth from being observed, we can misdirect
the target’s focus to the deceit. When we cannot inﬂuence the target’s
focus, we can confuse the target by presenting him with the truth and one
or more plausible deceits.
When designing deceptive systems, this dissertation follows the ordering given above.
Deception can also be consistent or inconsistent [57]. Consistent deception presents a
consistent but false view of reality. The deception remains persistent despite the adversary’s e↵ort in ﬁnding inconsistencies. The alternative is “inconsistent deception”
that presents deceptive information to an adversary, but the deception is ephemeral
or is easily veriﬁed to be false with some e↵ort. Inconsistent deception attempts to
disorient or confuse the adversary, which may be beneﬁcial even if the adversary is
aware of the ruse. The system defender, who controls the ﬁctional reality, can indirectly inﬂuence the adversary’s actions. The adversary’s perception of a system is
unclear because the defender introduces inconsistent information which requires time
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and e↵ort for the adversary to disseminate. If the attacker becomes aware of the inconsistency, she may conclude that the (i) defender is using deception, (ii) the system
is faulty, or (iii) her perception of the system is incorrect. Neagoe and Bishop [57]
argue that consistent perception is difficult to achieve because of the variety of paths
that an attacker can use to examine if some information is consistent or inconsistent.
While consistent deception is used in sandbox systems such as honeypots, inconsistent
deception can induce confusion, frustration, or impede the attacker from achieving
her goals.
Both consistent and inconsistent deception provide advantages and disadvantages.
The challenge with consistent deception is to present the deception regardless of the
adversary’s strategies to reveal the truth. In comparison to inconsistent deception,
consistent deception requires more e↵ort for the defenders of the system. Alternatively, the inconsistent deception may still disrupt the attacker who does not attempt
to unveil the deception and may require less e↵ort by the defenders to inject the
deception. This dissertation considers both consistent and inconsistent deception in
some of the experimental evaluation.
In defending computing defense system, there are several beneﬁts in using deception with other security technologies. The beneﬁts [56] are (i) “increases the entropy
of leaked information,” (ii) “increases the information obtained from compromise attempts,” (iii) “give defenders an edge in the [Observe, Orient, Decide, and Act] OODA
loop,” and (iv) “increases the risk of attacking computer systems from the adversaries
side.” This thesis does not explicitly explore the of goals (i) and (ii). Information
leakage is a loss of conﬁdentiality and is not a necessary condition in unauthorized
data modiﬁcation as mentioned in Section 2.2. It is possible to obtain information
about an adversary from failed unauthorized data destruction attempts. However,
the work here only gathers such information and does not attribute or attempt to
understand the attacker strategies.
This thesis explores the beneﬁts of (iii) and (iv). The OODA loop models how
adversaries and defenders behave in a conﬂict. The player who acts ﬁrst has a tactical
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advantage, and deception may disrupt a player’s view (e.g., observe and orient) of the
conﬂict, causing impedance during decision or selecting a suboptimal action [7, 56].
The advantage for the defender is additional time to decide and act when faced with
an adversary.
For unauthorized data modiﬁcation, the defender may be able to prepare data
redundancy in anticipation to a destructive action. If the redundancy or replication is
isolated and hidden from the attacker, the attacker may believe that she is destroying
data without knowing that the assets are under protection. Through careful planning
and a successful deceit, a defender can recover from unauthorized data modiﬁcation
quickly, giving the defender an advantage in the OODA loop. Injecting false responses
in the system may also cause the attacker to asset the situation, ﬁnd alternative attack
strategies, and possibly confusing the attacker [7]. In the former case, the defender can
react more quickly to unauthorized data destruction than what the attacker perceives,
and in the latter case, the attacker is slowed down which gives the defenders more
time to react to an attacker.
Disrupting the attacker’s destruction through the use of false information may
increase the risk for the attacker (beneﬁt (iv)). For instance, anti-forensics techniques destroy incriminating information on a system. Feeding false information to
an attacker, such as showing the attacker’s expected “successful” outcome when she
is destroying incriminating information, gives the attacker a false sense of assurance.
Further, some data destruction attacks attempt to be stealthy until the attack is
unleashed to maximize the e↵ectiveness. If the attacker believes that she is destroying data, but the system is resilient to the attack, the adversary risks revealing her
presence within a system.
Almesheka and Spa↵ord describe a model to plan and integrate deception into
computer security defense [7]. The planning requires strategic goals and how an attacker should react to deceit. The deception should exploit an attacker’s bias and
should reﬂect the simulation and dissimulation strategies. A feedback channel mea-
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sures how an attacker reacts to the deception. Further, the risks of using deceptions
should be well-understood.
In particular, the costs of using deception may impact the end user, especially if
resources are shared between the deceptive system and the system in need of defense.
The deceptive system may have to compete for resources, which may be undesirable
for the system under protection. There is a need to understand how deceptive systems e↵ect “normal users’ activities” and identify if the risks of using deception are
acceptable [7]. Distinguishing between truths and lies is also a challenge in some
computing applications Forensics attempts to ascertain the truth, and deceptive information may lead an examiner to invalid conclusions. The deception introduced
for defensive purposes must be identiﬁable for a forensic examiner but difficult for
an attacker to identify as deceitful. Details for the deception planning, integration,
risks, beneﬁts, and costs for the proposed system is found in Chapter 4.
Building on the work by Neagoe et al. [57], Sun et al. present Chameleon [58],
which explores consistent and inconsistent deception to vary the behavior of operating
systems. The authors present a case study to demonstrate Chameleon’s feasibility
against botnets. Chameleon injects deceit in several system calls, which is designed to
disrupt fragile software. The results indicate that the unpredictability of the system
calls slowed down the botnet’s ability to send spam without signiﬁcantly degrading
the performance of standard desktop applications. The results indicate that malware
is sensitive to minor operating system misbehavior.
A viable deceptive strategy evaluated in this dissertation is mimicking a system
that an adversary expects and mask the adversary from the truthful nature of the
system. There are several techniques, primarily used by rootkits to hide from system
administrators and anti-malware software, to hide components of a system [25,59,60].
Isolation is necessary to preserve the integrity of the preserved data that is under
destruction or any forensically valuable information. Isolation relies on compartmentalization or security parameters such that the user is unable to modify critical
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components or data. The existing techniques are designed to isolate rather than hide
the presence of the system.
For instance, FreeBSD could be conﬁgured to run in a secure mode which ensures
that ﬂags for immutable and append-only ﬁles cannot be changed and kernel modules
cannot be loaded after boot [33, Chapter 20]. It may be possible to write logs and
preserve the data under destruction into an immutable and append-only ﬁle to prevent
an attacker from destroying ﬁles, even at the highest attacker privilege level 4 . While
isolation techniques are critical to preserving the integrity of logs or preserved data,
attackers could simply look for the presence of such ﬁles as evidence that a system is
using the above conﬁguration and modify their attack strategy.
There are some existing data hiding techniques to increase the challenge of discovering critical components of a system. Several of the data hiding techniques are in
use in malicious software, such as rootkits. Kernel Object Hooking (KOH) and Dynamic Kernel Object Manipulation (DKOM) are well-known strategies that rootkits
utilize to stay hidden from anti-malware software and system administrators. There
exists a rich body of literature ( [59, Chapters 3-6]) that details how rootkits remain
hidden from monitoring. The same techniques can hide the presence of deceptive
technologies.
For instance, ﬁles associated with a deceptive system in persistent storage could
be inaccessible to any users within the system by modifying system calls (through
DKOM or KOH) to identify critical ﬁles and hide their presence from the operating
system [59, 61]. Other techniques, such as unlinking processes from the process lists,
could also hide the presence of deceptive components within the operating system.
Another technique that may combine both isolation and hiding is Virtual Machine
Introspection (VMI). VMI allows a host machine to access the contents of memory
within a guest virtual machine by examining the “hardware states and events and
uses this information to extrapolate the software state” of the virtual machine [62]. A
deceptive system could be placed within the Virtual Machine Manager (VMM), intro4

Assuming that the attacker cannot access the system before boot to disable immutable ﬁles.
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spect a guest virtual machine, preserve information, and respond deceptively. VMI
provides some distinct advantages over the previously discussed hiding techniques.
One disadvantage of DKOM and KOH is that the core functionality exists within the
same system where a potential attacker resides. An attacker could compromise the
system and uncover the deception. A challenge of VMI is to extrapolate the semantic
meaning of low-level hardware changes [62]. However, techniques exist [63] to address
the challenge of the “semantic gap” [63].
Other isolation and data hiding techniques place system components near the
hardware, which are inaccessible unless an administrator has physical access to the
machine. Another design alternative is placing the deceptive system on the network,
which intercepts, analyzes, and modiﬁes network traffic outside of the system under
protection. All of the above data isolation and hiding techniques are considered in
designing the architecture for the experimental evaluation in Section 4.1.

2.7 Other Related Work
Barik et al. describe a system that enhances the logging mechanism for MAC DTS
(Modiﬁed, accessed, created, Date and timestamp) for the Ext2 File system [64]. The
proposed system preserves MAC DTS for key ﬁles through the use of Loadable Kernel
Modules for virtual ﬁle systems (VFS). The system uses two unused inode ﬁelds in
the VFS to (i) indicate the ﬁle is critical and (ii) a pointer to the MAC DTS trail
blocks. The goal is to preserve MAC DTS against an adversary who attempts to
purge evidence by modifying critical timestamps.
While the work by Barik et al. [64] is similar to the work presented in this dissertation, there are some crucial distinctions. First, Barik et al. do not explicitly use
deception to trick an adversary into believing that their evidence wiping technique
is working correctly [64]. Secondly, the authors do not attempt to hide the presence
of the of their proposed system. If an adversary is aware of the scheme proposed by
Barik et al. [64], they can trivially check to see if the two unused inode ﬁelds are in

39
use. Third, the logging mechanism is not resilient to unauthorized modiﬁcation. If
an adversary is aware of the scheme proposed by Barik et al. [64], she can merely
enumerate through the MAC DTS Trail Blocks and modify the entries.
Milkovic [47] describes how a rootkit could subvert memory forensic tools5 that
dump the contents of memory for forensic analysis and possibly exposing the rootkit
to an examiner. Milkovic proposes a method that intercepts system write calls and
examines the parameters to determine if a memory acquisition tool is dumping memory. If a memory acquisition tool is detected, the rootkit removes evidence of its
existence from memory before the memory acquisition tool can dump the contents
of memory for later examination. From the forensic investigator’s perspective, the
memory acquisition tool appears to be behaving normally but in actuality is failing
to capture malicious processes that are memory-resident. The same methodology
applies to defense. DecMS could be designed to be memory-resident. If an attacker
attempts to observe portions of memory that reveal DecMS, intercept the call and
produce plausible results to induce attacker doubt regarding DecMS.
Kuperman and Spa↵ord [65] describe AUDLIB, a method to wrap libraries to produce application-level audit information. AUDLIB uses Library Interposition to intercept library function calls to generate detailed audit information with a higher degree
of ﬁdelity than typical kernel logging. AUDLIB can produce a detailed audit trail that
includes timestamps, PID, PPID, the caller, and the library that the caller invoked.
Further, AUDLIB can identify misuses such as string, overﬂow, and return-to-libc attacks with little overhead to the end user.
AUDLIB is capable of detecting anti-forensics actions and other items of forensic
interests. However, AUDLIB is not designed with deceptive capabilities. An attacker
could simply check to see if AUDLIB is installed on a given operating system and disable
it. Library Interposition is a valuable method that DecMS could use to identify actions
of forensic interest but must be combined with hiding and isolation techniques to be
e↵ective.
5

http://www.volatilityfoundation.org/
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Nance et al. discuss the research challenges involved in digital forensics and VMI
[66]. In particular, they point out the challenges, from a digital forensics perspective,
of developing a VMI tool. They discuss the methods in which the goals VMI can be
achieved while considering the risks of unauthorized entities who may use VMI for
malfeasance. The work presented in this dissertation assumes that the interposition,
regardless of the method, is trusted and not compromised. Further, the authors
discuss the ability to conduct VMI for covert operations. The authors point out that
covert VMI is applicable in deception, where one can simulate hardware failures or
in general, inﬂuence the actions of processes. The discussion motivates the research
presented in this dissertation. The authors point out that such a system is challenging
because of the issues of “monitoring non-quiescent systems.” Finally, the authors also
discuss the possibility of detecting VMI on a virtual machine. The authors discuss
that an attacker could analyze system wall time or page faults to determine if she
is running within a VM with VMI. While the research challenge of exploring VMI
detection is relevant to DecMS with VMI, it is out of scope with the thesis statement.
However, design choices of DecMS are driven from the discussion presented by Nance
et al. [66], as it is more challenging to determine if a system has VMI compared to
determine if a system runs deceptive software within the host operating system.
Savoldi et al. [21] evaluates the feasibility of identifying regions on a disk where a
secure deletion action may have occurred. The same methods can be used to identify
where destruction took place to determine destruction as they occur. As shown by
Savoldi et al. [21], the statistical test suite for pseudorandom number generators [67]
and the entropy-based classiﬁer could be used to identify secure delete actions.
More recent work uses similar methods to detect secure deletion before reaching
the disk. Unveil [24] and CryptoDrop [23] use features to detect the presence of
destructive actions. Unveil monitors for stealthy Ransomware within an anti-malware
analysis system and monitors the entropy of writes to the disk as a detection feature.
CryptoDrop uses ﬁle signatures and entropy as part of its detection features.
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Bacs et al. [68] design an intrusion detection system called Storage-Level Intrusion
ChecKer (SLICK) to protect virtual storage devices. SLICK monitors write accesses
to speciﬁc regions of the disk that are critical, such as the master boot record (MBR),
bootloader, or space beyond the region of the ﬁle system. Particularly, the bootloader
and MBR are locations that an attacker replaces to execute code before the OS starts
or causes the OS to fail to boot, respectively. SLICK monitors for any modiﬁcations
in those regions and successfully detects all modiﬁcations.
The Drakvuf system [69] uses VMI to analyze malware through VMI. The goals in
Drakvuf that related to this thesis document include data collection ﬁdelity, stealthiness, and isolation. Data ﬁdelity in VMI is a challenge [66]. Drakvuf uses active VMI
to insert breakpoints at key locations to halt the virtual machine to gather runtime
information, thus avoiding the non-quiescent inconsistency problems [66]. Drakvuf is
a malware analysis system designed to test and identify malicious applications. With
some e↵ort, it may be possible to use Drakvuf to protect live virtual machine systems
with real users. Some of the experimental results use Drakvuf to observe for data
destruction actions. One of the prototype systems, DecMS-VMI, extends Drakvuf to
analyze for data destruction, preserves ﬁles, and injects deceptive responses to protect
a guest virtual machine.
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3 THREATS AND DECEPTION
Designing a DecMS requires an understanding of the threats, the cost/risks of introducing deception, monitoring for the desirable conditions to introduce deception,
and the methodologies to achieve the deceptive goals [7]. As with any security system, trade-o↵s guide in the design of the architecture. The design of the architecture
explored in this dissertation is guided deceptive planning detailed in [7].
First, an explicit threat model is necessary to design deception for defense. Building on the threat space introduced in Section 2.2, a deﬁnition of several threats are
given. Details regarding the destructive methods are presented, which is critical in
identifying destruction. Later, in Chapter 5, instances of each of the threats described
here are given to evaluate prototypes of DecMS. The threat models will help support
the DecMS Identiﬁcation and Reduction Goals.
Second, the deceptive planning in Section 3.2 follows the guidelines provided by [7]
to plan a defensive deception that is e↵ective in deceiving an attacker. The deceptive
goals and attacker biases guide the design decisions in subsequent sections. Based
on the assumed threats, the deception planning details the needs for monitoring
for a DecMS. Several services are identiﬁed to help facilitate the deception. The
contributions include a deceptive plan to produce plausible false reality and support
the DecMS Reduction Goal.
Third, the costs of deception within an I/O system are given. A crucial part of
planning for deception is understanding the costs and risks of using a deceptive system
[7]. Efficiency degradation is the cost of placing deception within the I/O system.
System defenders should determine the acceptable trade-o↵ for gaining resiliency of
data destruction at the cost I/O performance. A set of costs for deploying DecMS
is deﬁned. Given the costs, identifying the computing systems where a DecMS can
provide defense beneﬁts is also considered. The contributions include the cost factors
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associated with deception on I/O systems and several computing systems that may
be suitable for a DecMS. Further, the costs of deception and suitable systems guide
the design choices for the Impedance and Preservation Goals.
Fourth, the design space and architectures to exploit the adversary’s biases are
detailed. The architectures vary in complexity and e↵ort necessary to protect against
unauthorized data destruction. Some design and integration methods provide a balance of achieving the deceptive goals with an acceptable cost increase. The contributions include several design strategies given the threats, assumptions, and the cost
factors in using deception to protect against unauthorized data destruction.
Finally, the placement of DecMS is also considered. The beneﬁt of placing the
monitoring and deception services within the system under protection is a simplistic
design but at the cost of stealthiness. Alternatively, DecMS can be placed outside
the system under protection but may require additional work to monitor the system
from the outside. The challenges of both designs are detailed, and the contributions
include the trade-o↵s of both design. Further, the monitoring and protection policies
for identifying when the DecMS should impede data destruction to protect critical
assets are also considered.

3.1 Threat Model and Assumptions
The selection basis for the threats to evaluate the hypothesis statement is as follows. First, the threats should be instances of real unauthorized data destruction and
not synthetically created. Using real malware samples will demonstrate the e↵ectiveness of exploiting the conﬁrmation bias of current malware threats. To adequately
assess the threat space, the evaluations use several threats to span the possible losses
to Parkerian Hexad security elements caused by unauthorized data destruction. The
selection of threats evaluates the feasibility for DecMS to protect against all security
elements that are relevant to data destruction, as identiﬁed in Section 2.2.
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Figure 3.1.: Threats and loss of Parkerian security elements for various data destruction attacks.

Figure 3.1 illustrates three types of threats, their respective data destruction
method, and the loss of a Parkerian security element. Note that between the antiforensics and wiper malware threats, the entire threat space is covered. Below, each
of the three threats from Figure 3.1 is detailed.
The deﬁnitions of assets that DecMS protects are in Section 2.1, which include
RA and NRA ﬁles and metadata stored on a ﬁle system. Each threat focuses on a
subset of assets to meet their end goals. The goals, motivations, and targeted assets
are necessary to guide the deception design and defense, which reﬁned in subsequent
sections.
A deﬁnition of benign users is also necessary as the addition of deception relating
to I/O may a↵ect legitimate users, by limiting the resources available to the users or

45
by incorrectly presenting deception to benign users. The benign user is also deﬁned
below and will serve as a baseline in the experimental evaluation.

3.1.1 Wiper Malware Threats on Integrity
Wiper malware destroys digital assets to render computing services and data unusable. Other wiper malware may have di↵erent goals and methods. Below, a description of a particular type of wiper malware that targets the loss of integrity is
detailed for evaluating DecMS.

Goals
The goal of wiper malware is to destroy data assets to render data recovery difficult
and to cause the system to become unusable. The motivation is to bring computing
resources o✏ine or to halt users from completing tasks. The speciﬁc reasons may
include ﬁnancial gain, failing to pay extortion or to cause chaos.

Targets
Wiper malware targets both RA and NRA objects on a ﬁle system. RA objects
may include partition tables, master boot records (MBR), or other assets that are
critical for system stability. Several recovery tools exist to repair MBR [70] or partition table corruption [71]. The NRA includes frequently updated user ﬁles, such as
those found in a home directory.

Methods
Wiper malware attempts to destroy ﬁles quickly with the goal of making a recovery
difficult. Portions of ﬁles, such as ﬁle signatures, are overwritten so that recovery
software cannot easily distinguish the beginning of a ﬁle. Overwriting ﬁle system
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data structures such as the MBR or partition table also complicates ﬁle recovery
mechanisms as the indexes to the ﬁles are no longer available to the system defenders.
The wiper malware threat focuses on causing a loss of integrity of RAs and NRAs.
The entire contents of a ﬁle are not entirely lost to the above methods. It may be
possible to recover portions of a ﬁle because of the methods above only target a
small portion of a ﬁle rather than the entire asset. Figure 3.1 shows that the wiper
malware threat causes a complete loss of integrity from the partial destruction of
ﬁles. A partial loss of availability and utility is the result of the possibility of partial
recovery NRAs.

Alternative Goals and Methods
Wiper malware may also target evidence of malfeasance to hide the methodology of
the data destruction from forensic investigators or system defenders. Wipers may also
attempt to overwrite the entire disk or ﬁle but at the cost of the speed of exploitation.
A full destruction of a particular data asset, as deﬁned for the evaluation of DecMS,
is closely related to anti-forensics threats to Availability and Utility.

3.1.2 Anti-Forensics Threats to Availability and Utility
Anti-forensic techniques are speciﬁcally designed to overcome forensic analysis
software [35] or destroy digital evidence rendering it unrecoverable [27]. Data destruction is a particularly difficult problem to overcome in forensic investigation [27].
An attacker will not simply delete incriminating evidence, but rather, securely delete
incriminating data segments on the disk.

Goals
The goal of the anti-forensic attacks on Availability and Utility is to purge NRA
from a persistent storage medium completely. The ﬁles under destruction should no
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longer be available, and information that replaces the targeted ﬁles should have no
utility.

Targets
The assumed targets of Anti-forensic attacks on Availability and Utility are NRA.
Nonrecoverable ﬁles represent forensic evidence that is local to the storage medium.
The evidence is assumed not to be replicated elsewhere.

Methods
The methods for data destruction are known secure delete algorithms. Several of
the algorithms follow standards that are designed to destroy targeted data completely
and may include multiple overwrites. For example, tools such as shred [72] or srm [73]
are designed to erase data in a way that renders recovery impossible. The secure
delete methods the ﬁle, the associated metadata, and any information stored within
ﬁle system data structures.

Alternative Goals and Methods
Secure delete methods overlap with anti-forensics and wiper malware. It is possible
to securely delete data from a ﬁle by overwriting the complete ﬁle with arbitrary data.
Anti-forensics may target speciﬁc records in a log ﬁle rather than destroying the whole
ﬁle. The partial destruction of a ﬁle overlaps with the assumed methods of the wiper
malware threat.

3.1.3 Anti-Forensics Threats to Authenticity
An attacker may destroy forensically valuable information such as ﬁle timestamps,
which may be overwritten with misleading information causing a loss of authenticity.
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Goals
The goal of an anti-forensic attack on Authenticity is to overwrite data with
misleading information to obfuscate the evidence of a crime. Forensic examiners use
ﬁle system timestamps to create a forensic timeline, and replacing timestamps with
fraudulent times is one method to reduce the quality of forensic evidence.

Targets
The assumed targets for threats against authenticity are replacing the MAC DTS
for the ﬁle system metadata associated with a given ﬁle.

Methods
There exist libraries or system calls that handle changes to MAC DTS ﬁle system
metadata. The assumption is that the attacker uses the well-documented library to
modify MAC DTS to change the timestamp of a ﬁle. The MAC DTS replacement
can be innocuous, blending in with other ﬁles without raising suspicion.

Alternative Goals and Methods
Rather than replacing the MAC DTS, other ﬁle system metadata can be replaced
with misleading information. Rather than removing a log entry, for instance, the
adversary may replace the log with an entry that is innocuous. Other attacks that
cause a loss of authenticity may include replacing executable programs with ones that
contain hidden functionality such as a backdoor into the system.
A threat that modiﬁes MAC DTS satisﬁes the requirement of exploring an attack
on authenticity. The alternative goals and methods are protected by other mechanisms, such as integrity monitoring for binaries and log ﬁles.

49
3.1.4 Crypto Ransomware Threats to Authenticity
Rather than destroying critical data, Crypto Ransomware renders a target’s computer or data unusable unless the user pays a fee. The focus of ransomware is to
cause a loss of data utility and availability to the user.

Targets
The targets for the Crypto Ransomware threats are user ﬁles that are NRA. RA
are not considered as a user or system administrator can easily replace the ﬁle if
backups exist.

Goals
The goal of Crypto Ransomware is to extort payment by transforming user ﬁles
into an unusable state. Restoring ﬁles is not possible unless an extortion payment is
received.

Method
The assumption of the transformation method is an encryption method with a
key that is not in the user’s or system administrator’s possession. The key is assumed
to be computationally intractable to recover.

Alternative Goals and Methods
Other data transformation methods are possible that render user ﬁles unrecoverable. For instance, a steganographic method could place user ﬁles within multimedia
ﬁles. The extraction can use a key, which is out of the user’s possession. However,
steganography is not typically used in this way.
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3.1.5 Benign User
A benign user is assumed to be well behaved and does not attempt do any unauthorized data destruction. The impact of the deceptive system should not hinder the
end users’ ability to complete their tasks. The benign user will serve as a baseline
for the experimental evaluation. Several user tasks are simulated in the experimental
evaluation to determine if the deception causes any disruption to the end user.
A user may write compressed ﬁles to the disk, which may have high entropy and
potentially confuse a monitor for identifying destructive writes. High entropy writes
may cause misclassiﬁcation. Several data destructive methods (Crypto Ransomware
and secure delete) overwrite assets with randomly selected bits. The false positive
may cause unwanted disruptions for the end user or may indicate signs of the existence
of DecMS for threats.

3.1.6 Assumptions
Assumptions for all of the above threats follows:
1. It is assumed that the threat compromises the machine and can execute destructive actions.
2. The threat adversaries destroys data by overwriting a data object, partially or
completely, on a storage medium accessible from the compromised machine.
3. The attacker does not have physical access to the storage medium. Ergo, the
attacker cannot physically destroy the storage medium and uses the software
data destruction methods outlined above.
4. The attacker may have administrator access to the compromised machine but
cannot avoid monitoring 1 .
1

For example, Kernel Object Hooking (KOH), Dynamic Kernel Object Manipulation (DKOM),
or Direct Kernel Structure Manipulation (DKSM) [59, 74] could be used to remain hidden from
security monitoring from within an OS.
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3.2 Planning Deception
In this section, the plans for the deception is outlined to evaluate the hypothesis
statement for the dissertation.

3.2.1 Strategic Goal
As detailed in [7], it is critical to specify the strategic goals of the deception. The
goals of the deception are given.
1. To gain information about the targets of the destructive adversary while
preserving data under destruction.
2. If preservation of data is not possible, impede the destruction with plausible
but misleading faults that are difficult to attribute.
3. Decrease the e↵ectiveness of data destruction while increasing the risk of revealing the adversary and her techniques.
The ﬁrst goal is to provide the system defenders with a list of assets that adversaries target and aligns with the DecMS Identiﬁcation Goal. The list of assets may
provide insight regarding the data assets that interest the threats. Rather than preventing the destruction, the data under destruction is preserved and isolated from the
attacker, aligning with the DecMS Preservation Goal. While the same beneﬁts can be
gained from dynamic malware analysis, some preliminary information is obtainable
from the DecMS. Further, it may be challenging to capture the malware sample, as
seen in some wiper malware that destroys itself before wiping ﬁles from persistent
storage [75].
The second goal is to prevent a potential weakness of the deceptive strategy in use
for the ﬁrst goal. As storage space is ﬁxed, there may be a situation where preserving
data is not possible. It may be best to slow the attacker down or cause confusion to
prevent the storage medium from becoming full. The impedance may allow time for
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the system to remove useless information, compress data to make space to preserve
data from potential destruction or allow time to analyze the system state, which
aligns with the DecMS Impedance Goal. The deception that will react to such events
is designed to appear plausible from the perspective of the end user on the system
under protection to not raise suspicion.
The third deceptive goal is to reduce the e↵ectiveness of an attacker’s method
to destroy data, satisfying the DecMS Reduction Goal. As the ﬁrst two goals are
to deceive the attacker, the third goal is successful if the deception can mitigate the
destruction attempts. The more successful the data preservation is, the less reliable
the tools and data destruction methods are for the adversary, even if the adversary can
fool the analysis of data destruction. There should be a risk for the adversary even if
DecMS produces a false negative when attempting to identify data destruction. The
increased risk could be that the data under destruction may still be recoverable or
the e↵ort needed to destroy the data does not match the perception of the adversary.

3.2.2 Adversary Reaction
The adversary should assume that all of her destructive actions are successful,
even if the adversary validates that the data under destruction is no longer available.
Any impedance caused by the secondary goal should be innocuous and not raise the
adversary’s suspicion. The adversary should not suspect that the data destruction
tools are not e↵ective in meeting her goals. The threats should continue operating as
if the data destruction are e↵ective.

3.2.3 Attacker Bias
The bias that is exploited is the conﬁrmation bias as mentioned in [7]. The
adversary assumes that the information presented to her is truthful. Any detection of
malicious behavior will cause a denial of access to the compromised system to prevent
further disarray. The conﬁrmation bias is the belief that most computing systems
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report truthful information about the system state and not attempt to deceive the
end user [7]. A destructive action should be successful, and the expected results
should be veriﬁable. However, it may be unnecessary as there is typically no reason
to validate a result of changes to persistent storage because past interactions have
biased the user into believing results do not change unless explicitly modiﬁed by
some entity within the system. Further, it is common to occasionally see a drop
of performance in computing for a variety of reasons (e.g., network issues, memory
leakage, waiting for I/O, scheduling, competing for shared resources).

3.2.4 Deceptive Components
Based on the goals, there are several viable options for the deceptive components.
The deception should be in regards to the system’s functionality or state [7]. Further, the deceptive system should “identify patterns and characteristics [...] and the
conditions when to deceive” [7]. Identifying destructive patterns, characteristics, and
conditions require DecMS to (i) monitor I/O and (ii) analyze the I/O.
There are several methods to monitor and analyze I/O. To provide ﬂexibility in
observing and analyzing the destructive methods outlined in Section 3.1, DecMS uses
several policies that are deﬁned by the system defenders. In DecMS, the Monitoring
Policies deﬁne the methods to identify adversary destructive behaviors. The Monitoring Policies consist of an Observation Policy, which deﬁnes types of I/O requests that
may be related to data destruction. The Observation Policy focuses on observing the
I/O that may be of interest. The Analysis Policy takes the observable information per
the Observation Policy and determines the conditions when to deceive and to preserve
data that is under destruction. If the analysis policy identiﬁes that a deception or
preservation should take place, the Protection Policies detail the appropriate actions
to take. The Protection Policies consist of a Preservation Policy, which preserves the
data that is under destruction, and a Deception Policy, to obfuscate the true nature of

54
the system. For each of the Monitoring and Protection policies, an associated service
actualizes the rules deﬁned by the policies.

Patterns, Characteristics, and Conditions Of Deception
The deceptive system must identify unauthorized data destruction events to respond deceptively. Several prior works in misuse/intrusion detection may identify
common unauthorized data destruction patterns. Work that can help identify unauthorized data destruction is given in Section 2.5.4.
Some write requests for speciﬁc ﬁles may always be unauthorized and the monitoring should identify when such requests occur. Some of the integrity monitoring
methods can help identify unauthorized modiﬁcations to trigger deceptive responses.
The conditions for a deceptive response may consist of black/whitelists where the
blacklists provide a list of conditions, such as ﬁles or locations on a storage medium,
where there should always be a deceptive response or a whitelist where the system
should never inject deception. The rationale for a whitelist could be trade-o↵s in
time/space, or there may be conditions where deception is undesired, such as requests from high privileged processes. Whitelists may also decrease the e↵ectiveness
of the deception if the attacker can modify her attack to take place within a whitelist
directory or if she can whitelist her destructive actions.
Other conditions and events may also modify the deception to support the goals.
For instance, if storage space is abundant, the system may preserve all I/O that
modiﬁes ﬁles and allow the users on the system to operate without impedance. If
storage is scarce, the deceptive strategy may adjust to impede writes that appear
destructive.

Deceptive System Functionality and State
The Protection Policies should provide adequate defense and deception necessary to deceive threats and protect the truth regarding the “system functionality”
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or “system state” [7]. The deception may consist of any combinations (or multiple
combinations of) simulations/dissimulations. A single simulation/dissimulation pair
may not be sufficient to provide protection. Further, information regarding the true
system functionality and state may also be protected by other security mechanisms,
such as access control or integrity monitoring, but an emphasis is given to deceptive
strategies in this dissertation.
Modifying the way I/O operates to support the deceptive goals requires that
the adversary cannot uncover the true system functionality of overwriting a ﬁle by
manipulating the adversary’s perception through denial, misdirection, or confusion
[7].
Examples to deceive the system functionality includes masking the presence of the
services relating to the Monitoring or Protection Policies. A deception that protects
that system state may consist of a mask that hides the internal state of the system.
Deception regarding the system I/O exploits the conﬁrmation bias of the adversary’s assumption that overwriting data is an e↵ective way to achieve data destruction.
Note that all of the assumed threats use data overwriting to destroy some portion of a
ﬁle (or metadata) on a ﬁle system. The deception alters the overwrite functionality of
the system by preserving the data under destruction while reporting to the adversary
that the overwrite is successful.
An inconsistent deception for I/O may report that an overwrite is successful, but
upon review, the adversary discovers that the overwritten data is not on the storage
medium. Both strategies for I/O are viable, but the advantages/disadvantages require
discussing implementation details, which are given in Chapter 6.
The state of the system should appear weak to a data destruction attack to deceive
the adversary into using methods that DecMS is capable of handling correctly. The
deception can take the form of decoy data preservation services that are located
within the system under protection, without the attacker realizing the existence of
DecMS. Further, the impact of the attacks should also be convincing to an adversary.
As mentioned previously, a deception could convince the adversary that her data
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destruction attacks are e↵ective in destroying data by showing that the destroyed
ﬁles are no longer available.
Several services are necessary to support the goals of the deception. The Observation Policy and service mechanisms watch the users within a computing system for
destructive actions. Second, data preservation services are necessary to meet the ﬁrst
goal. The Analysis Policy and service identify data destruction and the Preservation
Policy and service preserves the data from potentially malicious destructive actions.
The data preservation service can incorporate one of the many preservation methods
systems from section 2.5.2.
If the services that are necessary to support the goals degrade system performance,
the attacker may uncover the presence of the deception. Deception regarding the
system activity may help obfuscate or deny the presence of service activity within the
system.
Speciﬁcally, there may be noticeable performance delay that occurs only during
data destruction. An adversary may conduct a statistical analysis to determine if
there are hidden services that are not visible from within the operating system.
The presence of the monitoring may be hidden from the users or may be isolated from the system under protection. There are several viable locations for the
monitoring service, which are described in Section 4.1.
The system under protection may have mechanisms in place that attempt to preserve user data. However, the data preservation within the system under protection
may be disabled after the attacker has compromised the system. If the attacker disables protection services, the attacker may perceive that the system is vulnerable to
unauthorized data destruction attacks. However, the perception of the system is incorrect if the attacker is denied access to information that indicates that a protection
system exists outside the system under protection. The attacker’s false perception of
the system state helps support the ﬁrst goal of gathering information about attacker’s
targets for unauthorized data destruction.
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Simulation and Dissimulation
Below are some simulation/dissimulation strategies for DecMS. The presentation
is left at a high level as it is necessary to provide implementation details to describe
the strategy adequately.
Mimicking The adversary’s conﬁrmation bias is that the system should behave
based on previous interactions with a similar system. A viable strategy is to conﬁgure
DecMS to behave in a indistinguishable manner to a system without DecMS. There
are several challenges to mimic a system with the monitoring and protection services.
If resources are shared between the services and the system under protection, then
the attacker may observe delays at unexpected times.
For example, DecMS could show the results of a successful data destruction attack
to convince the adversary that the attack was a success. The reality is that data is
preserved elsewhere.
Inventing Rather than mimicking a system without DecMS, the alternative strategy is to invent plausible causes of discrepancies. Some services, such as preservation
or analysis, may require additional delays that would not appear in a system without
DecMS. Inventing a cause of the delay, such as a networking delay or waiting for a
shared resource to become free may help deceive threat.
For instance, DecMS could invent arbitrary delays during benign writes to hide
true delays that caused by a preservation service. Inventing hardware or OS related
faults could also impede an attacker when data destruction is taking place.
Decoying If inventing is not convincing, then decoy services could lead an attacker
away from the true services. Several decoy services may purposefully be visible or
partially visible to an adversary. An attacker who disables or circumvents the decoy
service could fail to investigate the true service.
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For example, a decoy preservation service can be enabled on an operating system to
show that a system has protection against unauthorized data destruction. However, a
service outside of the operating system, such as a hardware component, could provide
the true preservation.
Masking Masking the true conﬁguration of the system could be achieved through
isolation techniques in addition to more deceptive techniques. For instance, DecMS
can insert deceptive responses whenever the adversary attempts to uncover information regarding the services of DecMS.
Repackaging If masking whole or parts of DecMS are difficult, then repackaging
can help in deceiving an adversary. DecMS can be repackaged to appear as an innocuous service that is unrelated to the goals of DecMS. For instance, a driver or kernel
module could be repackaged to support the goals of DecMS. The attacker may not
bother to verify that the kernel module is di↵erent from her preconception because
of her conﬁrmation bias.
Dazzling If the repackaging is not convincing to an adversary, then dazzling the
adversary is a viable option. For DecMS, dazzling may consist of producing several
plausible instances of DecMS. The dazzling strategy should make it difficult for an
adversary to identify the correct DecMS. Further, the risk should be high for an
adversary who interacts with the incorrect DecMS.

3.2.5 Feedback Channels and Monitoring
The defender uses the feedback channels to monitor the actions of the adversary
[7]. To protect against unauthorized data destruction, the feedback channel should
determine when a destructive action is taking place to react accordingly. The reaction,
as mentioned previously, should preserve the data under destruction to meet the ﬁrst
goal. The defenders should also react when the adversary is attempting to ﬁll the
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disk with meanless data to disrupt the system under protection in a way that may
negatively impact users of the system. The disruption may be in the form of halting
the system until sufficient storage space is available. Under such circumstances, the
attacker may be aware of the deception so the adversary may react with a counter
deception to potentially disrupt or impede the attacker.
The feedback and monitoring channel depends on the implementation of the deception. However, to protect against unauthorized data destruction, the following
actions should be monitored to support the deception.
• Identify writes that appear to be destructive
• Identify writes to any sensitive ﬁles that should preserve, regardless of the information that is written.
• A mechanism to determine the state of the system to adjust strategies as necessary.
Identifying destructive actions relies on existing detection mechanisms and thus
inherits the possibility of false positives and false negatives. As with other security
monitoring tools, the accuracy may not be perfect. There is a non-zero chance that
a benign user’s write appears destructive. Further, the monitoring and feedback
channels may also degrade system performance, which also a↵ects benign users.

3.2.6 Risks and Countermeasures
The ﬁnal step of planning the deception is to identify the risks and the potential
impact on the adversaries and benign users on the system. The risks and impact are
then examined to determine if the risks of using deception are worth the beneﬁts.
As mentioned in [7] there are risks associated with changes to the system that
a↵ect the adversary and the benign users or computing services on the system under
protection. The e↵ort necessary to destroy data under the proposed system is quantiﬁed, but additional experiments with real attackers and systems are left for future
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work. In addition to performance impact, real users may become confused when misinformation is presented. The confusion is subjective to the user who consumes the
deception and quantifying the confusion is also left for future work.
Several experiments will quantify the performance and degradation of the speciﬁc
deceptive strategies and systemization of the deception. The increase in write latency
and the decrease in throughput are viable measurements to quantify the impact of the
deceptive system. Likewise, the same measurements can also indicate the impedance
on the adversary. Other measurements, such as the percentage of ﬁles preserved will
quantify the accuracy of identifying destructive writes and the ability to safeguard
the ﬁles under destruction.
There are several viable strategies to deceive the attacker. The speciﬁc strategies
to deceive the adversary depend on the type of system and the amount of risk the
speciﬁc system may take. Hardware, software, virtual machines, and networking
solutions are viable places that may be modiﬁed to support the goals of the deception.
The design choices for implementing the deception, the types of systems that are
resilient to the risks introduced by deception warrant an in-depth discussion. Section
3.3 describes the types of systems that may support the risks of using deception and
Section 4.1 and 4.2 details the viable design choices to meet the goals.

3.3 Cost of Deception
While providing beneﬁts, deception comes at a cost. The system defenders must
support additional computing systems to manage, deploy, observe, or analyze the
e↵ectiveness of deceptions. Depending on the implementation, additional computational overhead and latency may be observable in the defended system. Since security
resources are bounded and often compete with other required services, deception may
also compete for resources. Further, adding deception into the system may need additional hardware to reduce the overhead associated with deception.
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Some of the costs include additional CPU cycles, storage space, and network transmission. For this dissertation, the costs for deploying deception to defend against
data destruction are associated with storage medium metrics, which include storage
space (for preserving data) and latency/throughput (for analyzing potential destruction). Further, any additional hardware/software introduced to a system increases
the chance of failure because of increasing the baseline complexity and reliance on
multiple systems. Misinformation may also cause user confusion or cause applications
to misbehave. Additional hardware, software, and other technologies such as virtual
machines may also be necessary to support the observation, analysis, and preservation
of unauthorized data destruction.
Below are performance or stability metrics that deception may degrade. While this
dissertation does not optimize for performance, the metrics are important nonetheless
to provide insight to help improve deceptive systems in future work.
Latency - The cost, measured in time, of “how long it takes for a given job or piece
of work to be completed” [76]. Latency metrics are typically given as a mean or
median for a ﬁxed amount of data written to or read from the storage medium.
Throughput “a measure of how much work gets done in a given time interval”
[77]. Throughput measurements are a unit of information (e.g., bits, bytes, or
kilobits) per a unit of time (e.g., milliseconds), typically taken as a mean or
median.
Variation The measurement of the “amount of variation [...] sometimes described
as spread or dispersion” [78]. The unit of measurement is a statistic such as a
variance or standard deviation for any of the other metrics in this list.
Permanent Error Rate A catastrophic error that cannot be repaired by a recovery
mechanism [79]. Permanent errors are detectable, either by a mechanism or
because they cause a catastrophic failure. Measurements for permanent error
rate include mean time to failure.
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Undetected Error Rate An error that remains undetected caused by “inadequacy
in the error check facilities” [79]. Undetected errors may cause the storage
system to misbehave by corrupting data or causing the system to perform poorly
(memory leakage).
Storage Space The measurement of information that occupies space on a storage
device.
The impact of each cost will ultimately depend on the implementation. It may
be possible, for instance, to use specialized hardware to optimize processing delays.
Several types of systems are portable, so power is an important cost factor to consider.
However, power constraints are not considered in this thesis and are assumed to be
adequate unless a need for additional hardware is necessary.
Deception may also produce misleading information for adversaries on the system.
As seen in [58], misleading information may take the form of false errors, which may
cause transient, permanent, or silent errors for malicious applications. Transient errors [79] or fault tolerance [80] will ultimately impact the latency/throughput/variation
(to analyze the fault) or storage space (e.g., error correcting codes) if the system shares
resources with the system under protection.
Additionally, there is a non-zero chance that a benign user may interact with the
deception. The deceptive information could disrupt benign users who are unaware of
the presence of deceptive information, such as system administrators, to misconﬁgure
the system to overcome a perceived error or performance degradation. Further, adding
additional systems increases complexity and testing, thus increasing the risks of bugs
and other errors.
The storage space increase to support the DecMS Preservation Goal may increase a
variety of ways. For instance, a system may be conﬁgured to copy-on-write everything
until the storage device is no longer in use. In the worse case, if every overwrite is
unique, then the additional storage space necessary is O(nk ) where n is the size of
the drive and k is the number of complete overwrites of n before the drive fails or is
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no longer in use. The above scheme is not practical; a more reasonable solution is to
reuse portions of the storage devices when preservation instances that are no longer
useful.

3.3.1 Types of Systems
The applicability of deception, given the costs above, may not be suitable for some
systems. Introducing additional latency may be unacceptable for certain computing
services, while perfectly acceptable for others. For instance, the additional overhead
introduced by analyzing and injecting deception on a system primarily for user media
consumption is acceptable given the degradation of storage performance. In contrast,
it may be unacceptable to reduce the performance of real-time systems, which has
strict deadlines to meet.
Four systems modes (interactive, batch, transaction, and real-time systems [81])
characterize the acceptable/unacceptable use of deception on storage mediums.
Interactive systems are primarily for active users who interact with computing
resources continuously. A user is interactive with the system through input peripherals and observes changes through an output device such as a monitor or terminal [82]. Important aspects of interactive systems include low “response time” to
allow a user to issue a command and observe output, and meet user’s expectations
of latency/throughput [81, Chapter 2.4.1]. Latency on interactive systems is a major
factor and deception, ideally, should be imperceivable to the end user. Delays are imperceivable to a user when they are below 0.1 s [83]. Current storage devices, such as
SSDs, write at a rate of about 500 Megabits per second. At 0.1 seconds, the amount
of data written is about 6.25 megabytes. When writing ﬁles under 6.25 megabytes,
the overhead from deception may be imperceivable.
Similar to an interactive system, transaction systems are designed to process a
large number of transactions concurrently. A user interacts with transaction systems
through queries (a transaction) with an expectation of a short latency of about one or
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two seconds [84, Chapter 1.7]. For transaction systems, data consistency is important.
Transactions must guarantee “atomicity,” meaning the transactions cannot be in an
incomplete state [84]. Thus, transaction systems are sensitive to any failures and
faults.
Batch systems, contrasted to interactive and transaction systems, do not have an
active user interacting with the systems [81, Chapter 1.4.1]. Instead, batch systems
gather jobs, processes them, and save results. Batch systems maximize throughput,
CPU utilization, and turnaround time, measured by jobs completed within a time
interval [81, Chapter 2.4.1]. Batch systems are not as sensitive to errors compared
to other systems. Faults are handled by discarding the results and relaunching the
batch job.
Real-time systems provide guarantees that a given task will complete within a
predictable time interval and by a certain deadline [81, Chapter 2.4.1]. Some realtime systems face catastrophic failures if the processing does not complete within
the time interval [85]. Throughput and latency are crucial measurements for realtime systems. Any changes to real-time systems should not encumber the ability
to complete tasks before the predeﬁned deadline with predictable time intervals. A
real-time system may disregard inputs to keep up with the time requirements, which
is not a feature in the other systems considered [84].
For some systems, deceptive information may be unacceptable if it impacts certain
resources. For instance, if a deception scheme impacts the latency for a real-time
system, it may be unacceptable. Other systems are ﬂexible for certain impacts caused
by a deception. Storage space and throughput, for instance, may be ﬂexible on
interactive or real-time systems. A user may not notice if the increase in latency is
imperceivable small [83] or mixed with other user interactions. Real-time systems
have a narrow set of requirements, and thus storage requirements are known ahead
of time. Below, the systems discussed above are compared to their tolerance of
degradation for several cost factors.
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3.3.2 Cost Impact of Deception on Systems
Given the above characterization of systems and potential costs associated with
the use of deception, Figure 3.2 illustrates a comparison of the non-economical costs
under three possible levels of impact: Tolerable, Undesirable, and Unacceptable. Systems that tolerate degraded performance are designed to handle the degradation, or
the speciﬁc metric is not critical to delivering the system’s end goals. The undesirable category describes systems that do not fail under instances of poor performance,
but the degradation causes inconvenience. Finally, systems that have unacceptable
degradation have little to no tolerance for reduced performance and risk catastrophe
if observed.
For each type of systems considered in Figure 3.2, resources between the deception
and the system under protection are shared. However, for illustrative purposes, each
system type does not overlap. In practice, systems may service multiple computing
roles, such as running batch jobs on an interactive system when a user is not present2
There are several caveats under all of the systems considered. Some real-time
systems have soft deadlines rather than hard deadlines [85]. Some interactive systems have a lower tolerance than others. Some interactive systems, such as video
editing require high storage throughput for rendering high-resolution media. We assume the typical case for each system based on the general design goals listed in
the cited references. Further, the ordering (from left to right) from tolerable to unacceptable is relative to the systems (batch, real-time, interactive, and transaction)
under consideration. Further, interactive, transaction and batch systems may also
be cloud-based. The cloud systems may increase the allowable latency or variance as
networking may introduce additional delays. Real-time systems are not cloud-based
as networking delays are difficult to predict unless there is a dedicated communication line. Cloud systems are not explicitly considered in Figure 3.2, but may allow
for more performance degradation for transaction systems and interactive systems,
speciﬁcally, latency and variance.
2
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Figure 3.2.: The costs of using deception on various systems.

The increase of I/O latency may not impact batch systems. Batch systems typically queue jobs to run. Latency is, therefore, more acceptable on batch systems compared to interactive and transaction systems. For both interactive and transaction
systems, a user is engaged in the system and expects tasks to complete quickly [81,84].
However, any delays below a certain threshold are imperceivable to users [83] so there
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are acceptable increases in latency. Increasing the latency for real-time systems is unacceptable compared to the other systems considered. Any additional delay caused
by or resulting from deception may cause the real-time system to miss tight deadlines [81].
A decrease in throughput caused by or resulting from deception may be tolerable
in interactive systems. On an interactive system, users are typically consuming or
producing a small amount of data from the storage medium. When high throughput
is necessary on an interactive system, a user can work on other tasks, so the decrease
in throughput is amortized. Compared to batch or transaction systems, a reduction
in throughput is undesirable. Transaction systems are servicing concurrent users, so
a reduction in throughput will cause fewer users serviced over time. Likewise, an
important metric for a batch system is the number of jobs completed over time. For
real-time systems, it is unacceptable for a decrease in throughput if it impacts the
ability to complete tasks by the deadline [81].
An increase in variance may also be acceptable for some systems. Batch systems
are designed to service jobs. The workload of batch systems depends on the number
of jobs to process. The variance is dependent on system load, and batch systems
are expected to handle a variety of workloads. As a live user is present in both
transaction and interactive systems, an increase in variance is undesirable. Users
operating such systems expect tasks to complete within a reasonable time frame
concerning their expectation [81]. High variance means that some transactions or
other user interactions may take a longer period than what is expected of the user.
Likewise, a high variance will produce a wide degree of possibilities, which are not
handled gracefully on real-time systems that have tight deadlines to meet [81].
For interactive systems, an increase error permanent rate is more tolerable compared to other systems. If an error occurs, the user can react and follow up with
additional inquiries to resolve the issue or ﬁnd alternatives. For batch and transaction systems, the errors will reduce the throughput, which is undesirable as the
goals of those systems are high throughput. For batch systems, a system job can

68
be relaunched after resolving the issue [84, Chapter 1.7]. Real-time systems should
gracefully handle errors by disregarding the issue to meet tight deadlines or halt the
execution to prevent a catastrophic result. Depending on the type of error, a realtime system error may also be unacceptable. The assumption for permanent errors
is that they are detectable, so a real-time system should be designed to handle the
errors appropriately.
Silent errors are undesirable for interactive systems. Silent errors cause an application or operating system to misbehave in unforeseen ways. Identifying silent errors
require manual investigation to ﬁnd the cause. An interactive system, by deﬁnition,
has a real user present and may intervene or determine the cause once the issue is observable. It may be as simple as restarting the machine to resolve memory leak issues
or may require running diagnosis tools to help root problems like hardware failures.
For real-time, transactions, and batch systems, client errors cause substantial issues.
For a transaction system, storing invalid or incomplete transactions are unacceptable.
Batch systems may report incorrect results for a job which is also unacceptable. Silent
errors for real-time systems may disrupt the ability to process information within the
deadline, which is acceptable.
Several systems can tolerate some storage overhead caused by deception. For
instance, interactive systems storage is ﬂexible. The user may manage the storage by
removing unneeded ﬁles or saving ﬁles o↵site. The user has control and can react to
the lack of storage so that the additional overhead may have minimal impact. If a
deception scheme impacts the latency for a real-time system, it may be unacceptable.
As real-time systems are designed for a well-deﬁned space, the storage requirement should be deﬁned ahead of time, so adjustments could be made to support the
additional storage costs.
Other systems are ﬂexible for certain impacts caused by a deception. Storage space
and throughput, for instance, may be ﬂexible on interactive or real-time systems. A
user may not notice that a task takes twice as long if the increase in latency is
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imperceivable small or amortize with other user interactions. Real-time systems have
a narrow set of requirements, and thus storage requirements are known ahead of time.
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4 ARCHITECTURE AND DESIGN SPACE
4.1 DecMS Integration Location
A computing system has several layers of abstraction to allow programmers and
users to achieve their goals without focusing on lower layer mechanics. Rather than
fully understanding the complexities of the system, a programmer or user can focus
on high-level goals without worrying about the speciﬁcs of the OS and hardware. A
user’s goal may be to write a report and send it to her colleagues. She wants to focus
on the contents of her report and not machine code that is required to operate the
storage device. Likewise, adversaries who develop malware and exploits and rely on
the consistency of the lower levels of abstraction to achieve her goals. As mentioned
in section 3.2.3 the adversary’s conﬁrmation bias is that the lower levels will operate
similarly to her prior interactions. The various layers of abstractions, where the
attacker may not check and validate for consistency according to her perception, are
viable locations to insert deception.
The deception exploits the adversary’s bias that the code (or hardware) at a lower
layer is trustworthy in completing an I/O request. As stated in Ken Thompson’s
Reﬂections on Trusting Trust:
“you can’t trust code that you didn’t write yourself [...] No amount of
source-level veriﬁcation or scrutiny will protect you from using untrusted
code [32].”
The above quote applies to adversaries as much as well-behaved users. At some point,
the adversary relies on code at a lower-layer of abstraction to facilitate the I/O. The
layers in which the adversary fails to check for deception are viable locations for
facilitating the deceptive goals.

71

C

-0:;:::::;
0
Cl)

User Process

Guest User Process

OS Software

(.)

ci5 ~

Device Drivers

ro en

Hardware Controller

Kernel

~

Host OS Kernel
Hardware

Physical Device

Host User Process

Hypervisor

>,

_J

Guest OS Kernel

Hardware

Figure 4.1.: Possible layers of abstraction and monitoring methods for deception,
based on [81, Chapters 5, 7].

Figure 4.1 is an illustration of typical computing systems, arranged by layers of
abstraction. The ﬁgure is based on the description of a multi-layer machine in [86,
Chapter 1], where the highest layer of abstraction interacts with lower layers through
a translation or interpretation of languages that are speciﬁc to each layer. As the
focus of this dissertation is on I/O, the translations or interpretations are in the form
of I/O requests. For instance, a high layer may request to write an English sentence
to the end of a named ﬁle. Lower levels translate the name of the ﬁle to the physical
location of the ﬁle on a speciﬁc storage medium. At the lowest layer, the I/O request
executes on the electronic circuits within the physical hardware.
The layers in Figure 4.1 illustrate the various I/O software layers, inspired by
the I/O software layers description in [81, Chapter 5]. Figure 4.1 contains additional
layers to describe the hardware below the software and a few optional layers, such as
the virtual machine layer and networking layer. The optional layers may be present
in systems that use virtual machines or if the I/O request is for a ﬁle on a network
storage system such as NFS.
The layers in Figure 4.1 are categorized as follows. At the top, user-space is where
applications request I/O through a well-deﬁned software mechanism such as an OS
system call. User permissions control mechanisms limit the read/write/execute permissions of certain ﬁles and locations of the disk. Below the user-space level are
the kernel layers, where I/O requests require administrative permission and have full
access to the storage medium. However, some of the hardware functionality may be
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inaccessible even within the kernel layers. Some functionality, such as hardware diagnosis information requires a special boot sequence that exists outside of the operating
system. Furthermore, the hardware controller may be inaccessible without physically
attaching a device to program the ﬁrmware.
The accessibility of the various layers requires a variety of e↵ort for the attacker to
gain access. At the user level, an attacker may be able to overwrite user ﬁles. If the
attacker gains administrative privileges, the attacker may overwrite any ﬁles within
the ﬁle system. Further, if an attacker has physical access to the device, she may able
to reprogram the I/O controller to cause damage to ﬁles that may be inaccessible for
security monitoring done at the OS level.
The deception may be hidden from view by placing the deceptive components
below where the adversary has access. Further, the security tools, such as access
control, may also supplement the deceptive components by denying access.
For each layer in Figure 4.1, a short description, advantages, disadvantages, and
examples are given.

4.1.1 User-Level
At the highest level, the user level application may be a valid place for inserting
deception. An application can be modiﬁed to observe for destructive actions and
provide mechanisms to protect against the data destruction. There may be several
tools within the system for data destruction. For example, some secure deletion applications such as shred or srm are standard tools used by benign end-users to delete
sensitive data from the disk securely. One possible strategy is to simply replace these
tools with versions that achieve the deceptive goals. However, the adversary may
install her own data destruction tools or use other techniques that do not rely on the
binaries on the system. Application level modiﬁcation should, therefore, be supplemented with other security tools, such as denying the installation of tools and have
a trusted procedure to modify and update system binaries. Additional mechanisms,

73
such as a method to preserve the data under destruction, may be necessary with
user-level modiﬁcation to support the deceptive goals.

Advantage
One advantage of inserting deception at the user-level is the simplicity. The states
of the operating system and applications are available at the user-level without having
to transform or interpret the information at higher levels. At lower levels, it may be
difficult to make decisions and select the best strategy to deceive the adversary. For
instance, monitoring for deception at the virtual machine level requires bridging the
semantic gap, which is nontrivial.
Even with a simplistic approach, the deception may work well against automated
tools or adversaries that do not check for deceptive strategies. It may not be necessary
to insert deception at lower levels of abstraction if the goals can be met at the user
level.

Disadvantage
It may be difficult to deceive the adversary if she can view the entire deception system. Users and potential adversaries interact with a computing system at
the user level. The attacker may exist on the user level (or lower), so the simulation/dissimulation strategies may be difficult if the attacker has full access to the
same level where the deception exists.
Several of the deceptive strategies involving hiding. The dissimulation strategy
of masking may be particularly difficult to do convincingly, but other dissimulations
strategies such as repackaging or dazzling may be more suitable at the user level.
The mimicking simulation strategy may be difficult for a defender to achieve if the
attacker can easily distinguish di↵erences between a system with or without DecMS.
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Nonetheless, even if the attacker can detect the presence of DecMS, she may decide
to go elsewhere1 and target a system without DecMS.
Inserting a DecMS at the user level may require additional security tools. Hiding
a deceptive component may rely on tools that operate at a lower level. For example,
a process listing tool may not report any processes that are in use for the deception.

Examples
Modifying user level applications to support a DecMS is one possible approach.
Prior work, such as the embedded sensors/detectors in Diego Zamboni’s work in [87]
can help detect destructive writes and trigger the use of a deceptive strategy. The
work, however, was not focused on achieving a deception but rather detecting attacks.
Other techniques can help support deception but may require additional tools at lower
levels of abstraction. For instance, rather than modifying the source code, a user
process can be instrumented with deceptive mechanisms through control hijacking
[88]. The advantage is that the binaries on persistent storage are not modiﬁed, and
the evidence of the deception occurs only in memory. Code injection modiﬁes the
execution ﬂow that attempts to write to storage and checks for destructive intent.
However, the components to insert the deception into the user level may require
administrative privileges or exist at a lower level, such as the kernel.

4.1.2 Kernel-Level
At the kernel level, an attacker must gain administrative privileges to view or
modify the kernel. There are several viable places to insert deception within the
kernel. The OS contains I/O related software that interfaces with user applications
that request to read or write to a ﬁle on some storage device. I/O related system
calls handle the requests. Other interfaces to hardware devices, such as drivers or
interrupt handlers, may be instrumented or modiﬁed to support the deceptive goals.
1

Finding an alternative attack may not be an option for a targeted attack.
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Advantages
For an attacker to gain a clear view of the abstraction between the user level and
the kernel level, the may need to gain administrative privileges. The access control
mechanisms on interactive systems typically protect the OS kernel. If the deception
requires portions of the system to remain inaccessible, then there is an advantage to
placing the deceptive system within the kernel as there exist control mechanisms to
deny users access to kernel modiﬁcation.
The advantage of operating system modiﬁcation is access to a rich collection of
forensically valuable information, such as running processes, timestamp changes, ﬁle
writes, and active users. The information can be later used for forensic analysis if the
destructive writes are unauthorized and malicious.

Disadvantages
While it may be suitable to protect against user-level applications that are partaking in unauthorized data destruction, kernel level deception may be broken if an
attacker gains administrative privileges. Security monitoring tools that exist within
a kernel [89] are shown to be weak against a persistent attacker who is motivated to
circumvent such security mechanisms.
In regards to ease of development, it may be harder to modify a kernel to support
a DecMS. Further, kernel code is sensitive to changes and an increase in system
instability is undesirable.

Examples
Modiﬁcations to the POSIX read, write, or open system calls may be conﬁgured to
examine the write bu↵er for destructive patterns before reaching the storage medium.
Shared libraries are another viable location to examine for destructive I/O. Prior
work in function, library, or system call interposition [65,90] could be the mechanism
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used in monitoring for deception. Wrapping system libraries also provide a defensive
advantage to hide the presence of DecMS. Recent work in [53] use custom drivers to
observe for write patterns typical in crypto ransomware. In the domain of deception,
prior work in honeypots [89] uses custom kernel modules to intercept system calls to
gain an understanding of an attacker within the honeypot system. Work in [58] use
inconsistent deception in modifying the system calls and show that malware operates
poorly within these systems with some degradation to benign applications.
All of the above examples are viable strategies to monitor and react to destructive
I/O operations.

4.1.3 Hardware-Level
Another viable layer of abstraction is to insert deception within hardware components. It may be difficult for an adversary who does not have physical access to a
device to identify if there are undesired components attached to hardware interfaces
and bus lines. Also, it may be difficult to verify that the controllers are operating
correctly without physical access to the hardware controller. However, there are some
challenges in understanding the semantic meaning of the I/O requests without context or additional information from the higher levels of abstraction. For example, it
is non-trivial to determine the speciﬁc ﬁle under destruction by examining raw disk
access only. Mapping low-level disk operations to ﬁles are considered a semantic gap
problem for disk storage [91].

Advantages
At the hardware level, the deception may be hidden unless the attacker has physical access to the system. Deceptive dissimulations, such as masking, may be hard to
unmask at the hardware level. To detect the presence of a hardware attachment, the
attacker may have to conduct timing analysis to see if a speciﬁc task completes slower
than expected. Hardware changes may also have some other e↵ects that an attacker
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may use to determine the presence of a hardware device without having physical access to the machine. If the hardware device that is in use for the deception alters
data caches, then the attacker can measure the cache hit/miss rate and determine
if the machine has additional hardware attached to the storage system. Both timing and cache analysis may be difficult to do compared to the detection methods at
higher levels of abstraction. However, the timing and cache analysis may be simpler
to conduct than compromising a system administrator account if the deception exists
in the kernel or user levels. Nonetheless, masking and mimicking deceptive strategies
may work well with hardware solutions if performance and cache hit/miss rates are
not a↵ected.
Some deceptive systems may be instrumented without a↵ecting performance degradation. A data bus that is sending information from one device to another may be
observed by physically attaching a wire to the bus. A deceptive system could simply
relay all the information sent over the bus and preserve an audit log of all requests
sent to and from the devices. Further, hardware solutions may increase performance
in comparison to the software solutions at higher levels.
Modifying the physical layer to enable deception may outperform solutions that
place the analysis within the software. For example, Spensky et al. interpose a SATA
controller with a physical device and demonstrates a near identical read throughput compared to the same system without the instrumentation [92]. However, other
experiments show a degraded write performance compared to a system without interposing at the SATA controller.

Disadvantages
One disadvantage of placing deception within the physical layer is the additional
cost of using hardware. The layers above are all software solutions and do not require
special hardware to support the deception. Reprogramming the hardware controllers
is a valid strategy to insert deception within the hardware, however, reprogramming
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hardware controllers is often nontrivial and may require a special hardware interface
to access the ﬁrmware. Physical modiﬁcations and testing for consistency in hardware
may also be more challenging than compared to software solutions.
It may also be necessary to gather other information to determine the best deceptive strategy when monitoring for deception. Simply logging and preserving audit
logs for destructive writes may be meaningless for a user, system administrator, or
forensic examiner. Because of the hardware semantic gap problem, it may be difficult, or impossible, to determine the speciﬁc process or the user who requested the
destructive write by examining only the raw disk writes. Gathering such information
may require examining higher levels of abstraction.

Examples
A hardware controller or a device connected to the data bus, for instance, may
keep an audit of all writes to a storage device. The device may store the audit trail
on a write-only device such as an optical disc.
Dione [91] interposes disk operations outside of the “system-under-analysis” with
physical hardware or virtualize software. Dione then translates the raw disks requests
to high-level data objects through the use of Sleuth Kit. Interposing at the hardwarelevel may be feasible through similar techniques proposed by Dione to monitor for
destructive disk writes and to insert deception when necessary.

4.1.4 VM-Level
Virtual machine introspection (VMI) may also be used to inspect a virtual machine
and examine system calls for ﬁle modiﬁcations [62, 63]. The monitoring for deception
exists outside of the system under protection within the virtual machine monitor
(VMM). VMI allows a host machine to access the contents of memory within a guest
virtual machine, interpose events, and “extrapolate the software state” of the virtual
machine [62]. The challenge of VMI is bridging the semantic gap, that is, gather
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meaningful information about the guest OS from raw memory access. It is typically
assumed that the VMM is isolated from the guest OS and several security tools take
advantage of the isolation. For instance, IDS [62] and dynamic malware analysis [69]
systems are some of the security tools enabled by VMI.

Advantages
There are several advantages of placing deception outside the protected operating
system and within a VMM. First, if an attacker inﬁltrates a guest virtual machine,
it is difficult for the attacker to reach the host. Virtual machines and the VMM
are designed to be isolated.Secondly, VMI can be stealthy [63, 69, 93], increasing the
difficulty for an attacker to uncover the deception.

Disadvantages
There are also some disadvantages of VMI. Similar to the challenges of inserting
deception near the hardware, the challenge with VMI is bridging the semantic gap,
i.e., determining which ﬁles are changed from outside the operating system, from
information stored in system memory. Prior work [94] and an associated open source
project [95] address semantic gap challenges. Rekall, a memory forensic framework,
proﬁles modern operating systems and provides indexes to kernel objects as they
reside in memory2 .
Placing DecMS within a VMM is not as ﬂexible as placing DecMS within the
operating system. One disadvantage is that commercial operating systems frequently
update, so the indexes to in-memory kernel objects must be updated for the VMI
mechanism as well. However, it is evident when updates are available thus the maintenance of a system with VMI can be managed accordingly.
2

http://www.rekall-forensic.com/posts/2014-02-20-profile-selection.html
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Examples
As referenced earlier, there are several tools available to inspect a virtual machine
from a VMM. In particular, the Drakvuf VMI mechanism [69] works well because
Drakvuf is stealthy and provides an advantage to deceptive strategies that attempt
to mask the deception or mimic a system without deception.

4.1.5 Networking-Level
Networking is another layer where deception can be inserted into. Particular to
I/O, there is network ﬁle system that sends read/write requests for ﬁles over the
network. A deceptive system can inspect all the read/write requests and identify
writes that may be destructive or the deceptive system may create an audit trail of
commands that overwrite data, which are reversible if the writes are later determined
to be destructive.

Advantages
As with other layers of abstraction, the attacker may not have access to routers
or servers where the deception is taking place. The separation between the system
under protection and the deceptive systems provides advantages when the deception
calls for masking or mimicking strategies.
The other advantage is that interception I/O at the networking level is more
well deﬁned compared to analyzing raw disk accesses or VMI in which both require
bridging the semantic game.
Another advantage is that user tolerance for latency may be up to 0.1 ms [83],
allowing for some delays without signiﬁcantly harming the user experience. Deceptive
strategies that are designed to impede the attacker can be repackaged as networking
delays caused by network congestion or other factors.
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Disadvantages
A disadvantage of placing deception at the networking layers is that it may be
difficult to partition the network so that the attacker is not able to view the deception.
That is, relative to the partitioning of deceptive components that require hiding that
is within the physical layer. It may be difficult to control the attacker’s access certain
segments of the networking where the NFS exists but it still may easier to control
compared to placing the deception in the user or kernel layers. Another challenge
with networking layer deception is the lack of information about active users within
the system under protection, which is the same problem when placing deception in
the physical layer. Additional tools may be necessary to gather information when
reacting to an adversary with deception.

Examples
The work on storage based intrusion detection systems (SBIDS) [52] describe
the inspection of reading/write requests on an NFS. The read/write requests are
inspected for behaviors that are suspect. A similar strategy can check for destructive
write patterns.

4.1.6 Summary
As discussed above, placing deception within each I/O layer has advantages and
disadvantages. Some of the weaknesses that appear in several layers are the requirement of using other security mechanisms for protecting the deception. Some of the
additional security mechanisms are standard in modern systems, such as access control or requiring physical access to program hardware components.
While the discussion focuses on individual layers of deception, it is possible to
place deception within multiple layers of abstraction. For instance, the kernel level
or VM level deception can work in conjunction with deception in lower layers, such
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Table 4.1: Summary of possible layers to monitor and preserve data under destruction.
Layer
User

Advantages
Simplicity.

Kernel

Protection under access control. Access to
system state

Virtual

Solution
separates
trusted and untrusted
system. The adversary must compromise
VMM. More stealthy
compared to user or
kernel layer
Inaccessible to remote
threats. May provide
performance improvement.
Separates trusted /
untrusted system. A
higher threshold of acceptable delays and reduced throughput.

Hardware

Network

Disadvantages
Hard to hide from
threat. Threat can disable.
Access control to kernel may fail.
More
complex to modify and
test than user layer.
The semantic gap
problem and maintenance.

Higher cost compared
to software solutions.
The semantic gap
problem for hardware.
Observing system internal state and information. Not as ﬂexible compared to other
solutions

Examples
Embedded
Sensors/detectors [87].
Library and system
call interposition [65,
90]. Modiﬁed kernel or
drivers [53, 89].
Virtual machine introspection [69], virtual
disk monitoring [91].

Modiﬁed
ﬁrmware
or
hardware
controller [92].
Network interposition
or monitoring [52].
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as the physical or network layers. The higher layers have a better semantic view of
the system where the attacker operates and can monitor and provide information to
the deception in lower layers.
The decision to place deception within certain layers is driven by attacker biases
and assumptions of the attacker’s capability. It may be sufficient to protect against
unauthorized data destruction attacks through the use of a deceptive kernel module
if the attacker does not gain administrative access to the system under protection.
The other factor in deciding where to place the deception is the impact on wellbehaved users on the system. As discussed in Section 3.3, some performance penalty
may be acceptable for some systems (e.g., interactive or batch systems) but not
others (e.g., real-time systems). In selecting the layer(s) to place the deception, one
must consider performance penalties that may not be suitable. However, it may
be possible to minimize some of the performance penalty if the dedicated hardware
supports the deception. A pure software solution may not be suitable because of the
performance cost on some systems, but a solution could split the deception between
high layers (e.g., kernel or VM layers) and lower levels (e.g., physical or networking
layers). Placing deception in lower layers, however, requires additional testing and
costs compared to pure software solutions but the cost may be justiﬁed if the data
within the system is protected.

4.2 DecMS Integration Methods
At each layer of abstraction, information is passed between layers to facilitate the
I/O. At the highest layer, the user (or process) on the system requests to overwrite
a ﬁle, and at the lowest layer, the hardware writes the speciﬁed data to a location
determined by higher levels of abstraction. The information may transform between
layers into a language that is suitable for the given layer of abstraction. For instance,
the data ﬂow at the high layer may be a string that represents a ﬁle and a bu↵er.
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Table 4.2: Methods to support the goals of a DecMS
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• •
Req uest I/O
Exec ute I/O
Verify I/O
Information
Flow

+Lv-

L r - (Process) overwrite

file with all zero
L, - (Process) verify fi le
contains all zeros

is a modified L e
that supports
deception and
executes I/O
Ld

Ld -

Preserve Data
then Exec ute
I/O

The introspection is passive
and does not modify flow of
information but may invoke
actions
D monitors for events of
interests
D - Asynchronous Data
Preservation

Interposition

Wrapper

;
The interposition alters
the flow of information.
D monitors and responds
deceitfully to I/O
req uests
D - Data Preservation
then Exec ute I/O

•'

The wrappers D 1 and
D2 alters the
information between
layers or executes
actions to support the
deception
D 1 - Alter to cause a
write fa ult in L e
D2 - Alter return code
to "Success"

At lower layers of abstraction, the data ﬂow between layers may be in the form of a
smaller segment of the write bu↵er and a physical address of the storage device.
The deception modiﬁes or observes the data that passes between layers. The
deception may support the original requests (e.g., write to a speciﬁc location on a
storage medium) but may also include additional tasks that are not part of the user’s
perception of the system (e.g., write audit information for every write request).
There are several strategies to observe or modify data ﬂow between or within
the same layer to support a deception. Figure 4.2 illustrates all the strategies to
observe or modify I/O ﬂow between (or within) layers. Lr represents the layer when
the I/O request originates and the request passes to a lower layer. The layer below,
Le represents the execution of the I/O request. The speciﬁcs of the execution is
dependent on the layer, but it can be a translation of the request to a language that
a lower layer understands. The execution may also break the requestion into smaller
segments, bu↵er the request, or any code execution that is necessary to facilitate the
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request at the speciﬁc layer. Next, layer Lv veriﬁes the I/O by either receiving the
sought information or a status code that indicates the I/O is a success or failure.
Note that Lr , Le , Lv may exist on separate layers or the same layers. For instance, Lr
and Lv may be a request and validation at the user layer. For simplicity sake, Le is
assumed to be in a di↵erent layer than Lr or Lv but in practice may all exist within
the same layer. For instance, Lr a function call, Le is the function, and Lv is the
continuation of the code execution after the function call.
The layer itself may undergo a modiﬁcation to support a deception, introspection
can passively observe information, interposition can disrupt to data ﬂow and route it
to a di↵erent layer or component within the layer, or a wrapper can insert addition
layers before and after a speciﬁc layer.
Each of the above strategies has advantages and disadvantages to consider. The
discussion below explores and discusses the strategies. Each strategy is independent
of the layer where the deception is placed, but the speciﬁc implementations may have
a performance impact. For instance, wrappers may have a performance penalty that
is higher than using introspection. The additional layers may cause additional performance overhead compared to a strategy that passively observes the I/O. Further,
the speciﬁc strategies may require additional security mechanisms to protect the deception. For instance, the wrapper strategy may require additional mechanisms to
deny the user access to the new layers inserted between layers.

4.2.1 Modiﬁcation
A modiﬁcation to a layer is when a layer is replaced to support the deception.
The strategy is analogous to trojan horse applications that contain additional functionality hidden and undesired by the end user. The modiﬁed layer may support the
functionality of the layer and only insert deception when necessary. In Figure 4.2, the
layer Le is replaced with Ld . The letter d or D is the nomenclature that represents a
deception.
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To help support the deceptive goals, D may impede requests, preserve data under destruction, gather information regarding the ﬁles under destruction, or respond
deceptively with false errors.

Advantages
Depending on the layer, it may be simple to replace or modify the layer. For
instance, a standard I/O library or drive can be replaced with a customized version
to support the deception. If the modiﬁcation is within a layer that is inaccessible
to the user (e.g., within the physical layer), then it may be difficult to recognize the
presence of a modiﬁed layer.

Disadvantages
If the adversary has access to the modiﬁed layer, she may compare the modiﬁed
layer with her expectation. For instance, a library or drive can be compared with a
cryptographic checksum, detecting the presence of the modiﬁcation.

4.2.2 Introspection
Introspection, based on the deﬁnition from [96], “a technique for externally monitoring the runtime state of a system-level virtual machine.” Rather than observing
the state of a virtual machine, the deﬁnition is broadened to include any layer of abstraction. Introspection observes the state of the layers and the information exchange
between layers without disrupting or altering the said information or layers. The
observation is passive but still exploits the adversary’s conﬁrmation bias that the I/O
request is not observed closely by the system defenders. Introspection is analogous
to an eavesdropper on a channel who observes but does not modify the information
exchanged between the communicating parties.
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The introspection strategy can help in achieving the deceptive goals by observing
for data destruction actions and preserve data before Le executes. While D itself
cannot inject false information or disrupt information ﬂow, D may work with other
strategies and trigger other deception mechanisms to react to speciﬁc events.

Advantages
It may be difficult for an adversary to observe the presence of introspection because
the information ﬂow is not disrupted and there are no modiﬁcations to any of the
layers. Because of its passivity, there may be no noticeable performance impact,
especially if there is no resource sharing between the introspection system and the
system under protection. For preserving an audit log of all changes, the introspection
method may work well as long as the introspection system can handle the I/O requests
without dropping requests.

Disadvantages
There may be a race condition if the introspection observes then reacts to an
event. Reacting to an event may require additional strategies such as a modiﬁcation
or interposition at di↵erent layers.

4.2.3 Interposition
Rather than passively observing the I/O passed between layers, the introspection
strategy intercepts the I/O between layers and redirects the information to di↵erent
location. In Figure 4.2, the D component receives the information that Le should
receive. After D facilitates the request, with possible deception, D then sends some
information to layer Lv to verify the I/O request.
Interposition may help in the deceptive goals. The interposition may inspect all
I/O request, properly facilitate the request, and only react deceptively under some
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circumstance. If the I/O request is suspicious, D may respond slowly, preserve the
data under destruction, or partially fulﬁll the request to confuse the adversary.

Advantages
By disrupting the information ﬂow between layers, the interposition has more
control over the introspection strategy. The interposition may require some tasks to
complete before allowing the I/O to continue to other layers. For instance, D may
need to write an audit log or copy some information before Lv executes. Another
advantage is that the Le remains unmodiﬁed so the adversary cannot simply check
Le for integrity.

Disadvantages
The Disadvantage with interposition is a decrease in stealthiness compared to
introspection. The adversary may look for evidence of disrupting the data ﬂow between layers, which is comparatively less stealthy than the introspection strategy
which does not alter information ﬂow. The challenge for the defender is to protect
the mechanisms that disrupt the ﬂow of information between layers.

4.2.4 Wrapper
Rather than changing the ﬂow of information, the wrapper strategy changes the
information that is passed between layers to inject deception into the I/O. The rightmost column in Figure 4.2, D1 is placed between Lr and Le . D1 may simply modify
the requests sent to Le to meet some deceptive goal. Likewise, D2 is placed between
Le and Lv . The D1 and D2 wrappers are either new layers that exist between Lv , Le ,
or Lv or they may exist within the layers.
Modifying the information can help facilitate the deceptive goals. The D1 layer can
observe the speciﬁc targets, identify destructive behaviors, preserve the data under
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destruction, or impede the speed with which attackers destroy ﬁles. The D2 layer can
also impede but may modify the values returned to Lv to confuse the adversary.

Advantages
The advantage of wrappers over the other strategies is that it allows Le to execute
while allowing modiﬁcation of the I/O before and after. An attacker can verify that
Le executes and that the integrity of Le is valid.

Disadvantages
The wrapper does not have as much ﬂexibility as the modiﬁcation or interposition
strategy. The deceptive strategies are a modiﬁcation to the I/O between layers rather
than modifying how a speciﬁc layer behaves. Further, the defenders must protect D1
and D2 , which could be challenging if the attacker has access to the layers.

4.3 Monitoring Methods and Policy
Section 4.1 describes the various layers of abstraction to place the deception, and
in Section 4.2, the strategies to insert the deception are detailed. Each layer of
abstraction and the strategies must also consider the location of the adversary and
the location of where any processing, logging, and data preservation takes place.
The deception can share system resources with the adversary, however, if the
deception is not adequately protected, the adversary may be able to uncover the
deception or disable it.
There are several trade-o↵s to consider. If the attacker is not checking for deception, it may be sufficient to place the deception within the same layer of abstraction to
which the adversary has access, referred to as co-location henceforward. The attacker
may simply check for the deception, but the defenders may also use additional protection or deceptive mechanisms to protect the deceptive components, referred to as
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co-location with protection. Finally, the deception may be external to the abstraction
layer that the adversary has access.

4.3.1 Deception and Adversary Co-location
As the name implies, the adversary and the deception are within the same layer of
abstraction. It is assumed that the adversary and deception components have access
to the same set of resources. If the adversary and the deception exist within the user
or kernel layers of abstraction, then they both share resources such as CPU, memory, networking, and storage space. For physical space, the deception and adversary
share hardware channels, power, and other hardware components. For networking,
the adversary and deception share networking bandwidth, routing, switches, or other
network-related resources. Likewise, if the deception is co-located within the VMM,
the adversary and the deception can both view guest OS and control the VM conﬁgurations.
There are some advantages in placing monitoring and analysis components within
the same layer. First, it may be sufficient to protect against automated attacks that
are designed on systems without deception. If the attacker does not bother to check
for deception, then her automated exploits may not correctly handle events that may
divert the adversary into the unexpected. Prior work in deceptive systems show
that disrupting attackers with deception are e↵ective in reducing their impact on the
system under attack [58].

4.3.2 Co-location with Protection
Additional protection mechanisms can help aid in the deception. Access control can deny adversaries access to deceptive subsystems or audit logs. Additional
deception may also help, for instance, by hiding the presence of interposition and
introspection.
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Several of the techniques are utilized by malicious software such as rootkits that
hide the presence of processes and other tools for system administrators and security
monitoring tools. At the user layer, access control can help deny users who wish
to read/write/execute deceptive components of the system. At the kernel layer, the
components of the system can be set to be immutable so that the adversary cannot
change components even if she has administrative access on the machine. At the
networking or VM layers, there may exist decoys to confuse the adversary.
However, the disadvantage is that an attacker can look for changes to the system
that is out of the ordinary for evidence of deception. Further, the adversary can focus
on moving to a lower layer of abstraction to circumvent the deception.

4.3.3 Deception in External Layers
Rather than placing the deception within the same layer that the attacker has
access to, the analysis and monitoring can be inserted in a layer of abstraction to
which the attacker does not have access. There are several viable options. However,
a good understanding of the capabilities of the adversary is necessary. The deception,
analysis, and monitoring must be with placed in a layer that reﬂects the adversary’s
capabilities. For instance, if the adversary exists only within userspace, then a DecMS
at the kernel layer may be sufficient.
One challenge with placing deception external to the layers that an adversary has
access to are the various e↵ects that the deception can have in higher layers that may
confuse benign users or cause the adversary to raise suspicion.

4.3.4 Identiﬁcation Methods
4.3.5 Policies and Components of DecMS
DecMS consists of four main components, each consisting of a policy and a method
to enforce or execute the policy: Protection, Detection, Deception, and Clean-Up.
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Monitoring Policies
The Monitoring Policies handle the monitoring as stated in [7]. The monitoring
policies determine what set of events should trigger a deceptive response or other
protection mechanisms. For the experimental evaluation, the Monitoring Policies
consists of a Observation Policy and Analysis Policy.
Observation Policy
Purpose The Observation Policies should instrument I/O and observe for circumstances that require additional analysis by the Analysis Policy and service. The Observation Policy determines the set of ﬁles, libraries, users, or processes that DecMS
interacts with. The Observation Policy indicates which user ﬁles (e.g., all ﬁles in a
user’s home directory) to protect with DecMS and which to ignore. The Observation
Policy also indicates what speciﬁc events require additional analysis. The overall purpose is to determine which ﬁles or events need further processing under the Analysis
Policy. The Observation Policy consists of blacklist/whitelist users, ﬁles (directories
or speciﬁc ﬁles), events such as system calls relating to a storage medium or other
identiﬁers that can help identify data items of interests.

Analysis Policy
Purpose The Analysis Policies should specify the methods to identify destructive
I/O, deﬁne the conditions to deceive a potential attacker, and deﬁne other conditions
that warrant a defensive action, as determined by the Protection Policies.
The Detection Policy deﬁnes the strategy, given the situation, that is best suited
to determine if a deceptive response is necessary. The Detection Policy dictates the
set of methods needed to detect if a deceptive response is warranted correctly. The
Detection Methods can be included signature-based, behavior-based, or heuristicbased detection schemes. The purpose of Detection Methods is to determine if a
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Stratagem should be used or to let the system call continue without modiﬁcation or
interruption.
A commonly deployed method to detect known malicious applications is signaturebased detection. The core idea is to examine the binary of the malware for key
patterns of known malicious code. Malware counters anti-malware software through
polymorphic techniques that modify distinguishing features before execution. Another approach that can be used to identify key actions or data objects is through
behavior-based detection schemes. The core idea is to observe the actions of some
applications for some period. If the actions fall outside the scope of what is expected,
fail the application.

4.4 Protection Methods and Policies
The goal of the protection policies is to facilitate the deception and provide general
protection or resilience against attacks targeting one of the Parkerian Hexad for data
destruction attacks. The Deception Policy is responsible for injecting deceit into the
protected system at some given time. It may take the form of a deceptive response
for some I/O request or the conﬁguration of the system to remain hidden from the
threats.

4.4.1 Deception Policy
Purpose To deﬁne the deceptive response given the conditions reported by the
Monitoring Policies and insert deceit into the system under protection.
The goal of the Deception Policy is to decide on the deceptive strategy to execute,
given the policy decisions and observations in the previous two components. The
Deception Methods are simulations/dissimulations that are designed to deceive an
adversary.
For example, the selected stratagem may attempt to deceive an adversary, who
is destroying incriminating evidence, by pausing the write system call, logging the
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incident, and creating a copy of the data elsewhere. The Preservation Policy and
service are responsible for handling the data preservation.

4.4.2 Preservation Policy
Purpose To preserve any data that is overwritten by destructive I/O and deﬁne the
conditions to identify, retain, migrate, compress, or remove stagnant data to optimize
storage space utilization.
The Preservation Policy should provide a strategy for tracking deception and
anticipate how the users will react to the stratagem. For example, a policy could be
deﬁned to log all changes to a ﬁle of interest or simply log the ﬁnal change to a ﬁle.
Several challenges in designing a preservation policy when storage space is ﬁxed. The
Preservation Policy should also determine how long data under preservation should
be preserved before moving elsewhere, compressed to save space, or to delete so that
space can be used.

4.4.3 Other Protection Policies
In addition to the above policies, several additional policies may exist to help
protect data from unauthorized data destruction attacks. Some protection mechanisms, such as access control, may be implicit as modern operating systems use access
control. While not explicitly explored in this thesis, it is possible to further protect
the data by communicating the data destruction actions to their security mechanisms
such as an IDS.

4.5 Summary of Integration Location
Inserting the monitoring, preservation, and the deceptive systems within the hardware may reduce the risks of performance degradation. Software solutions are also
possible and are relatively easier to implement compared to hardware solutions. How-
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ever, the performance of a software solution may not work as well as a hardware
solution, especially if resource sharing is necessary between the system under protection and deceptive system. A virtual machine monitor or networking solutions may
also be viable options. VMI may monitor for adversaries and insert deception during appropriate opportunities. Similarly, network interposition may also monitor for
destructive changes to network storage mediums and insert deception when necessary.
Some of the solutions outlined above allow for the deception service and components to be isolated from the adversary. As the assumption is that the attacker does
not have physical access to the compromised system, she may not be able to identify
hardware or networking solutions that support the deceptive components. Denying
the adversary from the truth is critical for some deceptive strategies and isolating
the deceptive service and components is an advantage over some architectures. The
deceptive service and components may also exist within the system itself, which provides several beneﬁts, such as having access to the operating system internals, but it
may be difficult to remain hidden from the adversary.
Each of the designs has strategic advantages and disadvantages. As shown in the
top of the Figure 4.1, placing deceptive service and components near the application
level help preserve ﬁles under unauthorized destruction but at the cost to stealthiness
(if the attacker can examine the layer with the deception). Placing the deception in
lower layers of abstraction, such as within the hardware, may increase stealthiness,
but the deceptive system complexity increases as it is necessary to translate raw
disk writes to ﬁles as the policies may deﬁne speciﬁc write patterns as destructive
for certain types of ﬁles. Further, selecting the layers to insert deception may also
depend on the deceptive technique, which is guided by the type of adversary that the
defender faces.
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5 PROOF OF CONCEPT DESIGN
5.1 Desired Traits
In the previous chapter, several design choices and architectures to support deceptive goals are detailed. For the proof of concept, two prototypes are selected based on
the goals of this dissertation. The DecMS-Kernel proof of concept uses a kernel module to hide the presence of DecMS and reactively preserves the ﬁles from destruction
before the writes occur. The DecMS-VMI proof of concept builds on the experimental results of DecMS-Kernel by placing the deception and preservation outside of the
system under protection. Below, a discussion for each of the goals that lead to the
design of the prototypes is provided.

5.1.1 Identiﬁcation
Trait The identiﬁcation method should accurately identify ﬁles that are under threat
of unauthorized data destruction and provide information of forensic value,
such as timestamp information, active running processes, and the method that
triggers the data destruction.
The Monitoring Policies and services should provide a list of ﬁles that can easily be
understood by a system administrator. Some of the low-level preservation mechanism
may preserve ﬁles by preserving raw storage blocks that may need additional processing to be easily understood by a system administrator. The engineering challenges
in developing a hardware-based DecMS motivated the decision to use DecMS-Kernel
and DecMS-VMI as the proof of concept systems in the experimental evaluation.
DecMS-Kernel has a full view of the system under protection, so it is possible to
log the desired information. Likewise, for DecMS-VMI, the proof of concept relies
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on existing software to bridge the semantic gap. Capturing ﬁle-level and forensics
information is possible through VMI.

5.1.2 Impedance
Trait The impedance should provide sufficient time to adjust the deceptive service
or preserve a ﬁle under destruction and have an acceptable impact on the user.
Further, the impedance should be designed with the DecMS Preservation Goal
to preserve the data under destruction without compromising data integrity and
authenticity.
The wrapper method from Section 4.2 is capable of halting the ﬂow of an I/O
request to allow the Analysis or Preservation services to complete tasks. The modiﬁcation method is practically challenging if the source code for applications, or the
operating system, is not available. The introspection method requires additional
mechanisms to halt the I/O request. The interposition circumvents the valid layer(s)
to facilitate the I/O request and may require an implementation to service the I/O
when benign writes occur.

5.1.3 Preservation
Trait The preserved data should maintain its integrity and should not be modiﬁed
by the adversary after preservation.
The Protection Policies and service should hide the presence of the ﬁle or place
the ﬁle in a location that is inaccessible. Two approaches are selected: (i) threat
collocation with protection and (ii) external layer to the threat.
For DecMS-Kernel, ﬁles and the preserved data relevant to DecMS are hidden
from the process list along with the kernel module. For DecMS-VMI, DecMS is not
accessible from within the VM. All preserved data is placed outside of the VM.
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5.1.4 Reduce
Trait Demonstrate the ability to reduce the e↵ectiveness of threats that lead to a
loss of security elements caused by unauthorized data destruction.
The prototypes should be able to protect against instances of the threat space
from Section 3.1. In the following sections, instances of threats are given to evaluate
the e↵ectiveness of the proof of concept instances in enhancing data preservation.

5.2 Threat Instances
In the following section, several threats instances are detailed and are later used
to evaluate the DecMS prototypes.

5.2.1 Ransomware
Ransomware renders user ﬁles on a system inaccessible until a ransom payment
is received. Typically, the malware encrypts user multimedia ﬁles that are NRA, but
may also target backup ﬁles [97]. The malware operator will leave behind a message
instructing the user to send a payment in exchange for ﬁle decryption. A well-designed
piece of ransomware can encrypt user ﬁles using a public key scheme to minimize any
possibility of decryption without payment [98].
Some widespread strains of ransomware in 2016, such as TeslaCrypt and AlphaCrypt, use symmetric encryption. TeslaCrypt and AlphaCrypt use AES with
a local, randomly generated key, which is sent to a server while the local copy of the
key is deleted. Variants of this program can be thwarted by retrieving the key locally or intercepting the key in communication [99]. More sophisticated ransomware,
such as CryptoLocker, CryptoWall 4.0, Samas, TorrentLocker, KeRanger, and Locky
encrypt the AES symmetric key with an RSA public key to avoid locally storing or
communicating the AES key in an exploitable way [97, 100–104].
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Name
MD5
Destover
2618dd3e5c59ca851f03df12c0cab3b8
Shamoon
d214c717a357fe3a455610b197c390aa
Shamoon 2 2cd0a5f1e9bcce6807e57ec8477d222a
Stonedril
0ccc9ec82f1d44c243329014b82d3125
Table 5.1: Wiper Malware samples for evaluation

To evaluate the e↵ectiveness of DecMS-Kernel against ransomware, a ransomwarelike application, based on the methodology of the Linux.Encoder.1 Linux ransomware and its OS X variant KeRanger 1 was developed2 . The ransomware statically
links the ARMmbed

3

TLS libraries for RSA public key encryption as well as AES

encryption in CBC mode [105] [97]. The AES key is stored encrypted via RSA public
key encryption and prepended to the ﬁles targeted by the ransomware along with the
Initialization Vector (IV) for AES. The code to encrypt the test ﬁles is based on the
crypt and hash application found in the ARMmbed GitHub [106].

5.2.2 Wiper Malware
Destover, the Wiper Malware that infamously infected Sony computers in 2014,
overwrote master boot records with 64 KiB 4 of 0xAA [107]. Shamoon destroyed data
on a storage medium by overwriting with a JPEG ﬁle fragment [108]. An attacker
may destroy a ﬁle by overwriting the entire ﬁle or portions of the ﬁles that would
render the ﬁle unusable for some applications [109].
The MBR is an obvious target for Wiper malware [108]. Destroying the MBR
or partition table will render the storage medium unusable. The blacklist for our
evaluation includes ‘e:,” “PhysicalDisk1,” “Harddisk1” [110], which point to NTFS
data structures protected by DecMS-VMI.
1

The source code or sample of the actual ransomware was not acquired.
Thomas Yurek, an undergraduate student at Purdue University developed and evaluated the
experimental crypto ransomware on DecMS-Kernel.
3
https://tls.mbed.org/
4
KiB is deﬁned as 21 0 bytes.
2
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5.2.3 Anti-forensics
The anti-forensic threats considered include falsiﬁed timestamp evaluation and
secure delete methods.

DecMS-Kernel Secure Delete Anti-Forensics
Secure delete methods are used to evaluate DecMS-Kernel e↵ectiveness against
attacks on availability. Two conﬁgurations of srm are evaluated. The default setting
is based on the secure delete algorithm described by Peter Gutmann [111], which
consists of 38 passes:
1. A single pass of 1-bits
2. Five passes of random bits
3. 27 special values deﬁned in [111]
4. Five passes of random bits
Optionally, srm has a “less secure” mode that consists of a pass of 1-bits followed by
a pass of random bits.

DecMS-VMI Anti-forensic Evaluation
Two anti-forensic techniques are considered on a Windows 7 VM: secure delete
and timestamp fabrication. While the design of DecMS may be able to counter other
anti-forensic techniques, such as data concealment or obfuscation, we focus on secure
delete and timestamp fabrication to cover the entire threat space outline in Chapter
3.1.
The secure delete tools evaluated under DecMS-VMI are listed in Figure 5.2.
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Table 5.2: A list of secure delete methods considered in the evaluation of DecMS-VMI.
Algorithm
AFSSI-5020

Description
Three passes: random data, complement w/
8-bit shift, complement w/ 16-bits shift [112]
AR 380-19
Three passes: random byte, random byte,
complement of the second random byte [112]
British HMG IS5 (Baseline)
Single pass of zeros [112]
British HMG IS5 (Enhanced)
Three passes: zeros, ones, random data [112]
Canadian RCMP TSSIT OPS-II Seven passes: Three alternating passes of zeros
and ones, then a random byte [112]
DoD 5220.22-M(ECE)
Seven passes: A combination of random bytes,
complement of random bytes, and zeros [112]
DoD 5220.22-M (e)
Three passes: zeros, then ones, then random
[112] [113]
German VSITR
Same as Canadian RCMP TSSIT OPS-II [112]
Gutmann’s 35-pass method
35 passes: data (1-4), ﬁxed patterns (5-31),
random data (32-35) [111]
Overwrite with zeros
Single pass of all zeros [114]
Pseudorandom data
Overwrite with random bits [112]
Russian GOST P50739-95
Three passes: Single pass of zeros, then random data [112]
Schneier’s Algorithm [20]
Seven passes: zeros, ones, remaining passes
consist of random data [112]

102
5.3 Randomness Classiﬁer
For both DecMS-Kernel and DecMS-VMI, a classiﬁcation tree is used. This section
provides the details for training, testing, and validating the classiﬁcation tree.
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Figure 5.1.: The distribution of ﬁles in training, validation, and testing sets.

The classiﬁcation tree training uses the scikit-learn Python library [115], which
uses an optimized version of the Classiﬁcation and Regression Tree (CART) algorithm.
We explore the maximum depth parameter, up to a maximum depth of four, which
produces classiﬁcation trees that consist of, at most, four randomness features and
four Boolean statements.
The Observation Policy provides the Analysis Policy with: a write bu↵er, containing the data to be written to a ﬁle; a File Handle, metadata information about the
ﬁle; an o↵set, the location of where the write bu↵er should write to the ﬁle. For each
interposed write bu↵er, we must consider the sample size, sample o↵set, and sample
frequency for system write calls issued to a ﬁle.
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Figure 5.2.: An illustration of write bu↵er sampling for DecMS-VMI

Let Bi represent the write bu↵er provided by the Observation Policy. A sample
o↵set So deﬁnes the starting location in Bi for analysis. A sample size Sk which
deﬁnes the amount of data that is inspected per Bi . A sample frequency, Sf , deﬁnes
the frequency to inspect the write bu↵er Bi . An illustration of the above is shown in
Figure 5.2.
The sample o↵set, in conjunction with the o↵set provided by the Observation
Policy, deﬁnes locations of interests within the ﬁle. Several ﬁles use ﬁle signatures
[109] and metadata located at the beginning of a ﬁle5 .
There are several design choices one must consider for the Analysis Policy. The
sample size and sample frequency is a trade-o↵ between accuracy and time: larger
samples provide more information to identify if the write is destructive but the analysis latency grows as the sample size increases.
The sample size should be at least the recommended minimum input size for each
NIST randomness feature used in our classiﬁer. The maximum sample size must also
consider testing the entire write bu↵er, sub-segments of the write bu↵er, or combine
several write bu↵ers. We constrain the maximum bu↵er size as the smallest ﬁle size
5

In DecMS-VMI, the ﬁle signatures are used to help identify data destruction
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in Windows, 4,096 bytes. We validate our classiﬁer by exploring several bu↵er sizes
between 16 bytes to 4,096 bytes and identify a bu↵er size that provides high accuracy.
The features of our classiﬁcation tree consist of p-values returned by NIST randomness tests [67]. Our evaluation shows that even with four randomness tests (or
fewer), False Postive (FP) and False Negative (FN) rates6 can fall below 1% and
would be acceptable in many scenarios.
We also observed through experimentation that a sample o↵set of zero provides
viable information, such as ﬁle signatures. Further, we also set the sampling frequency
to only analyze the ﬁrst write to a ﬁle. We show that only sampling the ﬁrst write is
sufficient to detect the data destruction in our evaluation.
We use disjoint training and validation sets for our experimental evaluation. The
training set is used to train our classiﬁcation tree, the validation set explores the
optimal parameters for our classiﬁcation tree, and the testing set evaluates previously unseen data with the optimal classiﬁcation parameters, which we present in
conjunction with other detection mechanisms in Section 6.2.4.
There are two class labels for classiﬁcation. The benign class are writes that are
not destructive and the destructive class are destructive writes. For the benign class,
we use the forensics ﬁles corpora detailed in [116]. Speciﬁcally, DecMS is evaluated
against the Govdocs17 data set, which consists of ﬁles gathered from .gov domains.
The full distribution of training, validation, and testing sets are shown in Figure 5.1.
The Govdocs1 data set provides ten “threads,” each consisting of about 1,000
randomly selected ﬁles from the entire corpora. The intention for the “threads” is for
researchers to select distinct threads for training, validation, and testing.
For the training and validation destructive class, we use the same ﬁles overwritten
with pseudorandom bits using the shred [72] utility.
The benign class consists of all 991 ﬁles in thread0 for training and 993 ﬁles in
thread1 for validation. For the destructive class, we use the same ﬁles overwritten
6
7

FP and FN rates often referred to as Type-I and Type-II error rates, respectively.
http://digitalcorpora.org/corpora/govdocs
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with pseudorandom bits using the shred [72] utility. The training and validation set
each consist of an equal number of benign and destructive class samples.

5.3.1 Parameter Settings for Randomness Classiﬁer
For our evaluation, we measure the accuracy with increasing write bu↵er sizes
for DecMS. We ﬁnd the optimal bu↵er size by evaluating the precision and recall for
bu↵ers ranging from 16, 32, ..., 4,096 bytes. We vary the depth of the classiﬁcation
tree from 1 to 4. As the depth of the tree increases, the classiﬁcation latency increases,
but there is a better ﬁt to the data. Our policy deﬁnes a sample o↵set of zero, and
the sampling frequency is deﬁned to sample only the ﬁrst system write call to a ﬁle.
The rationale is derived from the observation that the secure delete tools we examine,
shown in Table 5.2, destroy ﬁles sequentially from the beginning of the ﬁle to the end
of the ﬁle. Therefore sampling from every system write call on a ﬁle is redundant.
The parameter values can be changed either deterministically or can be sampled from
distribution to add to the entropy of the protected system.

5.3.2 Randomness Tests
Through our evaluation, we decided on a tree that uses four di↵erent randomness
tests [67] that provide high accuracy and low computational cost: Frequency (Monobit) Test, Frequency Test Within a Block, Runs Test, and Longest-Run-of-Ones in a
Block Test.

Frequency Monobit Test
The Frequency (Monobit) Test calculates the proportions of zero and one bits in
a binary sequence. Each proportion is expected to be about 1/2 if the sequence is to
be considered random. A sample size of at least 100 bits is recommended [67].
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Frequency Test Within a Block
Rather than comparing the ratio of one-bits to zero-bits over the entire sequence,
the Frequency Test Within a Block breaks the sequence up into blocks. For each
block, the number of ones observed should be approximately half the length of the
block size if the sequence is random. NIST recommends a sample that is at least 100
bits long, a block size of at least 20 bits, a block size greater than 1% of the input
sequences, and less than 100 block segments [67].

Runs Test
The Runs Test examines the “runs” within a given sequence. A run is an uninterrupted sequence of identical bits. The test examines if the runs within a given
sequence “vary in length as expected for a random sequence” [67]. The minimum
sample size is 100 bits.

Longest-Run-of-Ones in a Block Test
The Longest-Run-of-Ones Test is measured within a block of the given sequence
and is compared to what is expected for a random sequence of the same block size.
NIST provides recommendations for the block size relative to the size of the input
sequence. For instance, for a sample length of at least 128-bits, NIST recommends
block sizes of eight bits. For larger sample lengths, the block size is increased: block
size of 128 for input length of 6272 and 10,000 for input length of 750,000 [67].

5.3.3 Classiﬁcation Training and Validation
Classiﬁcation accuracy is measured by recall and precision in our evaluation. Recall is measured by

TP
---.
TP+FN

A high recall rate is of importance because DecMS should

capture all data destruction activities (i.e., a low FN). Precision is measured by

TP
.
TP+FP

A high precision value indicates a low FP rate, meaning that few benign cases are
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classiﬁed as destructive. It is difficult to achieve a high precision without reducing
the recall or vice versa [117]. While both metrics are of importance, the impact of a
false positive classiﬁcation is preserving a ﬁle when a benign write occurs, potentially
slowing down a valid write to a ﬁle. The impact of a false negative classiﬁcation is
missing a destructive action and not preserving a ﬁle under destruction.
Figures 5.3 and 5.4 illustrate the recall and precision of various bu↵er sizes and
max tree depth conﬁgurations. The x-axis is the maximum depth training parameter
and the y-axis is the write bu↵er size. Each cell in the ﬁgures represent the precision/recall rate of training and validating the classiﬁer with the given parameters.
The general trend is that as the size of the bu↵er increases, the recall and precision
increases. A bu↵er size of 512 bytes or above is capable of over 0.95 precision and
over 0.98 recall. For the tree depth parameter, our results show a trend of increasing
recall and precision rate as the depth of the tree increases. Note that even while
inspecting small write bu↵ers between 16 to 256 bytes, DecMS is capable of recall
rate above 0.9 and precision rate above 0.84.
The box highlighted in red in Figures 5.3 and 5.4 indicates the classiﬁcation parameters selected for our testing of DecMS. We select a bu↵er size of 4,096 and tree
depth of two because the recall and precision rates on our validation sets are both
above 99% and increasing the depth of the tree does not signiﬁcantly improve the
accuracy. Figure 5.5 details the classiﬁcation tree created by our training. Three
features are used in this classiﬁcation tree: Frequency Test within a Block, Block Frequency (monobit) Test, and longest runs [67]. The false positives we observed in our
validation did not follow any discernible pattern and were approximately uniformly
spread among HTML, GIF, and SWF ﬁles.

5.4 Other Destructive Patterns
The classiﬁcation process also considers common write patterns found in data
destruction. For example, bleachbit writes all zeros over a ﬁle for destruction,
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Figure 5.3.: Recall score on the validation set for increasing bu↵er sizes and a maximum depth of tree parameters.

whereas srm uses a combination of random bits and ﬁxed patterns. The common
destruction patterns are an additional check to the randomness test.
DecMS-Kernel ﬁrst examines the write bu↵er to determine randomness. If the
bu↵er is classiﬁed as benign, DecMS-Kernel then checks the write bu↵er for ﬁxed
patterns. For our experimental evaluation, DecMS-Kernel also checks if the write
bu↵er contains all zeros or all ones.
In addition to the randomness test and common destructive patterns, DecMS-VMI
uses ﬁle signatures to detect destruction. Overwriting a ﬁle signature is a promising
indicator for data destruction, as indicated in [23] for crypto ransomware. While some
ﬁles, such as ASCII text ﬁles, do not use ﬁle signatures, multimedia ﬁles often do.
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When overwriting the beginning of a ﬁle, we check to see if the write bu↵er contains
a ﬁle signature that matches the ﬁle extension 8 .

5.5 Design Overview for DecMS-Kernel
Figure 5.7 illustrates the integration method for the DecMS-Kernel proof of concept. A wrapper for several system calls inspects for destructive write requests. Figure
5.6 illustrates, at a high level, the DecMS-Kernel proof of concept. The Observation
Policy deﬁnes a set of system calls that write to a ﬁle. When a process invokes a
system call that modiﬁes ﬁles, DecMS-Kernel intercepts and inspects which ﬁles are
accessed. Step (1) shows that a process is calling the sys open system call. Step
8

An adversary may circumvent this analysis by writing a ﬁle signature that matches the ﬁle
extension then overwriting the rest of the ﬁle.

110
112/40

BlockFrequency <= 0 .0023
samples = 1982
value = [99 1, 99 1)
class = Benign
True

samples = 981
value = [979 , 2)
class = Benign

False

Frequency<= 0.9603

Runs<= 0.0009

samples = 982
value = [979 , 3)
class = Benign

samples = 1000
value = [12 , 988)
class = Random

samples = I
value= [O , 1)
class = Random

samples = 9
value= [9, OJ
class = Benign

samples = 99 1
value= [3 , 988)
class = Random

Figure 5.5.: Classiﬁcation tree for randomness testing with input bu↵er size of 4,096
bytes and tree depth of two.

DecMS

Backup

HDD/55D

Figure 5.6.: General ﬂow of DecMS-Kernel.

(2) intercepts the sys open system call and identiﬁes if the ﬁle should be protected,
based on the Observation Policy. DecMS-Kernel places the ﬁle descriptor in the
“protected ﬁles list.” At some later point, if the process calls sys write (Step (3)),
on a protected ﬁle, DecMS-Kernel determines (Step (4)), as deﬁned by the Analysis
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Policy, if the write bu↵er contains random binary data or write templates commonly
used for data destruction. If classiﬁed as “destructive,” DecMS-Kernel triggers the
Deception or Preservation, Step (5). The Preservation Service can back-up the data
before destruction can occur, and the Deception service can report that the ﬁle was
successfully written. Step (6) sends a return value to the caller of the sys write call.
The return value can appear to look as if the write was successful without additional
execution of code.
The design space consists of the placement of DecMS-Kernel, the policies to protect data items of interest, the policies to drive the randomness testing, and the policy
on reacting to detection of data destruction. The system call wrapper may also hide
the presence of the services and ﬁles through the use of several existing rootkit hiding
techniques.
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5.6 Design Overview for DecMS-VMI
DecMS-VMI is designed to protect against data destruction attacks and is a supplement to existing security monitoring tools, such as anti-malware or intrusion detection systems, and data back-up/redundancy technology. DecMS-VMI observes
persistent storage I/O, through active VMI that wraps several system calls (Figure 5.8), and provides resiliency against destructive I/O. The introspection observes
for system state and provides forensically valuable information when data destruction is observed. The high level design of DecMS-VMI is shown in Figure 5.9. The
trusted monitoring system, shown on the right, monitors for data destruction on the
Untrusted System, shown on the left. The monitoring system is isolated from the potentially compromised “Untrusted System,” where a destructive attacker may reside.
We assume that the monitoring and the analysis code are trusted and inaccessible
from the compromised machine.
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Analysis

Trusted Monitoring System

Figure 5.9.: DecMS-VMI interposes storage medium I/O in isolation. If the I/O
appears to be destructive, DecMS-VMI preserves the data.
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The top of Figure 5.9 shows an application in the Untrusted System that writes
data to a ﬁle located on some storage medium such as a Solid State Drive (SSD).
DecMS-VMI, located on the Trusted Monitoring System, interposes (1) when a ﬁle is
opened for writing to create a temporary checkpoint. Next DecMS-VMI interposes all
writes to an existing ﬁle, determines if the I/O is destructive (2), and the checkpoint
is preserved (3) if the behavior is suspect. If the application is malicious, it may
overwrite a critical ﬁle and compromise the ﬁle’s integrity, availability, or utility [2].
Each of the numbered items in Figure 5.9 are policy driven, to provide ﬂexibility
in deployment. The Observation Policy (Section 6.2.1) deﬁnes the ﬁles/directories
under protection, and the I/O related system calls to interpose. The Analysis Policy
(Section 6.2.2) describes a set of metrics derived from the interposed system call
parameters and deﬁnes a procedure to determine if a destructive action is taking
place on the live system. The Preservation Policy (Section 6.2.3) describes how to
preserve the data under destruction.

5.6.1 Assumptions
To summarize, we make the following assumptions:
1. The attacker destroys data by overwriting a data object, partially or completely,
that is located on the compromised machine.
2. The attacker does not have physical access to the storage medium. Ergo, the
attacker cannot physically destroy the disk.
3. The attacker may have administrator access to the compromised machine but
cannot avoid monitoring of our proposed system 9 .
4. The VMM analysis and storage used by DecMS-VMI is assumed to be within
our Trusted Computing Base (TCB).
9

For example, Kernel Object Hooking (KOH), Dynamic Kernel Object Manipulation (DKOM),
or Direct Kernel Structure Manipulation (DKSM) [59, 74] could be used to remain hidden from
security monitoring.

115
5. Our proposed system works in conjunction with other security monitoring tools,
such as Anti-virus scanners (AVS), and Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS).
However, we assume that AVS, IDS, and other security monitoring systems fail
to identify the entity that is destroying data as malicious to demonstrate the
e↵ectiveness of DecMS-VMI.
6. Our prototype implementation does not consider the case when valid users wish
to securely destroy or encrypt data.

5.6.2 Requirements
Preservation: Upon detecting events of interest, a log of the event and the data under
destruction should be preserved. The logging and preserved data should be inaccessible to the adversary.
High Accuracy: Detection of data destruction should be accurate with few false negatives (incorrectly identifying a suspicious write as benign). False positives (incorrectly
identifying a benign write as destructive) should also be kept low, to avoid encumbering the end user with degraded system performance. We focus on obtaining low
false negative rates to reduce the risk of data loss when destruction occurs.
Acceptable Performance: DecMS-VMI should impact latency and throughput for legitimate users as little as possible.
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6 EVALUATION
6.1 Kernel-Based Evaluation
6.1.1 Observation Policy and Service
To intercept system calls, we used the Suterusu Loadable Kernel Module Rootkit
[60]. Suterusu is an open source modern rootkit designed for x86( 64) Linux 3.X kernels. The rootkit demonstrates several common features, such as hiding the presence
of processes, ﬁles, and network sockets. The process and ﬁle hiding features are used
to mask the presence of DecMS-Kernel. Further, Suterusu hooks system read/write
calls for logging keystrokes. Care was taken to remove malicious functionality such as
the keylogger and remote execution of arbitrary binaries. The design choice of using
Suterusu is driven by its ability to hide and ease of extensibility.
Suterusu relies on inline function hooking that modiﬁes a targeted function to
transfer execution to another routine [60]. Suterusu provides hijack start, hijack
stop, hijack pause, hijack resume helper functions to easily hijack functions.
The following functions are hijacked for DecMS-Kernel. A short description is
provided for each hijacked function.
sys open - DecMS-Kernel keeps track of each ﬁle a user has open. The opened ﬁle
is inspected according to a predeﬁned Monitoring Policies, as shown in Figure
5.6 (2). For our evaluation, DecMS-Kernel places ﬁles into the “protected ﬁle
list” if sys open is invoked by a user process with a write request. Further,
only regular ﬁles are placed in the “protected ﬁle list.” Directory ﬁles, block
devices, character devices, pipes, sockets, and symbolic links are ignored in our
experimental evaluation.
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sys write - When a write system call is invoked, DecMS-Kernel checks if the ﬁle is in
the “protected ﬁle list.” If so, it passes the write bu↵er through the randomness
classiﬁer. If the bu↵er is classiﬁed as destructive, then execute Preservation
Policy (Figure 5.6 (5)). The policy deﬁned in our experimental evaluation is
to save the ﬁle elsewhere, with the assumption of sufficient storage space, and
allow the sys write to continue after the ﬁle is copied.
sys close - If the ﬁle is in the “protected ﬁle list,” then remove it.

6.1.2 Analysis Policy and Service
Figure 6.1 illiterates the policies to determine if a ﬁle is undergoing data destruction and whether the ﬁle should be copied. The policy we use to evaluate
DecMS-Kernel is to test if the ﬁrst write to a ﬁle is destructive. Two checks are
then conducted. The randomness test uses a classiﬁcation tree and the “common
secure delete patterns” to determine if the write bu↵er contains all ones or all zeros.
Checking subsequent writes to track how a ﬁle is changed over time is certainly
possible with DecMS-Kernel. However, analyzing the bu↵er for every system write
call on a ﬁle may not provide enough forensic value to justify the increased latency,
and in the case of a secure delete with multiple rounds, could result in excessive
storage space being used for pseudorandom data. However, checking the ﬁrst write
call to a ﬁle can be circumvented by an attacker who ﬁrst writes benign information
and then later switches to data destruction. The deﬁned policy should take into
consideration whether the potential savings in computational overhead and storage
space is worth the vulnerability to a targeted attack against DecMS-Kernel.
During initialization, DecMS-Kernel hijacks all three system calls listed above.
One potential ﬂaw is that hijacking is paused to allow the system call to execute.
There is a window of opportunity for other threads to execute the system call without
the hijacking enabled [60]; thus Suterusu hijacking is not thread-safe. After the
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Figure 6.1.: DecMS-Kernel policies to determine if a write bu↵er is used to destroy
data

system call completes, the hijacking resumes. Coppola [60] explains that locks and
permanently hijacking the system calls would solve the issue.

6.1.3 Preservation Policy and Service
If a process attempts to destroy a protected ﬁle, the ﬁle is saved using Redhat
Linux System Auditing (audit) [118]. Using Linux System Auditing allows for exist-
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ing parsing tools to work to extract information generated by DecMS-Kernel. Further,
audit is easily conﬁgurable with trigger actions if the log ﬁle is full, the disk is full,
as well as sending log information over a network1 . Another advantage is that we can
leverage Suterusu hiding ﬁle and network connections to covertly backup data.
Protected ﬁles that are under destruction are encoded and sent to the audit daemon. For our evaluation, the data is stored locally and only accessible under a
privileged account.

6.1.4 Deception Policy and Service
A denial of the truth is the deceptive strategy explored in this prototype implementation. A masking strategy hides the true nature of the system through a rootkit
mechanism. Suterusu hides the existence of the kernel module that handles both the
presence of DecMS-Kernel and the preservation. To complement the dissimulation
(hiding the real), the simulation (showing the false) is implicit by returning that all
writes to a ﬁle are successful. The state of the system is also hidden. Files that are
associated with the data preservation are not viewable through typical ﬁle listings
(e.g., ls).

6.1.5 Service Location
All of the services above are co-located with the threats but with additional protection. The assumption is that the attacker is running in user mode and all the
protection mechanisms execute with elevated privileges.

6.1.6 Metrics of Interest
For the experimental evaluation of DecMS-Kernel, two metrics of interest are calculated: the ability to accurately classify write bu↵ers as benign or destructive, the
1

http://linux.die.net/man/5/auditd.conf
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latency associated with conducting such an analysis on a live system, and the ability
to accurately preserve the data under destruction. For the Monitoring Policies, the
accuracy is necessary to determine if the system is capable of detecting data destruction. The latency also indicates the e↵ectiveness of the Protection Policies. High
latency indicates that some unknown service is present whenever a data destruction
action takes place. The preservation service must be able to preserve the entirety of
a ﬁle before the destruction occurs.

Detection Latency
The detection latency is a measurement of several components of DecMS-Kernel.
However, the execution of each component is driven by the system’s deﬁned policies.
The components that contribute to the detection latency include:
1. Interception of system calls
2. Determining if a bu↵er is random or contains common data destruction patterns
3. The latency to preserve the data under destruction
Write bu↵er interception occurs each time the sys - write system call is invoked.
However, the randomness analysis only occurs if the write call is applied to a ﬁle
marked for protection, shown in Figure 5.6 (2), the Observation Policy. Furthermore,
the Protection Policies, shown in Figure 5.6 (4), could be conﬁgured to always check
for randomness for each write call applied to the protected ﬁle. However, the policy
we deﬁne for the experimental evaluation simply checks for randomness and common
data destruction patterns on the ﬁrst write to the ﬁle and subsequent writes to the ﬁle
are not analyzed for randomness. This was done to minimize computational overhead
and prevent excessive storage from being allocated to random data. If the ﬁrst write
was classiﬁed as destructive, the entire ﬁle was moved elsewhere.
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Relationship of Accuracy and Latency
In general, the accuracy of the randomness test increases as the sample size increases. However, the latency to conduct the randomness test increases as the sample
size increases. While this dissertation does not optimize for performance, the analysis
could be further improved by using specialized hardware such as a graphics processing
unit (GPU) [119] that is capable of calculating randomness features more efficiently
than a software solution. For our evaluation, we measure the accuracy and latency
with increasing input sizes for DecMS-Kernel. The minimum bu↵er size we measure
reﬂects the recommended minimum size for each randomness test feature2 as deﬁned
by NIST in [67]. The maximum bu↵er size we measure reﬂects the default block size
for Ubuntu 14.04.4 LTS, 4,096 bytes.

6.1.7 Experimental Results
Our experimental evaluation was conducted within a Linux 3.18.27 Ubuntu 14.04.4
LTS VMWare Fusion Virtual Machine with 2GB of RAM and one processor core. The
host system is a MacBook Pro with Mac OS X 10.10.5, 2.7 GHz Intel Core i7, 8 GB
1067 MHz DDR3 RAM and a 256GB Solid State SATA Hard Drive.

Latency Analysis
There are two sources of latency associated with DecMS-Kernel: inline function
hooking and randomness classiﬁcation. Inline function hooking intercepts system
write calls and latency is observed for each write to the disk. As deﬁned by our
Observation Policy in Figure 6.1, the write bu↵er passes through our randomness
classiﬁer and common secure delete pattern checker only on the ﬁrst bu↵er written
to storage.
2

NIST recommends 120 bits for Frequency (monobit), Frequency Block, and Runs Tests, and
128 bits for longest run-of-ones Test
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Figure 6.2 shows the latency test of DecMS-Kernel compared against the system
baseline as well as DecMS-Kernel with only system call interception enabled (without
inspecting the write bu↵er for randomness or destruction templates). The latency
samples 500 separate ﬁle writes of 4 KiB. The median latency for the baseline is 0.0075
ms, and the median latency of DecMS-Kernel without conducting any classiﬁcation
is 0.015 ms. Thus the cost of each write call interception is about 0.0075 ms. The
median latency for DecMS-Kernel of bu↵er size 16 bytes and a max depth of one is
0.024 ms, which adds about 0.017 ms of overhead. Likewise, the median overhead
caused by a classiﬁcation tree with a maximum depth of two and bu↵er size of 4,096
bytes (D2B4096) is 0.046 ms, and for the D4B4096

3

classiﬁcation tree, the median

latency is 0.117 ms.
Note that the costs associated with the randomness classiﬁcation become increasingly large as the ﬁle size increases. The cost to intercept the write bu↵er eventually
becomes much larger than the cost to run the randomness test once. In Figure 6.3,
the latency for a 32 MiB

4

ﬁle is shown. The cost associated with writes interception

with 32 MiB. ﬁles is estimated to be about 93.05 ms. As shown in Figure 6.3, the
increased latency from the baseline for 32 MiB ﬁles is about 60.00 ms.
Figures 6.4 and 6.5 compare the latency of DecMS-Kernel with data backup enabled for 4 KiB ﬁles and 32 MiB ﬁles respectively. When DecMS-Kernel detects data
destruction, the ﬁle is hex encoded [120] and sent to the auditd for storage. The hex
encoding increases the overhead by a factor of 2.95x. The overhead for hex encoding
was calculated by measuring the average latency of 1000 10 Mib ﬁles for both the
baseline and hex encoding only. The usage of hex encoding is for convenience and
can be avoided altogether by writing the raw binary values out to the log. The total
median latency increase for 4 KiB ﬁles when a write bu↵er is classiﬁed as destructive
is a factor 19.5. For 32 MiB ﬁles, the median latency increases by a factor 20.6.
To summarize, the latency introduced by DecMS-Kernel is about three times the
latency of the baseline. Because our policy only checks for randomness on the ﬁrst
3
4

Maximum depth of four and bu↵er size of 4,096
MiB is 22 0 bytes.
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write to a protected ﬁle, the latency associated with intercepting the write bu↵er outweighs the cost to run the tree classiﬁer and common secure delete template matching
regardless of the conﬁguration explored in Section 5.3.3. The latency to move a ﬁle
if the write bu↵er is classiﬁed as destructive increases the baseline latency by about
a factor of 20.
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Figure 6.2.: A comparison of real time ﬁle latency for 4 KiB ﬁles for DecMS-Kernel
under various sample sizes.

Evaluation Against Applications
The evaluation is conducted on the shred [72] and srm [73] command line applications. Of the 993 test ﬁles, all were successfully detected by DecMS-Kernel, indicating
that the Protection Policies and service are working under the experimental conﬁg-
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Figure 6.3.: A comparison of real time ﬁle latency for 32 MiB ﬁles for DecMS-Kernel
under various sample sizes.

uration and threat assumptions. DecMS-Kernel is conﬁgured to detect if the ﬁle is
undergoing destruction and a log is generated.

Ransomware Evaluation
We tested DecMS-Kernel by measuring the ability to detect encryption of all the
ﬁles greater than 4,096 KiB in the Diverse testing set. The results show that DecMSKernel is capable of detecting 916/917 of those ﬁles. The misclassiﬁcation of one out
of the 917 was caused by the incorrect classiﬁcation of the random bu↵er written by
the experimental ransomware.
One false negative classiﬁcation out of 917 provides a signiﬁcant improvement
compared to the system without DecMS-Kernel. However, the loss of even a single
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Figure 6.4.: A comparison of real time ﬁle latency for 4 KiB ﬁles for DecMS-Kernel,
with and without the Analysis Policy and Preservation Policy.

ﬁle is devastating if the ﬁle is not replaceable. The classiﬁer can be adjusted to
improve accuracy, but perfect accuracy is not possible. For the DecMS-VMI proof
of concept, a ﬁle is always preserved (temporarily based on some retention policy)
upon opening a ﬁle. Even if a destructive write is misclassiﬁed, the ﬁle may still be
preserved.

6.1.8 Discussion
DecMS-Kernel is capable of detecting data destruction with high rates of recall
and precision.
We measured the latency of DecMS-Kernel, and our experimental results show
that it is suitable for users with low I/O demands. Furthermore, we demonstrate
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that DecMS-Kernel is capable of defending against commonly available secure delete
tools such as shred and srm as well as the ransomware which may use the commonly
observed combination of AES for ﬁle encryption and RSA public key encryption to
encrypt the AES key.
The above results show that the DecMS-Kernel proof of concept is capable of
preserving ﬁles under destruction and providing a log of targets that a threat may
target, satisfying the DecMS Identiﬁcation Goal, DecMS Impedance Goal, and DecMS
Preservation Goal. Two types of threats are shown to be unsuccessful in destroying
data, which indicates that it may be possible to reduce the e↵ectiveness of some data
destruction methods (DecMS Reduction Goal).
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There are several improvements guiding the design choices in the subsequent evaluations of DecMS. For large ﬁles (32 MiB in the evaluation), it appears that the
latency may not be suitable. Speciﬁcally, copying the ﬁles to another location is only
suitable for small ﬁle sizes because of the large latency. Likewise, the large observable
latency may indicate to the attacker that the I/O system is doing additional work
during destructive actions. The masking/mimicking strategy at the kernel level may,
therefore, be unsuitable under the current conﬁguration.
Given the above results, the following design choices were made. First, the process
preserving data under destruction should be optimized. An obvious choice is to use a
logging or snapshot ﬁle system that only saves changes to a ﬁle rather than overwriting
a ﬁle. A logging or snapshot ﬁle system will not require copying the entire contents of
a ﬁle when a destructive write is observed. However, the challenge is hiding the fact
that a logging or snapshot ﬁle system is in place. The control mechanisms of the ﬁle
system, to roll back to an older version of a ﬁle, should be outside of both the user
and threats control. Based on the results above, the following proof of concept places
the Monitoring Policies and Protection Policies, and associated services, outside of
the system under protection.

6.2 VMI-based Evaluation
Our prototype implementation DecMS-VMI interposes system calls through Virtual Machine Introspection (VMI) and places the analysis and preservation within the
Virtual Machine Monitor (VMM), which is part of the Trusted Monitoring System
(Figure 5.9). The challenge with VMI is bridging the semantic gap, i.e., determining
ﬁle activity from outside the operating system. Prior work [94] and an associated
open source project [95] address semantic gap challenges, which security monitoring
tools [69] use reliably.
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Our evaluation of DecMS-VMI protects a Windows 5 VM against data destruction
and uses VMI to intercept system calls associated with storage medium I/O. The
cost of DecMS-VMI is a decrease in I/O performance. However, we show that the
additional overhead may be acceptable in some settings.
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destruction is suspected.

Figure 6.6 illustrates the high-level design of DecMS-VMI when placed within
the VMM. When a process invokes a system call that writes to a ﬁle, DecMS-VMI
intercepts the system call and inspects the parameters (1). The Observation Policy
deﬁnes the set of system calls to monitor and a set of ﬁles that are under protection.
A temporary checkpoint of the ﬁle system occurs each time a ﬁle is open for writing.
Later, when the process writes to the ﬁle (2), the Analysis Policy examines the system
call parameters and decides if the write is suspect or benign. If the write is suspicious,
the temporary checkpoint converts to a permanent snapshot. If an attacker destroys
5

Our prototype and associated third-party software protect Windows 7, but we do not anticipate
signiﬁcant obstacles to using DecMS-VMI with more recent versions of Windows. Conceptually, it
should also port to Linux, Mac OS, and other systems.
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the ﬁles, a system administrator can use the snapshot of the ﬁle system to recover
the ﬁles. Temporary checkpoints are later consumed by a garbage collector to free up
storage space if they are no longer needed, according to the Preservation Policy.

6.2.1 Observation Policy and Service
Method
To intercept I/O system calls and inspect their parameters, we used the Drakvuf
Dynamic Malware Analysis System [69]. Drakvuf runs inside the VMM and inserts
breakpoints in key memory locations inside the VM’s memory to transfer control
to the VMM. When an application within the VM issues a system call, control is
transferred to Drakvuf. The design of Drakvuf is stealthy, such that it is difficult to
detect the presence of Drakvuf within the monitored environment. We implement
DecMS-VMI as a plugin for Drakvuf.

Policy
Our DecMS-VMI prototype intercepts two system calls on the guest VM: open ﬁle
and write a ﬁle. To open a ﬁle for writing, applications within the guest VM must issue
an open system call and request access permission for a given ﬁle. The Observation
Policy examines all open system calls and determines if the ﬁle is open for writing
by examining the call parameters. If the system call requests a write permission,
the Observation Policy determines if the ﬁle should be protected based on a blacklist
or whitelist. Algorithm 1 contains pseudocode summarizing the Observation Policy
decision ﬂow for open ﬁle system calls 6.2.1.
If the ﬁle is on the blacklist, we take a snapshot of the ﬁle system because the ﬁle
is considered critical to system stability. Whitelisted ﬁles are considered unimportant
and do not require preservation. If the ﬁle is on neither list, DecMS-VMI takes
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Algorithm 1 Open File VMI Pseudocode
if File is opened for writing then
if File is in Blacklist then
Create a Snapshot (Permanent)
Done
else if File is in Whitelist then
Done
else
Create Checkpoint (Temporary)
end if
end if
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a temporary checkpoint of the ﬁle system, and subsequent write system calls are
analyzed, according to the Analysis Policy, to determine if the write is suspect.

Implementation
Several ﬁles may always need protection from destruction, regardless of the write
pattern. Data objects that are critical for system stability, such as the Master Boot
Record (MBR), are present in the blacklist. If a ﬁle on a blacklist is opened for writing,
the Preservation Policy is automatically triggered, which handles the preservation of
the ﬁle that is open for writing. The blacklist for our evaluation consists of references
any devices in the Win32 Device Namespaces and the NT Namespaces [110].
Ignoring certain data objects, deﬁned on the whitelist, provides an increase in
performance by avoiding analysis of ﬁles that are not important. Data objects on
the whitelist, such as caches and temporary ﬁles, are ignored. For our experimental
evaluation, the whitelist includes all ﬁles that exist outside a speciﬁed “evaluation”
directory. We do this for two reasons. First, it allows us to have better control
over our experimental analysis because the system may contain ﬁle caches that are
periodically written to, potentially interfering with our results. Secondly, in practice,
the system ﬁles are much easier to recover from if destroyed. Users are more concerned
with personal ﬁles, typically stored in their home directory.
DecMS-VMI examines the following Windows system calls according to the Observation Policy:
NtOpenFile is the Windows system call used to open existing ﬁles, while
NTCreatFile can both open existing ﬁles and create new ones. The prototype Observation Policy identiﬁes that the ﬁle exists and opened with the write permission
by examining the DesiredAccess and CreateDisposition call parameters.
The NtWriteFile Windows system call writes data to an open ﬁle [121]. The
FileHandle, Buffer, ByteOffset, and Length parameters are given to the Anal-

132
ysis Policy, if the ﬁle is not in the blacklist or whitelist, to determine if write is
suspected of being destructive.
The NtSetInformationFile modify ﬁle metadata [122].

DecMS-VMI uses the

FileInformationClass, FileInformation, and FileHandle parameters. When
a FILE BASIC INFORMATION is indicated by FileInformationClass, a timestamp change is being made. For each timestamp type, a new time is speciﬁed in
FileInformation. The Observation Policy in our evaluation examines all timestamp
modiﬁcations for malicious timestamp changes. The Analysis Policy determines if
one of the timestamp arguments as given to one of these system calls will result in
a signiﬁcant timestamp shift from the current time. We assume that the timestamp
on the VM and the VMM are synchronized, and system time changes within the VM
are tracked. The Preservation Policy logs all incidents within the VMM.

6.2.2 Analysis Policy and Service
The interposed information is analyzed to identify destructive actions. The Analysis Policy describes the set of algorithms to determine if a write call is suspect. The
Analysis Policy details feature extraction that is then used to decide if a write is
suspect. Feature extraction should be quick to minimize analysis latency.

Policy
Our experimental policy examines the ﬁrst write to the beginning of a ﬁle. We
later demonstrate in our evaluation that our conservative sampling provides high
accuracy and acceptable performance. The analysis extracts the following features.
File Signatures We use the ﬁle signature corpus found in [123]. If the system
call overwrites the ﬁle signature with data that does not match the ﬁle extension, we
ﬂag the write as suspicious.
Data Destruction Patterns Several secure delete algorithms, as shown in Table 5.2, overwrite ﬁles with repetitive patterns. To identify common secure delete
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patterns, the Analysis Policy examines if the entire write bu↵er consists of repetitive
bytes, such as 0xFF or 0x00. If the ﬁrst 4 KiB of the write bu↵er contains a ﬁxed
pattern, we ﬂag the write a suspicious.
Randomness Testing Several data destruction tools use random binary data to
overwrite ﬁles. Prior work in [23,24,53] use entropy as a metric to identify encryption
in ransomware. Instead, we use a classiﬁcation tree with features used in evaluating
cryptographic pseudorandom number generators [67]. The experimental evaluation
demonstrates e↵ectiveness for detecting data destruction attacks. The beneﬁt of using
a classiﬁcation tree is the ease of implementation in C to provide a minimum impact
on latency. A detailed description of the randomness test training and validation is
given in Section 5.3. If the ﬁrst 4 KiB of the write bu↵er appears to contain random
binary data, we ﬂag the write as suspicious.
Algorithm 2 shows the ﬂow of our prototype implementation handling system
write calls. The ordering of the detection methods is from most efficient to least
efficient to compute. First, we check to see if the ﬁle extension in the FileHandle
does not match the ﬁle signature found in the write bu↵er. Next, we check if the
bu↵er contains known destructive patterns. Finally, a randomness test examines the
write bu↵er. If any of the tests return true, then the checkpoint, created when the
ﬁle was open, converts to a persistent snapshot.
Algorithm 2 Write File VMI Pseudocode
if First write and beginning of ﬁle then
if File signature does not match ﬁle extension then
Change checkpoint to snapshot
else if Sampled bu↵er is a common pattern then
Change checkpoint to snapshot
else if Sampled bu↵er is random then
Change checkpoint to snapshot
end if
else if MAC DTS Update then
if DTS does not match the current time ± � then
Log incident, including the original and attempted change MAC DTS.
end if
end if
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Implementation
Drakvuf interposes system calls within the guest VM transfers control between the
guest VM and the VMM. When the guest VM issues an open or write system call,
control transfers to the VMM. The previously mentioned features are extracted then
pass through a decision process, shown in Algorithm 2. After the analysis completes,
control transfers back to the guest VM, and the operating system continues.
A tree classiﬁer identiﬁes if a bu↵er contains random data. In Section 5.3, the
details regarding parameter constraints and features to produce our classiﬁcation tree.

6.2.3 Preservation Policy and Service
If a protected ﬁle is undergoing data destruction, the Preservation Policy deﬁnes
the actions necessary to preserve the data, the information to log regarding the state
of the VM, and the policies relating to the retention of temporary checkpoints when
a ﬁle is open for writing.

Method
Several design choices are possible regarding the preservation of data under destruction. Upon detecting a destructive write and before the write is committed to
storage, the ﬁles under destruction can move into a container that is isolated from the
attacker. We deﬁne the above to be a reactive strategy. While the design is simple,
the latency may be high if the ﬁle size is large. The reactive strategy only creates
back-ups of ﬁles as destruction occurs, thus only occupying space when necessary.
In contrast to the reactive strategy, the proactive strategy protects data in anticipation of a destructive action. The advantage is that there are several existing
schemes to quickly create a checkpoint of the storage medium or ﬁle to reduce latency
relative to the reactive strategy. For example, a copy-on-write (CoW) scheme may
outperform a reactive strategy. A checkpoint under a CoW scheme preserves the stor-
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age state, and any changes to the storage are tracked. Analysis of destructive actions
can occur after the data is written, reducing the latency compared to the reactive
strategy. If destruction is determined, the system can rollback to the checkpoint. One
disadvantage is that a checkpoint must be taken in a consistent state and be updated
periodically to save disk space.
A version control or log-structured ﬁle system provides advantages over a CoW
scheme. All writes are appended to the disk with a checkpoint number. Checkpoints
are taken continuously, allowing for a system administrator to roll back to a consistent
state if data destruction occurs. A disadvantage is a need for garbage collection. As
writes occur on the disk, checkpoints are created and consume disk space. A garbage
collector can run periodically, have a minimum time to retain checkpoints, and run
when the disk is nearly full — all based on policy.
We ﬁnd that for data preservation, a log-structured ﬁle system works well because
writes are in append mode only, writes are efficient, and automatic garbage collection
is possible (when checkpoints are no longer needed). We choose to use NilFS [124]
for this purpose because of its superior performance for ﬁle writes. NilFS uses checkpoints, which can be garbage collected, and snapshots, which are permanent. A
checkpoint converts to a snapshot upon command. We use the snapshot feature to
make a permanent copy of the ﬁle system when we suspect a ﬁle is the target of data
destruction. From the perspective of the Windows VM, the user is writing ﬁles to
an NTFS disk while the hypervisor and Host OS translate the writes to NilFS. The
creation of NilFS snapshots is done outside the Windows VM thus protecting it from
a compromised guest OS.

Implementation
For our experimental evaluation, we take checkpoints synchronously when a ﬁle
is opened. When a checkpoint is required, the task is given to a thread pool. Although NiLFS takes checkpoints quickly, we do not want the VM to hang during the
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checkpoint creation. Subsequent writes block until the checkpoint completes. From
our experimental evaluation, we found that this strategy does not impact the write
performance signiﬁcantly while providing certainty that the checkpoint matches the
storage state.

6.2.4 Experimental Results
Our experimental evaluation is conducted on a machine running Ubuntu 16.04.2
LTS (GNU/Linux 4.4.0-75-generic x86 - 64) conﬁgured with Xen 4.8.0 with 4,096 MiB
Domain0 memory and four dedicated vCPUs. The host machine is a Dell PowerEdge R410 with two Intel Xeon X5570s clocked at 2.93 GHz with 16 GB DDR3
Synchronized 1333Mhz RAM and a Samsung 850 250 GB SSD. We use the Drakvuf
v0.4-7a79990 VMI tool to intercept Windows system calls associated with ﬁle I/O.
The Windows Guest VM uses 2 GB of RAM, two vCPUs, and two virtual disks. The
ﬁrst disk contains the operating system and uses a Logical Volume Manager (LVM)
partition on the host machine. The second virtual machine disk exists within a NilFS
partition. All the experimental evaluation is conducted on the second disk, as it is
easier to control the read/write accesses on a disk without interference from the OS
related temporary ﬁles.
We compare the experimental results to our baseline system, which is a Windows
VM that does not have DecMS-VMI enabled but uses NILFS to create a periodic
checkpoint. The baseline system is a fair comparison to DecMS-VMI as it has the
beneﬁts of using NILFS to periodically take checkpoints but without the beneﬁt
of monitoring for potential data destruction. The garbage collector and continuous
checkpointing are disabled to provide optimal disk performance for the baseline. The
hardware and VM conﬁguration for the baseline and DecMS-VMI are identical.
We evaluate the three requirements identiﬁed in Section 5.6.2: accuracy, preservation, and performance. For data preservation, we check the di↵erence between the
ﬁles under protection before and after running wiper malware samples, listed in Ta-
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ble 5.1, and the secure delete tools, listed in Table 5.2. Some of the secure delete
tools use deterministic patterns for every secure delete, such as overwriting with all
zeros (e.g., British HMG IS5). Other methods generate random data at runtime (e.g.,
AFSSI-5020), so the data used to overwrite the ﬁle is di↵erent each run of the algorithm. While the sample size of wiper malware seems small, consider that modern
wiper malware is not designed to be as widespread as other malware such as botnets
or ransomware. The samples in our evaluation represent a sample of all the latest
wiper malware found in the wild.
We refer to ordinary ﬁles that should not trigger the system as benign. The benign
ﬁles used in our evaluation are from GovDocs [116].
For accuracy, we measure the recall and precision rates of our Analysis Policy to
identify benign writes and destructive writes. Finally, to measure the performance
impact of our prototype implementation, we measure and compare the latency and
throughput on the same hardware with and without DecMS-VMI enabled. We also
run PCMark 8 [125] to measure the performance impact of completing office tasks.

Metrics of Interest
Just as in the DecMS-Kernel prototype evaluation, the metrics of interest for
DecMS-VMI are: the accuracy of benign or destructive classes, the impact on the
latency associated with conducting such an analysis on a live system, and the ability
to preserve the ﬁles under destruction.
While both metrics are of importance, the cost of false positive classiﬁcation is
producing a NILFS snapshot on benign writes, which produces write latency for
valid users. Therefore, we favor a higher recall value than precision when selecting
parameters for our classiﬁer. A high recall implies that there is are few false negative
classiﬁcations. If speed is a priority, then a high precision rate may be of interest,
implying that the classiﬁer has few false positive classiﬁcations.
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The components that contribute to latency include the latency to intercept system
calls via VMI, the time needed to calculate features, the latency to run the Analysis
Policy (e.g., classiﬁcation time), and the latency to trigger and create a checkpoint
or snapshot.
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Figure 6.7.: Confusion matrix for PRNG data destruction, the worst performing test.
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In this section, we evaluate the accuracy of our Analysis Policy to distinguish
between benign writes and destructive writes. The test set consists of two classes
of ﬁles: Benign and Destructive. The Benign Class consists of Govdocs1 ﬁles from
Thread2, which represents common ﬁles real users typically encounter and DecMSVMI should not mistake writing these ﬁles as suspicious. The Benign ﬁles consist
mostly of multimedia ﬁles such as PDF, HTML, and JPEG. Figure 5.1 lists the ﬁletype distribution for testing accuracy.
The evaluation consists of overwriting ﬁles and observing the outcome of the Analysis Policy. For the Benign class, we overwrite the ﬁles’ contents, without changing
the ﬁle type, as would be the common case for benign use. For the Destructive class,
we overwrite the ﬁles with all of the secure delete tools found in Table 5.2.
DecMS-VMI with our experimental Analysis Policy can correctly preserve ﬁles for
all data destruction tools at 100% True Positive Rate, except for the Pseudorandom
Data destruction method. Figure 6.7a shows the confusion matrix for DecMS-VMI
under the Pseudorandom Data destruction method, which consists of overwriting a
ﬁle with a single pass of pseudorandom bits. The false negative rate is 0.2%, in other
words, out of 989 ﬁles, DecMS-VMI falsely identiﬁed two destructive overwrites as
benign. A CSV ﬁle and an XML ﬁle are not triggered by ﬁle signature/extension
mismatch because of the lack of ﬁxed ﬁle signature for ﬂat text ﬁles. In practice,
false negative ﬁles are not necessarily lost. The checkpoints are available until the
NILFS garbage collector runs, which can be set to only remove checkpoints if older
than some date/time or if the ﬁlesystem is nearly full.
The false positive rate is 0.51%: ﬁve ﬁles out of 989 benign writes were incorrectly
classiﬁed as destructive. Four of the ﬁve ﬁles triggered a snapshot because of a mismatched ﬁle signature. Upon further inspection, we veriﬁed that the four ﬁles (three
Excel spreadsheets, and one PDF) in our testing set simply have mismatched ﬁle extensions and signatures. There are several reasons why the mismatch can happen in
practice. As mentioned in [23], ﬁle signatures may change between di↵erent software
versions. The three Excel Spreadsheets use a ﬁle signature for which was not in our
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ﬁle signature corpus. It appears that these three ﬁles use an older ﬁle signature that
we did not account. After adjusting the ﬁle signature corpus, we have a false positive
rate of 0.2%, as shown in Figure 6.7b. The PDF ﬁle (206709.pdf in the GovDocs
dataset) has 112 bytes of data before the correct ﬁle signature, which may indicate
ﬁle corruption. The other false positive ﬁle, 186957.pdf in GovDocs, was incorrectly
classiﬁed as destructive by our randomness classiﬁcation tree.
DecMS-VMI also successfully detects all of the Wiper Malware in Table 5.1 upon
the ﬁrst suspicious write. Not only did we detect the ﬁrst suspicious write for all of
the samples, but we show in the following section that all of the ﬁles were successfully
preserved without any unauthorized modiﬁcation.

Preservation Under Wipers
To test if DecMS-VMI can accurately preserve data under destruction, we test
against four wiper malware samples that have caused substantial damage to real
systems. Table 5.1 list of all the malware we evaluate.
Our test environment consists of ﬁles found in GovDocs Thread9. We place all of
the ﬁles under a protected directory in a separate disk image in our Windows VM.
We also populate the VM with synthetic data to make the VM appear to be a real
system rather than a malware analysis system. Internet connection is disabled in our
test environment, as none of the samples require a network connection to destroy ﬁles
on the system, according to the tech reports for each malware sample [4,107,108,126].
The malware samples use two approaches to destroy ﬁles on the system: overwriting each user ﬁle or by-passing the ﬁle system and overwriting the raw disk. The
Shamoon, Shamoon2, and Stonedrill samples overwrite data using raw disk access,
which triggered the Blacklist in our Analysis Policy. The Destover sample overwrites
the protected ﬁles using a JPEG image fragment. The Analysis Policy triggers a
snapshot, because of mismatched ﬁle extension and ﬁle signature, to preserve the ﬁles
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under destruction. Therefore, the detection happens either before or upon the ﬁrst
destructive write to a protected ﬁle.
We ran each sample under administrative privileges with DecMS-VMI enabled
and veriﬁed that the malware samples destroy data. After the destruction completes,
we mount the disk image of the ﬁrst snapshot taken because of the malware’s data
destruction actions. We then compare all of the ﬁles from the snapshot to the original
ﬁles using the Unix diff tool. All ﬁles were successfully preserved against all of the
Wiper malware samples considered.

Performance Analysis
The performance evaluation consists of two categories: the latency for benign user
tasks and suspect ﬁle writes.
Benign Activity For benign user activity, we evaluate the performance by using
PCMark 8 [125]. PCMark 8 is a benchmark suite to measure system performance
under common user tasks. We evaluate DecMS-VMI using the “Work Benchmark”
test suite [125] which consists of web browsing, document processing, and spreadsheet
editing6 . These tests mimic how real users interact with the software and measures
user interface and runtime latencies. Below, a summary of each of the PCMark 8
Work Benchmark test for the evaluation follows. For details, refer to the PCMark 8
Technical Guide [125].
The Work Benchmark contains two separate web browser performance tests. The
JunglePin Test simulates a user browsing on a social networking website. The test
measures the latency to render the page and the rendering speed for several animations. The other web browser test, Amazonia Test, is an online commerce website,
which consists of the latency to update a shopping cart and several animations. Both
tests use Internet Explorer 9.
6

We do not consider the video chat test because our experimental machine does not properly
pass through GPU requests from the VM to the host machine.
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Figure 6.8.: PCMark 8 office benchmark results showing the overhead incurred by
DecMS-VMI for a variety of common office tasks.

The Work Benchmark also includes a word processing test called the Writing Test.
The test measures the time to load/save a document, resize the window, copy/paste
text, and add a picture to a document. The Writing test uses a document editor
develop by PCMark.
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The Spreadsheet Test measures the time to open and close a spreadsheet, copy
and paste data between spreadsheets, process data, and edit cells. The Spreadsheet
Test uses LibreOffice Calc, an open source office document editor, for data processing.
Figure 6.8a illustrates the overhead of DecMS-VMI under several benign user
tasks, from the Work Benchmark, which is typical in a work environment. The ratio
shown in the bar chart is the Median overhead introduced by VMI and the DecMSVMI Analysis Policy. The plot shows that the majority of the overhead is from
VMI for all tests, with DecMS-VMI analysis contributing to less than 1.6% overhead,
compared to the baseline, for all cases. The JunglePin Test performs the worst,
with 20.09% total overhead, with 1.54% overhead caused by DecMS-VMI analysis.
It appears that the overhead is caused by the rich image content of the JunglePin
website. The majority of the overhead is from intercepting the ﬁle creation and write
system calls for each image on the JunglePin web page. Additional overhead may
also be caused by a system-wide impact associated with the use of VMI
The Work Benchmark measurements include the latency that e↵ects user interface
elements, such as the scroll speed for both JunglePin and Amazonia, resizing the
window when writing a document, and the latency to edit a cell in a spreadsheet
citepcmark. It appears that the UI elements are a↵ected by using VMI (discussed
with the throughput analysis), even without running any analysis or preservation.
Since DecMS-VMI interposes storage I/O, we want to examine the impact of I/O
performance degradation without considering the degraded UI performance. We run
PCMark 8’s “Storage Benchmark,” [125] which measures storage latency performance,
to compare the latency of the baseline and DecMS-VMI. The Storage Benchmark
simulates disk usage and does not simulate the UI, which is the main distinction
compared to the Work Benchmark.
The storage performance consists of I/O traces of several popular applications:
four from Adobe Systems, three from Microsoft, and two computer games. The Adobe
Systems applications include Photoshop, a photo editing application; InDesign, a
web-publishing application; AfterE↵ects, a video editing and e↵ects application; and
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Illustrator, a vector image editing application. The Microsoft tests include Microsoft
Word, Excel, and Powerpoint. The two computer games are Battleﬁeld 3, a ﬁrstperson shooter, and World of Warcraft, an online role-playing game. All tests have a
single conﬁguration except Photoshop, which runs under a “light” or “heavy” usage.
Figure 6.8b shows the median overhead for storage I/O for DecMS-VMI. The
Adobe Photoshop and AfterE↵ects Test performed the worst with a median overhead
of 3-4%. Based on the description of the tests [125], it appears that the Photoshop and
AfterE↵ects Tests are heavy in random access I/O and writing. The best performing
tests are World of Warcraft and Battleﬁeld 3 with a median overhead of less than
1.5%. Both games are heavy in reading content on the disk and DecMS-VMI does
not interpose ﬁle read system calls. Based on the results, it appears that DecMS-VMI
introduces a latency increase of between 1% to 4% on disk storage.
To conﬁrm that VMI interposition adds overhead to the entire system (including the UI), we ran DecMS-VMI using the CrystalDiskMark 5.2.1 [127] throughput,
a Windows disk benchmarking application, to measure reading performance under
DecMS-VMI. Recall that our experimental policies do not interpose read system calls.
VMI reduces throughput for sequential reads by an average of 5.6% and 27% for
random reads, compared to our baseline. The above provides evidence that the VMI
methods we rely on account for overhead outside of system calls we interpose for
DecMS-VMI.
We also examined the write throughput under DecMS-VMI, which exposes a limitation to using VMI in this implementation. Under the CrystalDiskMark random
write test, we observed a decrease in performance of 57.5% in our prototype implementation of DecMS-VMI. However, 95.4% of the performance reduction was caused
by VMI. Nonetheless, these results show that DecMS-VMI may not be suitable for
applications that demand high throughput of random writes. Sequential writes, however, perform relatively well with 4.12% decrease in throughput, with VMI accounting
for about 72.1%.
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Figure 6.9.: Median Latency introduced by DecMS-VMI and VMI when data destruction is suspect.

Suspicious Activity To measure performance when a write is suspect, we measure the latency for destructive actions under various ﬁle sizes. Our test consists of
overwriting di↵erent ﬁles of di↵erent sizes, from 4 KiB to 32 MiB. We measure the
median latency (n = 100) to destroy an individual ﬁle of a speciﬁc size by overwriting
the ﬁle with pseudorandom data. As deﬁned by our Analysis Policy, the randomness
test executes last, so all features of the analysis and classiﬁcation execute during the
test. Thus, the test represents the longest execution path for DecMS-VMI analysis.
Figure 6.9 contains the latency results of writing a ﬁxed ﬁle size that triggers
DecMS-VMI to convert a checkpoint into a snapshot. Recall that DecMS-VMI only
examines the ﬁrst 4 KiB to identify if a write is suspected of data destruction. As the
size of the ﬁle increases, as shown on the X-axis, the analysis time becomes a smaller
ratio to the time it takes to write the ﬁle. Thus, for small destructive writes, we see a
large multiplicative factor in overhead. For 4 KiB ﬁles, the overhead is increased by
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a factor 7.44X compared to the baseline. While the overhead seems to be quite large,
this may not be relevant to a legitimate user. Foremost, if the latency is increased
for a malicious action (data destruction), then that is a desirable outcome. So, we
only worry about this increased latency for a false positive, i.e., a legitimate write
by a legitimate user is mistaken to be a destructive write. We have seen from our
accuracy analysis (Figure 6.7b) that this happens very rarely (0.2% of the cases).
Finally, the worst case increase in latency is for the smallest ﬁle size of 4 KiB, and
that increases latency from 0.16 ms to 1.20 ms, which is not perceptible for a userinteractive workload. Figures A.1, A.2, and A.3 in the appendix contains the write
latencies for various ﬁle sizes, measured in milliseconds, for DecMS-VMI.

Summary of Results
Our results show that DecMS-VMI protects against data destruction attacks at
the cost of tolerable overhead under several common workloads. While the overhead is
non-negligible, our results indicate that there are several use cases where the overhead
may be acceptable. The majority of the overhead is caused by VMI and not the
DecMS-VMI analysis. For benign user tasks, the DecMS-VMI analysis only accounts
for 1.4% to 9.29% (Figure 6.8a) of the total latency introduced, which is between
0.13% to 1.54% additional overhead compared to the baseline system. There has
already been more than a 5x reduction in VMI overhead from 2004 to 2011 [62] [128]
and as VMI mechanisms continue to improve in performance, DecMS-VMI will also
inherit the beneﬁts.

Latency analysis: Timestamp modiﬁcation

7

Figure 6.10 illustrates the latency of determining if a timestamp is fraudulent.
The latency is measured as the cumulative latency of changing 100 timestamps and
averaged. Note that in our parlance, one timestamp consists of four di↵erent 64-bit
7

Assistance from Thomas Yurek for prototype implementation and evaluation.
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values [129]: creation, last access, last written, last update, all of which are updated
together. The baseline median latency for changing a timestamp is 7.46 ms, while the
latency associated with VMI is 29.30 ms, a 3.83X increase. We suspect that the large
factor increase in latency is because writing timestamp metadata to a ﬁle is quick
and only requires writing 256-bits worth of data. The median latency associated with
comparing the timestamp passed in as a parameter and the true system time is 36 ms,
an increase of 22.9% over simple VMI. The increase in latency for timestamp update
still keeps the total time to less than 30 ms and so should be tolerable for most user
interactive scenarios. However, an informed attacker could examine the timestamp
modiﬁcation latency within the guest VM to determine if DecMS-VMI is running.
6
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Figure 6.10.: Cumulative latency (100 samples) to check for fraudulent timestamps.

Protecting Against Storage Saturation
One potential issue in the DecMS-VMI conﬁguration is protecting against a threat
that saturates the system with multiple overwrites to the same ﬁle. As the DecMS-
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VMI system uses NilFS, overwriting the same storage location multiple times with
destructive writes causes the storage medium to ﬁll at a linear rate. That is, for
each destructive write of size n at the same location, the NilFS system must consume
O(kn), where k is the number of times a ﬁle is overwritten.
If the NilFS storage medium is full, a snapshot or checkpoint cannot be taken. The
Preservation Policy should indicate what should happen. One strategy is to ignore
checkpoint/snapshot creation each time such a request is observed from the VMM.
Another policy is to impede the request and free old checkpoints. However, if the
attacker is aware of policies of DecMS, she may attempt to remove old checkpoints
that contain valuable information. Alternatively, the Deception Policy and service
can inject a deceptive response.
Rather than denying the write request, an inconsistency response is given. The
DecMS-VMI policy reports to the guest OS that the overwrite actions are successful,
but the ﬁles still exist within the protected VM. If the adversary observes the failure,
the attacker may attempt an alternative strategy to destroy the data, allowing for
additional information to be gathered regarding attacker strategy. Further, the NilFS
does not increase its space usage when the deception is injected into the system.
The silent error approach is successful for all of the secure delete methods in Figure
5.2, except Gutmann’s 35-pass method. On Gutmann’s 35-pass method, the Analysis
Policy failed to detect data destruction for nine of the 35-passes. Nonetheless, the
other 26 passes did not occupy space on the NilFS storage.
Note that some of the speciﬁcations for the secure delete algorithms require a
veriﬁcation between each write cycle. The experimental evaluation shows that the
write action attempts three times and continues regardless of the fact that the data
is not observable from the guest VM.
The results from the silent error experiment show that the data destruction tools
do not follow the usual programming standard. One issue is that the secure delete
speciﬁcations do not detail what to do if overwriting and veriﬁcation failed. Another
insight from this experiment is the fact that an inconsistent view of deception can be
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e↵ective if the threat does not validate its actions properly. Finally, the silent error
injection is e↵ective for several secure delete algorithms; thus DecMS-VMI is capable
of adjusting strategies based on the state of the system.
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7 CONCLUSION
7.1 Summary
This dissertation explores the use of deception to defend digital assets from remote
threats that destroy information by overwriting data. Rather than halting a detected
data destruction, the deception is designed to gather information about the adversary
while preserving the data under destruction for later recovery.
Several design choices to achieve the above goals are presented in Chapter 4. A
summary of the contributions include details in planning the deception for a DecMS
system. The deceptive goals are deﬁned, and several viable deceptive strategies were
given. The deceptive planning also describes several services to facilitate the deception
and preserve data from destruction. The design decisions for DecMS are driven by the
goals and risks of using deception. Several computing systems are evaluated based on
the cost metrics. DecMS could viably protect batch and interactive systems because
of the ﬂexibility in some cost factors. Further, the hardware and software design
space are explored, and several locations are identiﬁed to monitor and defend against
destructive threats.
Two software solutions, Kernel-based and VMI-based DecMS, are selected based
on their ease of deployment while providing isolation techniques to mask the presence
of the deception. In Chapter 6 the Kernel-based (DecMS-Kernel) and VMI-based
(DecMS-VMI) solutions are evaluated. Both solutions attempt to mask the presence
of DecMS and mimic the baseline system.
The evaluation of DecMS-Kernel demonstrates the ability to protect against secure
delete and ransomware-like threats by preserving the data under destruction. One
potential issue of DecMS-Kernel is the relatively high latency for large ﬁles; large ﬁles
migrate to a log ﬁle, and the latency may be noticeable for an active adversary. The
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impedance should be long enough to preserve the data under destruction without
increasing suspicion. While an optimized solution is not a goal of the work presented
here, improvements in performance were integrated into DecMS-VMI.
For DecMS-VMI, several improvements are incorporated based on the evaluation
of DecMS-Kernel. First, a continuous logging ﬁle system preserves the ﬁles under
destruction, signiﬁcantly reducing the latency and throughput of the data destruction.
Next, the control mechanisms for the preservation are placed outside of the system
under protection, increasing the difficulty for an attacker to access DecMS from within
the guest OS. In addition to the masking and mimicking strategy, a masking/inventing
strategy is explored. The results indicate that the DecMS-VMI system is capable of
defending against several wiper malware, secure delete, and timestamp fabrication
techniques. The data is successfully preserved for nearly all threat instances and ﬁle
preservation, except one single ﬁle where the classiﬁer incorrectly identiﬁed a secure
delete as a benign write.
By hiding the presence of data preservation and back-up system, it may be possible
to use deception to protect a system against adversarial data destruction attacks. A
careful understanding of threat bias and destruction methods is necessary to provide
protection. The current proof of concept systems assumes that the threat will not
attempt to overcome the defense mechanisms of DecMS. Future work should evaluate
threats that attempt to overcome the deception and preservation methods found in
DecMS. Further, the solutions here are not optimized for performance, so reducing
the latency or increasing the throughput may be valuable. Improvements in speed is
a desired for benign users on the system and may also increase the challenge for the
adversary who conducts statistical analysis to uncover the presence of DecMS.

7.2 Shortcomings, Enhancements, and Future Work
The discussion below is focused on the DecMS-VMI proof of concept system as
several of the shortcomings of DecMS-Kernel were addressed in DecMS-VMI.
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7.2.1 Counterdeception
If the attacker becomes aware of DecMS-VMI, she may decide to go elsewhere and
target a system without DecMS-VMI. However, if the attacker is persistent, she will
attempt to circumvent DecMS-VMI. Counterdeception is an analysis of a denial and
deception operation [130, Chapter 7]. A destructive adversary’s counterdeception
analysis may yield methods to circumvent the data preservation enhancements of
DecMS. Three viable counterdeception strategies that an adversary may employ are
(i) to remain hidden from DecMS monitoring from within the OS, (ii) run the data
destruction outside of DecMS, or (iii) avoid the behaviors and heuristics that cause
the snapshot to trigger.

Hide from Monitoring
Attackers have an array of techniques to hide from security monitoring tools and
system administrators. As mentioned in Section 6.1.1, a variety of techniques exists,
predominantly in use by rootkits, to hide from security monitoring (e.g., KOH or
DKOM). If the attacker is successful in avoiding the VMM monitoring, then snapshot
or checkpoint creation never triggers, which makes the recovery of the destroyed data
difficult. Speciﬁcally, the adversary may install her own privileged I/O software to
avoid the DecMS-VMI system call monitoring altogether. In addition to writing
the I/O software, the attacker must circumvent software integrity and authenticity
validation1 , and have the privilege to install custom drivers or to make changes to
the kernel.
Another approach for the attacker is to use rootkit hiding techniques to avoid the
VMM monitoring. In the current prototype conﬁguration of DecMS-VMI, an attacker
who uses a KOH should be able to circumvent the system call monitoring. However,
a KOH detection technique already exists in Drakvuf, the VMI tool on which DecMSVMI builds. The System Service Descriptor Table (SSDT) Monitoring plug-in allows
1

Such as Windows 10 driver veriﬁcation [131].
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Drakvuf to detect if the system call table within Windows is modiﬁed. The SSDT
Monitoring plugin can be extended to work with DecMS-VMI and trigger a snapshot
before any modiﬁcation to the SSDT is observed, in addition to other actions at the
security administrator’s discretion. The attacker must use a hiding technique that
DecMS-VMI, or VM security monitoring software, fail to detect. While there are
several methods, such as KOH or DKOM, the attacker must evaluate the stealthiness
against VM security monitoring tools. Rather than avoiding all monitoring, the
attacker may choose a strategy that requires less e↵ort to avoid some aspects of
DecMS-VMI. The attacker may alter her destructive behavior to avoid the snapshot
trigger or destroy the data from a location that the current conﬁguration of DecMSVMI cannot observe.

Out-of-band Destruction
Another counterdeception method to circumvent DecMS is to modify the bootloader and destroy data from outside the operating system. An attacker who writes
over the bootloader without detection can destroy the ﬁles or the entire ﬁle system
without the risk of the VMM interposing OS system calls. In our evaluation, any
changes to the NTFS data structures automatically trigger a snapshot of the ﬁle system. Our experimental evaluation does not include malware that attempts to replace
the bootloader, but some samples did modify the partition table, which is detected
and in principle should work the same if the malware overwrites the bootloader. However, a limitation of DecMS-VMI, assuming the KOH/DKOM detection methods fail,
is if the attacker replaces the bootloader by circumventing the VMI interposition, then
she may be able to destroy ﬁles without triggering checkpoints/snapshots. Under the
experimental conﬁguration of DecMS-VMI, an attacker may be able to replace the
bootloader without detection if she can execute before DecMS-VMI is enabled. The
experimental evaluation assumes that DecMS-VMI is enabled before any malware or
data destruction tools execute. In practice, if a race condition exists, the attacker
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is likely to use it for out-of-band destruction. An attacker may modify an existing
wiper malware to execute before DecMS-VMI is enabled.
Bacs et al. in [68] successfully demonstrate the ability to modify changes to
virtual disks at speciﬁed locations such as the bootloader. The work identiﬁes speciﬁc
regions of the virtual disk for any modiﬁcation without relying on VMI. One solution
is to combine the detection mechanism in [68] with the preservation methods in the
work proposed here. Before modifying the bootloader, create a snapshot so that
the ﬁlesystem is recoverable if the modiﬁcation is malicious. The advantage is that
monitoring for changes on speciﬁc regions of a virtual disk can be done without
DecMS-VMI or the guest OS running, mitigating the race condition attack mentioned
previously.
Another possibility is to escape the guest OS and compromise the host machine
[132]. Once the attacker compromises the host machine, which is assumed to be
trusted in this dissertation, the attacker may destroy the preserved ﬁles. In addition
to common security practices to audit and verify the correctness of VM software,
DecMS can be layered and protect the ﬁles stored on the host OS. Protecting the
host machine from an attacker who escapes the VM is outside of the scope of DecMS.

Modify Behavior to Misclassify Destruction
An attacker may avoid the behavior and heuristic indicators that trigger a snapshot of the ﬁle system. To circumvent our experimental Analysis Policy, the attacker
may destroy a ﬁle by overwriting it with data that is non-random, that does not follow
common data destruction patterns, and avoids overwriting ﬁle signatures. However,
note that our experimental policy creates a checkpoint each time a protected ﬁle is
opened for writing. For an attacker to overcome the checkpoint and destroy a ﬁle
permanently, she must circumvent the Analysis Policy and force the NILFS garbage
collector to deallocate the relevant checkpoint. The e↵ort to force the NILFS garbage
collection to run is high (compared to the baseline system), requiring the attacker to
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either ﬁll the storage space and wait until the checkpoint is destroyed or wait until
the minimum retention time for checkpoints is met. For both cases, the speed of the
attacker is reduced compared to the state of practice.
Alternatively, an attacker may also avoid the Analysis Policy by overwriting small
segments of the ﬁle. The experimental Analysis Policy only analyzes write bu↵ers of
at least 4,096 KiB and when writes occur at the beginning of a ﬁle, as a trade-o↵
of robustness for speed. Currently, the experimental Analysis Policy is adjustable to
sample all writes or to sample the write bu↵ers randomly. Additional experimentation
is necessary to determine the sampling rate to provide sufficient protection without
compromising performance.
The attacker may move a ﬁle from a blacklisted directory into one that is whitelisted,
such as a web-browser cache, and destroy the ﬁle there. The Observation Policy can
monitor the NtSetInformationFile system call, which renames and moves ﬁles, to mitigate the attack. DecMS-VMI takes a snapshot if a ﬁle is moved from a protected
directory to one with less strict monitoring rules. Similarly, NtDeleteFile should also
be monitored to prevent an attacker from deleting protected ﬁles and then ﬁlling the
space on the disk.
The weaknesses above are not exclusive to DecMS-VMI but all security monitoring
tools. Attackers are persistent and eventually discover new methods to avoid monitoring. However, the design of DecMS-VMI increases the challenge of unauthorized
data destruction by isolating the snapshot or checkpoint mechanism and preserving
the data under destruction that is out of reach for the attacker. Some policy changes
can help mitigate destructive attacks by periodically taking snapshots regardless of
the changes observed, a standard conﬁguration of NILFS. Further, DecMS-VMI can
introduce inconsistencies to produce doubt for the attacker’s data destruction methods. As mentioned in prior work related to VMI, the latency associated with VMI
can be hidden from the attacker by adjusting for the timing delay within the guest
VM [62], making the detection of DecMS-VMI from the attackers’ perspective more
difficult. Further, injecting deceptive faults into the VM to disrupt the data destruc-
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tion may also slow down or disrupt the attacker. The uncertainty and confusion may
cause the attacker to stall and waste time overcoming faults that may not exist, as
shown by the work of Sun et al. [58].
For the prototype evaluation of DecMS-VMI, if the attacker is aware of all of the
methods to trigger a snapshot, then, with minimal e↵ort, the attacker may modify
her destruction to avoid triggering a snapshot and force (or wait) for the garbage
collector to remove temporary checkpoints. Even if the attacker does not trigger the
garbage collector, it may be difficult for the defender to identify and recover from
some destructive incidents. Speciﬁcally, attacks on integrity or authenticity may be
troublesome if there is no clear indication of when a ﬁle su↵ered a loss of integrity
or authenticity. The defender is forced to trace through the checkpoints and identify
when the incident occurred. Slowing down the speed at which the defender can recover
ﬁles may be sufficient to meet the goals and motivation of adversary.

Counter-Counterdeception
Identifying the strategies to circumvent DecMS can help produce features to identify destructive adversaries. Almeshekah and Spa↵ord identify that a successful deception for defense should monitor the perception and actions of an adversary to
adjust the defense accordingly [7]. Features such as (i) ﬁlling the disk with checkpoints/snapshots at a high rate (to force garbage collection) or (ii) out-of-band writing
to the guest virtual disk are both viable counter-counterdeception features. Future
work for DecMS should investigate the use of counter-counterdeception features to
identify adversaries that attempt to circumvent the protection mechanisms of DecMS.

7.2.2 Alternative Analysis Policy
An efficient method to identify Crypto Ransomware is analyzing read/write patterns, as shown in [23, 24, 53]. Ransomware follows several predictable I/O patterns,
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such as overwriting the ﬁle with the encrypted version or copying the encrypted ﬁle
elsewhere and destroying the original ﬁle [24].
Read/Write patterns may apply to detecting Wiper Malware. However, it appears
that Wipers overwrite ﬁles and do not necessarily read the ﬁle contents before destruction. Future work should investigate other I/O patterns that are write-centric.
Other possible detection metrics include the process-centric approach in [53], which
measures the rate at which a process writes to ﬁles.
File type funneling quantiﬁes the number of ﬁle type read and written to a storage
medium per process [23]. Other patterns, such as directory listing, ﬁle type coverage,
and ﬁle renaming, are features for the classiﬁer in [53]. File-centric features may not
be applicable for Wiper Malware. Wipers may write directly to a storage medium,
bypassing ﬁle system conventions [4,107,108]. All of the above metrics are ﬁle-centric
and are not readily applicable to low-level disk writing. Applying the above metrics
for low-level storage access requires the defender to bridge the semantic gap to a raw
storage medium. Prior work [91] provides some solution to the raw storage medium
semantic gap problem.
Some of the metrics listed above are not applicable to secure delete tools. For
example, secure delete tools do not need to read a ﬁle before destroying it. Listing
the ﬁles within a directory is not required for secure deletion. Some secure delete
tools do not follow conventional patterns and thus make detection difficult without
prior knowledge of how the tool works. For instance, the sdelete secure delete tool
renames a ﬁle 26 times before destruction [113]. However, it appears that renaming
ﬁles before destruction is uncommon.
Anomaly detection is another viable detection method, proposed in Garﬁnkel and
Rosenblum’s VMI work [62], that we do not consider in our experimental evaluation.
The experimental evaluation for DecMS-VMI demonstrates that the performance
impact is small for false positive detection. The disadvantage is the need to train for
benign interactions of ﬁles.
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A substantial di↵erence between Wiper Malware and Ransomware is the stability of the compromised system. The goal of Ransomware is to collect an extortion
payment. Ransomware must present the ransom note to the end user, which means
there must be a system that is at least partly functional to provide such output to
the user. Presumably, if the user pays the extortion, the ﬁles are unlocked.
The goal of some wiper malware is to make a system or data unavailable to users.
The attacker is not required to present a message to the end user upon wiping a
machine 2 . Several examples [4,108] restart the compromised machine, which displays
a Master Boot Record error.

7.2.3 Other Limitations
A benign user may have a legitimate reason to destroy or encrypt data, and that
should not trigger DecMS-VMI. The grounds to destroy or encrypt data may be
completely valid for privacy reasons. Our current implementation does not support
valid data destruction or encryption from within the VM. A simple solution to support
valid data destruction or encryption is through a manual out-of-band mechanism
whereby the user approaches the system administrator to disable DecMS-VMI for
the speciﬁc user’s VM temporarily. The simple solution, however, is a path for an
attacker to subject the users and system administrators to social engineering whereby
the protection is temporarily disabled for unauthorized data destruction. A better
solution for benign data encryption and destruction is left for future work.
The extra storage requirement of DecMS-VMI is directly related to the frequency
and size of edits made to protected ﬁles. As NilFS behaves similarly to a versioning ﬁle
system, the physical size of a snapshot is only the size of changes made to ﬁles. With
a false positive rate of roughly one in one thousand, an administrator can expect that
a snapshot, containing all changes to all protected ﬁles since the last snapshot, will be
generated for roughly every one thousand saved changes. In practice, the size of these
2

There are exceptions [107] if the attacker wishes to let the defenders know of the destruction
and convey a message.
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snapshots should be much smaller than the total size of all protected directories, and
so the extra storage needed to use DecMS-VMI is comparatively small, depending
heavily on entropy of the writes.
Additional enhancements for storage space that is not explored in this dissertation
is combing NILFS with a full backup, to optimize storage space for the guest VMs under protection. If storage space on the guest OS is full, then the storage is unavailable
until the garbage collector can free storage space by purging old checkpoints. One possible solution is to periodically create a full backup of the entire NILFS storage from
the host OS. All of the snapshots and checkpoints are then cleared, to free up space
on NILFS. If at some point a destructive adversary is discovered, then the full backup
can be referenced to recover ﬁles. Backing up and cleaning the NILFS snapshots frees
up storage for the guest OS and is a trade-o↵ of convenience. If the destruction occurred before the full backup but discovered after clearing the checkpoints/snapshots,
then the system administrator must reference the full backup rather than rollback to
an old checkpoint/snapshot. Future work should explore the beneﬁts of using a full
backup (and clearing snapshots/checkpoints) with DecMS conﬁguration that uses a
log-structured ﬁlesystem.
Our prototype implementation of DecMS-VMI only supports the snapshot or
checkpointing at the ﬁle system level and does not allow for recovery of individual
ﬁles without reverting the entire ﬁle system. While it is suitable for recovering from
devastating wiper malware that attempts to bring a system and data o✏ine quickly,
the current solution does not directly provide methods to repair individual ﬁles. The
system administrator would then need to manually identify what ﬁles should be saved
or reverted before rolling back to an earlier snapshot. One solution is to replace the
log-structured ﬁle system with one that tracks changes at the ﬁle level. The system
administrator may then revert speciﬁc ﬁles to previous versions without rolling back
the entire ﬁle system.
Another limitation of the current prototype of DecMS-VMI is if destruction actions are intermingled with benign writes to the storage medium. In the current

160
implementation of DecMS-VMI, the snapshots roll back to the state before data destruction takes place, undoing benign writes along with destructive writes. It may
be difficult to revert the e↵ects of destructive actions when benign applications are
a↵ected by the destruction. Fortunately, there are existing systems, such as the
Taser Intrusion Recovery System [55] mentioned in Section 2.5.5. Taser resolves the
issue through taint analysis. Taser requires snapshots that are already in place in
DecMS-VMI. However, incorporating that into DecMS-VMI will require additional
engineering e↵ort; to work with a taint analysis system is left for future work.
While the dissertation does not focus on performance, there are several enhancements to explore in future work. Improving throughput should be a priority to help
expand the applicability to other computer systems, such as batch and transaction
systems. The DecMS-VMI prototype also e↵ects the user interface, which may be an
issue if used in practice. It appears that transferring control to the VMM whenever
there is an open or write system call causes the UI to stall. Another future enhancement is to avoid checkpoint/snapshot for destructive writes to small ﬁles. It may be
quicker to copy the ﬁle than to issue a checkpoint for the entire ﬁle system.
Another area of future work, which may improve performance and further isolate
DecMS from potential adversaries, is to place DecMS within hardware components
such as a hardware wrapper around storage devices or placing DecMS within the
hardware controller itself. Future work should examine if it is feasible to improve
performance so that an attacker cannot determine if DecMS is in place without insider
knowledge or access to the physical system.

7.3 Conclusion
The evidence provided by the experimental evaluation conﬁrms the thesis: It is
feasible to use deception to enhance the preservation of digital assets against unauthorized data destruction.
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A ADDITIONAL PERFORMANCE RESULTS
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count
mean
std
min
25%
50%
75%
max

100
5.232
0.507
2.394
5.064
5.152
5.241
7.138

BL O

100
147.440
13.185
132.655
142.710
145.596
147.701
221.694

BL W
100
0.075
0.020
0.064
0.070
0.071
0.072
0.243

BL C
100
152.748
13.204
135.114
148.056
150.820
153.033
226.769

BL S
100
8.960
12.504
3.759
5.698
5.939
6.317
105.405

DMS O
100
170.420
26.278
143.841
155.732
159.301
175.143
291.480

DMS W

DMS S

100
100
0.368 179.748
0.050 29.990
0.268 149.618
0.338 161.909
0.362 165.869
0.389 184.170
0.573 295.797

DMS C

100
7.161
7.464
3.784
5.141
5.275
5.469
52.550

VMI O

Table A.1: DecMS-VMI latency for 32 MiB ﬁles.

100
166.784
26.013
141.972
150.799
157.900
170.403
306.449

VMI W

VMI S
100
100
0.247 174.193
0.061 26.761
0.189 147.617
0.228 156.298
0.242 165.479
0.249 183.494
0.757 310.991

VMI C
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count
mean
std
min
25%
50%
75%
max

100
0.138
0.525
0.075
0.076
0.078
0.082
5.336

BL O
100
0.049
0.013
0.042
0.043
0.043
0.046
0.101

BL W
100
0.042
0.008
0.038
0.038
0.038
0.041
0.085

BL C
100
0.230
0.533
0.157
0.158
0.162
0.169
5.501

BL S
100
0.360
0.142
0.265
0.317
0.334
0.342
1.625

DMS O
100
0.715
1.116
0.387
0.455
0.539
0.606
9.376

DMS W
100
0.330
0.054
0.262
0.302
0.317
0.343
0.738

DMS C
100
1.406
1.150
0.989
1.135
1.207
1.278
10.402

DMS S

100
0.286
0.420
0.184
0.199
0.219
0.249
4.311

VMI O

Table A.2: DecMS-VMI latency for 4 KiB ﬁles.
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0.192
0.043
0.147
0.162
0.176
0.201
0.379

VMI W

100
0.193
0.059
0.144
0.156
0.170
0.207
0.576

VMI C

100
0.672
0.455
0.497
0.527
0.552
0.655
4.824

VMI S
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